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Chapter 1
Introduction

iNTRO DU CTiO N
1.1 Social cleavages and political divisions
1.1.1 Class and religious conflic t in Western democracies
Understanding the relationship between society and politics is elemental to 
political sociology. Its aim is “to map variations in the relationship between social 
structures, politica l orientations, and politica l action, and to explain the patterns 
that arise" (Svallfors 2007: 1). The patterns of political alignment that proceed 
from structural divisions in societies are often referred to as social cleavages, and 
suppose to identify enduring conflicts within the electorate (Manza and Brooks 
1999). The link between social cleavages and political conflict may reveal itself in 
political action of various kinds by various actors. In democratic societies elections 
are an important mechanism for the expression of conflict between groups in 
society. Therefore the relationship between the social position of individuals and 
their voting behavior has received ample attention of political sociologists. In this 
thesis we study two traditional social divisions in the electorates of Western 
democracies: social class and religion. The central aim is to investigate 
cross-national and over-time variation in class and religious voting. We combine 
comparative analyses of 15 modern democracies in Western Europe, Australia 
and the United States since the 1960s, with detailed analyses of cleavage voting 
trends in the Netherlands since the 1970s.
Social cleavage research can largely be traced back to the junction of two 
sociological traditions on conflict in societies. One the one hand, there is the 
class-based tradition of power and politics that originated from Marxist theory on 
societal development. And second, W eber’s distinction between social class and 
status (Zuckerman 1975; Manza and Brooks 1999; Dalton 2008). In the Marxist 
sense of the word ‘classes’ are demarcated on the basis of the relation to the 
means of production. Based on their relation to property Marx’ class-centered 
model of history distinguishes between three fundamental classes in capitalist 
societies; capitalists who own the means of production and hire workers, workers 
who sell their labor, and petty bourgeoisie who own and use the means of 
production w ithout hiring others (Knutsen 2007). The dominant classes seek to 
maintain the control over the means of production because of the political power 
associated with that control. Marx was therefore primarily interested in the 
emergence of a shared sense of class interests among the underprivileged 
working class to provide a basis for conflict with the ruling class (Knutsen 2007).
Weber has built on the Marxian legacy by expanding the potential lines of 
conflict in society beyond the capital/labor divide (Zuckerman 1975; Manza and
17
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Brooks 1999). W eber’s theory is primarily concerned with life chances, access to 
scares goods and services (Pakulski and Waters 1996). Inequality is not simply 
associated with production, but also with social esteem and social closure. 
Economically defined ‘classes’ are distinguished from broader ‘status groups’, 
which are not reducible to economic relations alone (Chan and Goldthorpe 2007). 
Status groups are differentiated by prestige rankings and consumption patterns. 
According to Weber the degree of openness or closure of social groups can be 
determined on the basis of occupational mobility, educational access and the 
frequency of inter group marriages. Because the Weberian approach reaches 
beyond the conflict over the means of production it considers the class cleavage 
not to be the primary source for political conflict in a society, but rather as one 
among the many sources of conflict (Knutsen 2007). In W eber’s theory there is 
great emphasis on religious prestige, and the division in social chances and 
access to political power between dominant and subordinate religious groups. 
But, implicitly the Weberian approach suggests that there exists an unlimited 
number of potential cleavage bases (Zuckerman 1975). The notion that political 
conflict is related to a limited number of ‘structural’ cleavages, of which class and 
religious divisions are the most important, can be found in Lipset and Rokkan’s 
(1967) influential book Party Systems and Voter Alignments. In their famous 
introductory chapter Lipset and Rokkan laid the groundwork for our current 
understanding of the social-structural bases of politics. They specified a pattern 
of historical interaction in Europe between cleavages lines and the political 
behavior of parties and the electorate (Zuckerman 1975).
According to Lipset and Rokkan the class cleavage is rooted in the Industrial 
Revolution, and is primarily concerned with the conflict between employers (owners) 
versus laborers (workers). The centrality of social class in political sociology is 
understandable given the fact that it is more uniformly decisive than the other major 
cleavages in the Lipset-Rokkan model (i.e. center/periphery, church/state, rural/ 
urban). As industrialization progressed workers increasingly railed against their low 
wages, poor working conditions and the insecurity of their contracts. To defend 
their interest labor unions and socialist parties emerged at the dawn of democracy 
in Western Europe. Because class divisions in the labor market were relatively 
uniform across nations, they moved the development of party systems in a common 
direction (Knutsen 2007). Other cleavage lines, such as religious divisions, were 
often interwoven with nation-specific conflicts shaping dissimilar party structures 
across countries. The variety of religious-based parties, in terms of their presence, 
strength and affiliation, is therefore far greater than of socialist parties.
18
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The religious cleavage in Western Europe is more complex than the class 
cleavage. According to Lipset and Rokkan the religious divisions in politics 
originated from the interplay between the Reformation and Counter-Reformation 
(16th-17th century) and the national state-building revolutions (1789 and after) 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; 37-41). The consequences of the Reformation were 
therefore not only religious, but also political in nature because the religious 
cleavages frequently interacted with the nation-building process (Knutsen 2004: 
98). In Northwest Europe, Britain and in Scandinavia Protestants were often allied 
to rising nationalist forces. In Southern and Central Europe, the Counter-Reforma­
tion strengthened the position of the Catholic Church and perpetuated its 
relationship with the old regimes. And the territories of The Netherlands, Germany 
and Switzerland were cross-but by the religious frontiers of Europe (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967: 37-41). The division between Catholics and Protestants, created by 
the Reformation and Counter Reformation therefore not only appears between 
people but also between nations. Once the new cleavage structures were settled, 
the French Revolution of 1789 was the catalyst for new religious conflicts across 
Europe. The secular and liberal movements, which emerged as the offspring of 
the French Revolution, forced both Catholics and Protestant to defend the 
privileges of the church in conflicts over the disestablishment of state religion, the 
introduction of religious freedom and the control of mass education (Knutsen 
2004; 98; Lipset and Rokkan 1976).
The influence of social class on political divisions may be more universal in 
nature, but religious divisions are often considered to be more important. Early 
comparative studies emphasized the strength of religion as a determ inant of 
political party choice. Rose and U rw in’s early examination in 1969 of sixteen 
Western democracies led them conclude that “religious divisions, not class, are 
the main social basis o f parties in the Western world today" (Rose and Urwin 1969: 
12). And studying cleavage politics in four multi-cleavage countries Lijphart 
reached the same conclusion. He stated: ‘social class is clearly no more than a 
secondary and subsidiary influence o f party choice, and it can become a factor of 
importance only in the absence o f potent rivals such as religion and language'' 
(Lijphart 1979: 53).
Conflict along other cleavage lines sometimes interferes with the class 
cleavage in the labor market. This taps into the distinction between ‘horizontal’ 
cleavages that are related to economic and social divisions (e.g. occupation, 
income, and education) and ‘vertica l’ cleavages (e.g. religion, language, and 
ethnicity) that divide societies along cultural criteria (Dogan 2004). By studying
19
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social class and religion we capture the most potent distinctions of the two types 
of cleavages. The class cleavage is related to nearly all material concerns of 
voters in modern democracies, e.g. improvement of living standards, maintaining 
economic security, the distribution of economic rewards, income taxation, 
unemployment and inflation. Religion, on the other hand is related to a wide range 
of cultural issues; abortion, euthanasia, homosexual rights and other morality 
policies (Dalton 2008).
1.1.2 Class and Religious Voting
For a long time within political sociology, the relevance of social cleavages on 
voting remained uncontested. During the first half of the twentieth century scholars 
commonly assumed that there was a strong relationship between social group 
membership en party choices, especially in Western Europe. Political parties 
were considered to be the representatives of specific interest groups and members 
of these groups were expected to support political parties out of group interest. 
The working class is historically represented by political parties on the left, by 
socialists, communists and social-democrats. Politically, the conflict over the 
means of production is translated into a ‘democratic class struggle’ (Lipset 1960; 
Korpi 1983; Nieuwbeerta 1995) in which the working class, as opposed to 
members from other classes, supports parties that advocate the redistribution of 
wealth and strive for welfare state expansion. The bourgeoisie on the other hand, 
the self-employed and the owners of capital, support parties that reject government 
intervention and advocate a free-market based economy. Hence, traditional class 
voting predicts that while the working class is voting left-wing, the non-working 
class supports the right.
The association between religious groups and political parties is less clear-cut 
because of the diversity of religion within and between nations. Generally however, 
when scholars investigate the influence of religion on political alignment they 
assume that the voting behavior of ‘religious’ voters, whether in affiliation, 
comm itment or belief, is substantially different from ‘secular’ voters because of 
their non-material interests. Historically, religious voters supported parties that 
defended their religious freedom in conflicts over the disestablishment of state 
religion and the secular versus religious control of mass education. Later, the 
conflict between religious and secular voters also involves other non-material 
interests. Religious voters, as opposed to secular voters, support parties that 
reject liberal political ideals about abortion, euthanasia or homosexual rights. The 
religion-vote association can be found under many different names and labels in
20
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the literature, e.g.: denominational voting, religiosity voting, confessional voting or 
Christian voting. In this study we will use the most general term ‘religious voting ’ 
to refer to all research investigating the influence of religion on party choice.
The archetypical perception of the relationship between social cleavages and 
party choice is subject to change. From the second half of the twentieth century 
most democratic societies transformed from industrial economies to advanced- 
or post industrial economies. Due to the decline of traditional industrial economies 
in Western countries the classical Marxist conflict over the means of production 
becomes increasingly unrelated to disagreement among voters. In recent decades 
something close to a ‘new conventional w isdom ’ (Franklin 1992, Dogan 1995, 
Lane and Errson 1997, Dalton 2002; Elff 2007) emerged dictating the decline of 
social class a basis for party support in modern democracies. Clark and Lipset
(2001) argue that class voting has declined in all Western-democracies for which 
data are available between the 1940s and 1980s (see also, Lipset 1960 1983). 
Based the first large-scale comparison of class voting using log-odds ratio ’s 
Nieuwbeerta (1995: 195) concludes that ‘in many of the countries substantial 
declines in the levels o f relative class voting occurred in the postwar period'. 
N ieuwbeerta found that the decrease in class voting was the largest in countries 
where the class-vote relationship had traditionally been high. Pakulski and Waters
(1996), even proclaiming the ‘death of class’, write that ‘since the peak o f class 
effects during the middle o f the twentieth century, the significance o f class as a 
basis for political identification and behavior and as a force for change has been 
declining’ (1996: 132).
This new consensus is sometimes also assumed with respect to the relevance 
of other traditional social divisions in politics, such as religion. Franklin et al. 
(1992) have assessed the influence of various attitudinal and social structural 
variables on voting in a series of sixteen country-specific analyses. They 
concluded that there was a widespread reduction of in the explanatory power of 
class and religion, on left-wing voting. Dogan (1995) reports that both class voting 
and religious voting have eroded in Western Europe (1992: 338). Similarly, Dalton
(2002) writes that “there has been an erosion in the ability o f social cleavages (and 
the social characteristics derived from these cleavages) to explain electoral 
choice. The weakening o f class and religious alignments has been accompanied  
by an apparent erosion o f long-term partisan commitment and enduring feelings 
of party identification" (2002: 338).
Despite this prevalent view cleavage voting remains one of the most debated 
topics in political sociology. As we will discuss later, some recent studies have
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challenged the claims about the long-term, universal and unidirectional weakening 
of social cleavages on voting. In the next paragraph we will discuss the literature 
on class voting and religious voting studies over the last decades. We will focus 
on the differences and sim ilarities in the two fields with respect to their theoretical 
and empirical evolution.
1.2 Cleavage voting research
1.2.1 Three generations of class voting research
The association between social class position and left-wing voting is certainly 
one of the most w idely studied relationships in cleavage voting research. Long 
before the introduction of modern election surveys around the 1960s scholars 
sought to investigate the relationship between social stratification and voting 
behavior. These early studies often relied on ecological inferences, i.e.: drawing 
conclusions about voters on the basis of aggregate information (Tingsten 1937). 
The introduction of election surveys signals the starting point of a gradual 
development process in class voting research. Over time there has been an 
evolution in four domains of the class voting literature: (1) formulation of research 
problems, (2) the content of the major hypotheses, (3) measurement procedures 
and (4) methods of data analysis. On the basis of these criteria Nieuwbeerta 
(1995) divided the history of this research area into three generations (cf. 
Nieuwbeerta 1995, Chapter 1: 3-15; and the summary by Knutsen 2007).
The first generation of class voting research was conducted after the Second 
World War during the 1950s and 1960s. This generation gave attention to a broad 
range of research problems concerning the class-vote relationship. Research 
often relied on limited number of datasets and examined cross-tabulations of 
dichotomous (manual/non-manual) class measurements and vote choice. The 
Alford-index was a commonly used measure for the strength of the class-vote 
relationship (Alford 1963). Other illustrative examples for this generation of class 
voting research are the studies of Lenski (1970), Lipset (1983) and Korpi (1983). 
Explanations for variation in class voting were sought in social and political char­
acteristics of countries (see for example: Lipset and Bendix 1959; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967).
In the late 1960s the second generation of class voting research replaced the 
simple analyses of cross-tabulations with more sophisticated analysis techniques. 
This generation is characterized by more detailed class schemas and the use of
22
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linear regression. Researches primarily examined long-term trends in single 
countries and differences between countries in single periods (e.g. Franklin et al. 
1992). Hypotheses were mainly concerned with value-orientations explaining 
variations in class voting (Inglehart 1977, 1990).
The third generation started in the mid-1980s. Scholars of this generation 
often deduced hypotheses from macro-m icro-macro theory that concerned 
compositional explanations and class mobility explanations. Instead of linear 
regression techniques these studies employed logistic models to study interna­
tionally standardized class schemas, e.g. the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero 
(EGP) class schema. Researchers of this generation argued that absolute class 
voting measures based on percentages differences, such as the Alford-index, 
were sensitive to the marginal distributions and preferred the use of log-odds 
ratios instead (Heath et al. 1985). Until the mid-1990s third generation researchers 
had only studied class voting trends in single countries.
At that time Nieuwbeerta published his study the third generation had yet to 
live up to the expectations. He characterized the precision of hypotheses and 
empirical tests of his generation as ‘promising, but (...) s till in its infancy  
(Nieuwbeerta 1995: 4). Nieuwbeerta (1995) positioned his study as the next step 
in the third generation of class voting research. To describe and explain 
cross-national and over tim e variations in class voting he constructed an 
innovatively large-scale dataset containing 113 surveys from 16 countries over 
the period 1956-1990. Using multi-level models he systematically assessed the 
effects of social and political characteristics of countries on the levels of class 
voting. N ieuwbeerta’s work was concerned with describing and explaining 
variation in the effect of class (manual/non-manual vs. EGP) on left-wing voting 
and in the effect of class mobilization on left-wing voting. Another im portant step 
in fulfilling the expectation for third generation was presented by Evans (1999) in 
‘The End of Class Politics?' and by the authors who contributed to this edited 
volume. In a combination of large-scale pooled analyses and successive coun­
try-specific chapters this international group of scholars offered a state of the art 
investigation of class voting in comparative perspective.
During the third generation Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) introduced a new 
measure to provide “a uniform metric for comparative and historical analyses 
based on suitable class and voting typologies" (1995: 814). This ‘kappa index’ is 
an aggregate measure of class voting strength, calculated using the standard 
deviation of the log-odds or predicted probabilities of all possible combinations 
of class categories and party outcomes. The kappa index allowed researchers to
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consider more differentiated party measures than previous generations (e.g. Hout 
et al. 1995; Brooks et al. 2006). Knutsen (2006) has exploited this measure 
thoroughly in study of class voting in Western Europe which enabled him to test a 
large set of macro-level explanations for changes in, and the comparative strength 
of class voting using a more differentiated dependent variable than Nieuwbeerta 
(1995). Others (e.g. Pakulski and Waters 1996; Clark 2001; Houtman 2003) have 
criticized the kappa-index for two of its properties: First, as a summary measure 
the kappa index does not specify relationships, or directions thereof, between 
particular classes and parties. It is therefore not able to detect all changes in 
class voting. Second, all classes, regardless of their size contribute equally in 
calculating the average class voting effect (Knutsen 2006: 53). The third generation 
of class voting research also further explored the micro level explanations for 
variation in class voting. Some recent work has elaborated on first and second 
generation theories (Lipset 1959; Parkin 1968; Inglehart 1977;1990) on working 
class authoritarianism, middle class radicalism and value orientations by 
employing the methods of data collection, class measures and logistic/multi level 
models of third generation class voting research (e.g. Achterberg and Houtman 
2006; Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman 2007).
1.2.2 A fourth generation of class voting research
Recently, a new generation of class voting research is evolving. Knutsen (2007) 
already announced the emergence of a new generation of class voting, but he 
ended his announcement w ith a question mark (2007: 460). Instead of signaling 
recent developments in class voting research, he -  in line with his aforementioned 
large-scale comparison (Knutsen 2006) - primarily calls upon researchers to 
reconsider the dependent variable in class voting. We however argue that also 
the research problems and major hypotheses are shifting, and that the 
measurement procedures and analyses strategies are becoming more 
sophisticated. Below we will sketch the contours of what is becoming the fourth 
generation in class voting research.
Research problems: To begin with, there has been quite a debate about the 
decline of class voting in modern democracies. The study of Nieuwbeerta (1995) 
for the most part ended this debate. Many contemporary researchers are not 
concerned anymore with arguments about whether class voting has declined are 
or not. The current research problem is much more why the class basis of voting 
is declining (Evans 1999b: 6).
Major hypotheses: A lthough three generations of class voting researchers
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have proposed many hypotheses on explanations for variation (over time and 
across countries) in the class-vote relationship only few have systematically tried 
to test these explanations (see Nieuwbeerta 1995, Chapter 4; Nieuwbeerta and 
Ultee 1999; Knutsen 2006). If these studies are the forerunners of a new generation 
of class voting research we may expect to see a stronger focus on factors 
interpreting patterns of class-alignment. The most common hypotheses for 
dealignment in the class voting literature generally fit two main categories. The 
first category of hypotheses is concerned with sociological factors related to 
changes in the size and composition of classes and the relative importance of 
class versus other cleavage lines. The second set of hypotheses use political 
factors that are related to party programs and the class basis of electoral appeals 
that parties make (Evans 2000; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Knutsen 2006). The 
latter category assumes that patterns in class voting reflect the outcomes of party 
behavior rather than changes in social structure. In section 1.3 we elaborate on 
the content of the major hypotheses fitting the two categories. Here we will discuss 
the increasing concern of third and currently upcoming fourth generation of class 
voting studies for hypotheses on political change.
Although previous generations of research tested hypotheses about the 
impact of political influences on the class-vote relationship, stringent tests of 
whether political factors influenced class voting remained largely underdeveloped. 
Since the late 1990s/ early 2000s there is an increasing concern for the extent to 
which political parties and changes in the party system have any autonomous 
effect on class voting. The third generation of class voting research was criticized 
for largely neglecting political factors. In reaction to Evans (1999) and his 
colleagues, Mair advised that in explaining variation in class voting “You need to 
look at politics as such: you need to look at the cleavage structure and how that 
changes: you need to look at the parties themselves -  or blocks of parties -  and 
how they interact (...) [Y]ou need to look at what competitors do; and you need to 
look at the institutional context in which this competition takes place. A ll these 
factors help to explain why social structure translates into politics differently from 
one country to another" (Mair 1999: 311). The implication of this approach is that 
in studying class voting scholars should combine the theories and methods of 
social stratification studies with those from political science. In some of the third 
generation studies researchers relied on the observation of discontinuity in the 
strength of class voting effects to infer a political influence. The studies of Evans, 
Heath and Payne (1991) and De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) for example 
contain hypothesis about marked discontinuities between different elections that
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are consistent with party shifts instead of social change. The measurement of 
actual party positions, as is done in the studies of Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), 
Oskarson (2005), Achterberg (2006) and Elff (2009) is a quite recent novelty to 
the field of class voting research.
Measures: The first generation of class voting used a traditional two-class 
schema dividing manual workers from all other classes. In the second generation 
more detailed class measures were used, but different studies often relied on 
different classifications. The third generation typically employed standardized 
m ulti-category class measures suitable for over time and cross-national 
comparisons (Nieuwbeerta 1995). The EGP class schema, originally developed 
with respect to social mobility studies, nowadays is the most influential operation­
alization of social class in European sociology (Knutsen 2007). Like other 
established class schemas the EGP schema was constructed for countries with 
employment structures dominated by industrial occupations, often called the 
manufacturing sector. The employment structures of modern democracies are 
evolving from industrial to post-industrial. The new generation of stratification 
researchers have adjusted the EGP class schema to account for this transformation 
by distinguishing between separate classes within the expanding service class 
(Van de W erfhorst and De Graaf 2004; Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2007a). 
Typically, these studies differentiate between a ‘new’ class of social and cultural 
specialists and an ‘o ld ’ class of technocrats. Güveli et al. (2007a) for example find 
that the adjusted EGP class schema explains people’s political orientation 
substantially better than the standard EGP class schema. They conclude that the 
‘new’ classes of social and cultural specialists vote significantly more for leftist 
parties and differ substantially in their political orientation from the ‘o ld ’ classes of 
technocrats.
In proposing a new generation of class voting research Knutsen (2007) notes 
that the three previous generation of class voting all relied on a dichotomous 
party choice variable that grouped parties of the left into one category and all 
other parties into the other category. He argues that also this division can be 
questioned in advanced industrial societies. Knutsen emphasizes that new-left 
parties receive stronger support from the higher educated and the new middle 
class relative to the less educated and manual workers. Moving beyond ‘trad itional’ 
(left/right) class voting, Knutsen proposes that a new generation of research 
should consider all parties as separate categories.
Methods o f data analysis: Next to the shift in research problems, hypotheses, 
and measurement procedures, there is also promising innovation with respect to
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the methods and analysis techniques. The third generation primarily relied on 
logistic models of class voting. In doing so, many comparative studies on class 
voting use a generic categorization of parties or party families (often ‘ le ft’ versus 
‘non-le ft’) regardless of the fact that parties change their positions on policies or 
that different parties within the same ‘party fam ily ’ are perhaps sim ilar but often 
far from equal. This raises a problem for comparative analyses of class voting, 
whether over time or space, as the extent to which leftist parties advocate redis­
tributionist policies and non-leftist parties oppose them is - falsely - assumed to 
be fixed. Researchers who realized this began to examine whether variation in 
class voting was related to the difference in the redistributive policy choices 
offered to voters. In the first studies that attempted to account for the ‘top-dow n’ 
direction in which class and vote are associated, researcher ‘eye-balled’ the 
extent to which the patterns of party change were related to class voting (Evans 
et al. 1999). The second step was to calculate the correlation between party 
polarization and the levels of class voting (Oskarson 2005; Knutsen 2006). In the 
meanwhile, studies on electoral behavior borrowed ‘discrete choice m odels’ from 
consumer behavior economics (McFadden 1974; Alvarez and Nagler 1998). 
Applied to electoral research discrete-choice models express the probability that 
an individual voter chooses a specific alternative as function only of its attributes, 
w ithout the need to take into account the names or identities of the specific 
alternatives. Elff (2009) recognized the applicability of McFadden’s conditional 
logit model in analyzing social divisions and party choice. His study confirmed 
that the decline in the relation between social divisions and voting behavior is 
attributable to parties’ changing political positions. Once these changes are 
taken into account, Elff argues, the impact of social class and religion on voting 
behavior persists. A lthough conditional logit models have repeatedly been used 
in electoral research, E lff’s study (2009) is to our knowledge the first to apply this 
model to address changes in cleavage voting.
W hether or not the recent developments in class voting truly constitute the 
emergence of a new research generation remains debatable. Some of the 
proposed innovations are subject to controversies, for example, the question 
whether changes in the occupational structure warrant the adjustment of 
established class schemas. Differences within the service class are in part 
associated with the expansion of the welfare state and the growth of public sector 
employment. And the split between those who work in the private sector and 
those who in the public sector is sometimes seen as one of the ‘new’ political 
divisions cross-cutting the class cleavage (Dunleavy 1980). Other developments,
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such as the inclusion of party positions and the use of discrete choice models, 
are promising but are also still in stages of infancy. We thus draw the same 
conclusion as Nieuwbeerta (1995) did when identifying the first three generations 
of class voting research: Different generations of class voting research are not 
truly separated in time. There is a slow diffusion of innovation in political sociology 
leading to gradual scientific change, not to immediate change of practice. The 
third generation has matured as a result of the studies like those by Nieuwbeerta 
(1995), Evans (1999) and Knutsen (2006). And at the same time, these and other 
studies have paved the way for yet a new precision of research problems, 
hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collections and analysis techniques. 
In table 1.1 we summarize the main developments in class voting research. The 
summary of the first three generations are taken from Nieuwbeerta (1995: 20). 
The potential characteristics of the fourth generation are added on the basis of 
the overview above.
1.2.3 Religious voting research
Although religious voting research resembles class voting research in the sense 
that they both explore trends and country differences thereof in social structural 
divisions on party choice, the two research lines are rooted in different traditions. 
The generations in class voting research are anchored in the history of comparative 
research on social stratification (Ultee 1989; Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee 
1991). The introduction of new class measures and the shift to logistic modeling 
in this school of research not only moved stratification research from the second 
generation to the third, but also marked the emerge of the third generation in 
class voting research. Contrary, the history of religious voting research is not 
directly linked to developments in the social stratification literature, but much to 
debates about secularization in the sociology of religion. In some studies religion 
is used as a control for class voting (e.g. Alford 1963; Kelly and Evans 1995), but 
electoral studies solely investigating religion are much rarer. The body of literature 
on religion and voting behavior is not only smaller than the class voting literature, 
its history is also less well documented. Exceptions are the very useful reviews 
made by Manza and Wright (2003) and Esmer and Pettersson (2007). Below we 
will discuss the literature on religion and voting by the same criteria that are used 
to identify different generations in social stratification and class voting studies; (1) 
formulation of research problems, (2) the content of the major hypotheses, (3) 
measurement procedures and (4) data collection and methods of analysis. With 
respect to data collection and analytic strategies the developments in religious
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Table 1.1 Characteristics of studies explaining varia tions in class voting
First generation 
(...-1970s)
Second generation 
(1960s-...)
Third generation 
(1980-...)
Fourth generation 
(late 1990s-...)
Question Does country A, that has a 
higher level of class voting 
than country B, have a 
higher or lower score on 
country characteristic than 
country B
Is there a bivariate 
correlation between 
country characteristics and 
countries levels of class 
voting?
To what extent can 
differences across 
countries and changes 
within countries in class 
voting be explained by 
variation in these countries’ 
(1) social and political 
characteristics, (2) class 
composition, (3) mobility 
patterns, (4) Value 
orientations
To what extent can the 
decline in class voting 
be explained by social 
changes and changes in 
political choices?
Explanatory hypotheses Social and political 
characteristics of countries 
Social mobility
Value orientations Social and political 
characteristics, class 
composition, mobility 
patterns, value orientations
Social changes (class 
composition, mobility, 
and relevance of other 
cleavages) and Political 
changes (Party positions 
and polarization)
Class measures Manual/Non-manual class Manual/Non-manual 
class, more detailed class 
schemas
Standardized, detailed 
class schemas (EGP)
Standardized, detailed 
class schemas (EGP) and 
revised 'postindustrial' 
class schemas
Techniques Comparing cross­
tabulations
Comparing cross­
tabulations, linear 
regression
Logistic regression, log- 
odds ratios
Binary, multinomial 
and conditional logistic 
regression
Data Small number of countries 
and years
More countries and years More countries and years More countries and years
ro
CD Table based upon Nieuwbeerta (1995: 20), fourth generation is own addition.
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voting research are sim ilar to those in class voting research. We will, however, 
show that the boundaries between different generations in religious voting studies 
are generally less clear-cut.
Research problems: In contrast to class voting, religious voting research is 
characterized by a broader range of research problems concerning the relationship 
between religion and voting. Esmer and Pettersson (2007) argue that studies of 
religion and voting behavior generally fit two categories, i.e.: studies that compare 
the voting behavior of different denominational groups and studies that correlate 
levels of religiosity with voting behavior. In this categorization religiosity relates to 
both belief and practice. A lthough the latter is commonly operationalized as 
church attendance, the former may relate to a wider range of indicators of faith 
such as one’s belief in God or Biblical literalism. Manza and Wright (2003: 
299-300) even distinguish four categories of religion-vote relationships that are 
found in the literature: (a) church attendance; (b) denominational groups; (c) 
doctrinal beliefs and (d) local/contextual aspects of congregational memberships 
(e.g. the impact of individual churches or church leaders). ‘Generational’ 
differences between studies conducted in the 1960s versus later research do not 
play a substantive role in the formulation of research problems concerning 
different types of religious cleavages. Most studies investigate either 
denominational differences or religiosity, sometimes using one as a control for 
the other. S im ultaneous investigations of various types of religious cleavages are 
rarer, but are found across many decades of research (Lijphart 1979; Bean 1999; 
Kolter-Berkowitz 2001; Raymond 2010). In the US, though, scholars ‘rediscovered’ 
the role of religion in politics in the 1990s by focusing on differences between 
religious affiliation, comm itment and belief (Leege and Kellstedt 1993; Layman 
1998). This development matched debates in the sociology of religion about 
belonging, behaving and believing (Davie 1994; Voas and Crockett 2005; Aarts, 
Need, Te Grotenhuis and De Graaf 2008). Generally, the main research question 
in analyzing religion and party choice is not whether a relationship exists or not, 
but rather if, and to what extent this relationship is declining (Esmer and Pettersson 
2007).
Major hypotheses: Comparative studies - both over time and space - on 
religious voting have been dominated by theories and hypotheses of secularization. 
Secularization, Manza and Wright (2003) argue, involves that the importance of 
religion in the lives of individuals is declining, that the social and political influence 
of religious organizations is declining and/or that the engagement in political life 
by religious organizations is declining (2003; 300-301). These secularization
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processes often lay at the core of hypotheses predicting religious dealignment 
(Broughton and ten Napel 2000; De Graaf et al. 2001; Knutsen 2004, Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). Norris and Inglehart (2004) postulate that: “In recent decades 
(...) as secularization has progressively weakened religious identities in advanced 
industrial societies, we would expect to find that the political impact of 
denominational differences would also play less o f a role in party and electoral 
politics". Investigating survey data from a wide range of industrial and postindustrial 
countries, they conclude that: The pattern documented (...) at both the individual 
and macro-level is broadly consistent with these expectations’ (2004: 211-212). 
On the one hand, secularization hypotheses suggest a decline in the religion-vote 
relationship as a result of rising levels of education and affluence causing voters 
to become less reliant on ‘simple religious heuristics to govern all aspects o f their 
lives, including how they vote' (Manza and Wright 2003: 301). On the other hand, 
declining levels of church attendance are assumed to weaken the capacity of 
churches to influence the voting behavior of their members. Yet, changes in the 
religious structures and secularization processes do not necessarily produce a 
decline religion-vote relationship. Manza and Wright (2003; 313) note that while 
church membership or church attendance may decline, levels of religious voting 
can remain stable among those who remain in church. In this sense, the analogy 
to the third generation class voting hypotheses about social mobility is found 
hypotheses about changing or leaving church. Need (1997) explicitly draws this 
comparison by not only looking at inter- and intragenerational class mobility but 
also at religious mobility in the Netherlands. She finds that those who leave the 
church are more likely to vote for a religious party than second generation 
non-church members.
Secularization theory is not undisputed in the sociology of religion. Most 
criticized is the assumption that secularization is a universal process and a 
one-way road. Secularization theory assumes that religious involvement weakens 
following a decrease in religious demand. Especially the United States are a 
problematic case for secularization theorists because both religious membership 
and church attendance are found to be high despite relatively high levels of 
affluence. Opposing, so-called ‘supply-side’, theory has argued that religious 
demand is stable over time and countries, but that the level of religious participation 
may vary depending on the level of religious pluralism (cf. Stark and Iannaccone 
1994). In religious diverse ‘m arkets’ the suppliers of religion, denominations and 
sects, are in mutual competition to attract members. In the United States, unlike 
in Europe, “the absence of a state church has resulted in the flourishing o f an
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unprecedented range o f denominations and sects" (Manza and Wright: 302). 
Supply-side theory assumes that religious diversity results in high levels of 
religious involvement. However, empirical tests show little evidence to support 
supply-side theory: in most western societies, churches continue to lose member 
(Aarts 2010).
Despite the recent critique of religious market theory on secularization in the 
field of sociology of religion, religious voting studies are often almost entirely 
focused on demand-side arguments predicting secularization (Jagodzinski and 
Dobbelaere 1995; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Yet, the evidence for the decline of 
religious voting is, also in Europe, far from close to scholarly consensus. Knusten 
(2004) finds that there is no uniform or clear decline in the relationship between 
religious denomination and party choice in Western Europe. For some specific 
periods the average correlation even increases, and although he finds long-term 
decreases in some countries, Knutsen deems the size of such decline to be small. 
Also Elff (2007, 2009) reject the notion of a universal decline in religious voting: 
“Reports o f the death of social cleavages are exaggerated. While the consequences 
of class positions seem to have weakened in some o f the countries, the 
consequences o f the division between religious and secular people have not" 
(2007: 289). Hypotheses on election-specific fluctuations and reversals in religious 
voting trends, attributed to the mobilizing effort of particular religious organizations, 
are mostly found in studies on American politics (Manza and Brooks 1997; Manza 
and Wright 2003). The religious pluralism of the US also led to the formulation of 
more group-specific hypotheses, like the ‘Catholic Dealignment Thesis’ and the 
‘Liberal/Mainline Protestant Dealignment Thesis’ (Manza and Brooks 1997). In 
section 1.3 we will discuss the content of these hypotheses in more detail, and 
compare them to the major hypotheses in the class voting literature.
Measures: The fact that religion can be broken down into various aspects not 
only caused diversity in research questions and theoretical approaches, but also 
brought about a wide selection of categorizations and measures of religious 
membership, behavior and belief. Wald and Wilcox (2006) emphasize the 
complexity of measuring religion in political science by establishing that the 
American National Election Study in 2004 had 135 categories of religious 
affiliation, including 18 for Baptists alone. The diversity of the religious structure in 
the US is in sharp contrast to the Protestant state churches in the Nordic countries 
or the dominance of the Catholic Church in Southern Europe. C lassifications of 
church membership may therefore strongly vary between studies from different 
countries. There are also large inconsistencies in the way church attendance is
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measured across studies. Church attendance is often used to measure attachment 
to the church. A lot of cleavage voting studies use a dichotomous measure of 
‘regular church attendance’, but rely on different classification of what counts as 
‘regular’ (e.g. weekly, once a month, or twice a month). Church attendance is 
even more complex because the frequency or religious services may vary between 
denominations (Wald and W ilcox 2006). The frequency of attendance that is 
associated with strong religious attachment may thus differ from one faith to the 
other. More sophisticated, i.e. multicategorical or ordinal, measures are sometimes 
used instead of binary variables. Affiliation and church attendance are indicators 
for respectively religious belonging and behaving. As a third aspect of religion, 
the measurement of religious beliefs is heavily debated in the sociology of religion, 
but it is far less central in studying the religious cleavage in politics.
Methods of data analysis : Already in early 20th century the relationship between 
religion and voting behavior was subject to scholarly attention. Like class voting, 
early studies on religion in politics were primarily based on aggregated data of 
single countries or single elections. In 1904 Blank, for example, published an 
ecological analysis the electoral support for the German Social Democratic Party 
(SDP) that aimed to reveal the intervening role of religion in class politics. A similar 
analysis in the Netherlands was conducted by Den Uyl (1951) who investigated 
the association between denomination and party choice in the Dutch 1948 
elections. The advent of election surveys marked the starting point of systematic 
empirical research on religious voting. The study of De Jong (1954) is probably 
the first (cf. Lijphart 1979) cross-national survey-based analysis of voting behavior. 
Investigating a series of cross-tabulations De Jong concludes that “across 
Western Europe there is at least a certain association between religion and political 
choice" (1956: 125). In seeking explanations for differences between countries in 
this association he suggests both individual level (church attendance, religious 
belief) and contextual level (state churches, Catholic hegemony) explanations. 
De Jong therefore not only pioneered in empirical descriptions of religious voting 
in cross-national perspective, but also in addressing explanatory questions.
Class voting research has moved away from the examination of cross­
tabulations a long time ago. In religious voting research there are great differences 
in methods employed to analyze the influence of religious cleavages on voting. 
Cross-tabulations were common in the 1950s and 1960s (De Jong 1954; Scoble 
and Epstein 1964), but are still employed in some very recent studies (Minkenberg 
2010). Also in studying trends recent, prominent comparative studies have 
analyzed religious differences in voting on the basis of percentage differences
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and bivariate correlation coefficients (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Knutsen 2004). 
Via researchers in Britain (Heath et al. 1985, 1991, 1995) logistic regression 
models and odds ratios found their way from class voting studies to religious 
voting studies in the 1990s (Ultee, Arts and Flap 1992; Manza and Brooks 1997; 
Need 1997). Religious voting research is therefore increasingly connected to the 
third and coming fourth generation of class voting studies (Need 1997; Bean 
1999; De Graaf et al. 2001; Oskarson 2005; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2009).
1.3. Two perspectives on cleavage voting
In this section we will further discuss the most common hypotheses raised in the 
literature explaining variation in class and religious voting. We will show that the 
same logic is applied in formulating explanations about the decline in religious 
voting as to explaining the decline in class voting, albeit sometimes under the 
guise of different names and labels. With respect to class voting various, more or 
less equivalent, categorizations of explanations can be found across the literature 
(see: Manza et al. 1995; Goldthorpe 1996; Evans 1999; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 
1999; Knutsen 2006). Most of these summaries are mainly concerned with 
explanations in which social changes are the primary source for changes in class 
voting. But next to hypotheses about changes in the attributes, attitudes and 
aptitudes of voters, the class voting literature contains explanations with respect 
to the characteristics of voting, i.e. hypotheses about party strategy, electoral 
appeal and the choices offered to voters (Manza et al. 1995: 146). This distinction 
is most explicitly made by Evans (2000) and Evans and Whitefield (2006) who use 
the term ‘bottom-up perspective’ to refer to all explanations that approach the 
decline in class voting as a consequence of social changes, i.e.: changes in the 
composition of classes and the relative importance of class versus other cleavage 
lines. For explanations that use changes in political choices as the primary source 
for changes in class voting the term ‘top-dow n’ perspective is adopted. In this 
study we use this distinction, and apply the theoretical insights from both 
perspectives. By discussing hypotheses about religious voting simultaneously 
with hypotheses about class voting we aim to illustrate that ‘bottom -up’ and 
‘top-dow n’ processes are applicable to both social cleavages.
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1.3.1 Bottom-up: social change explanations
Social mobility : In class voting research mobility hypotheses involve that the level 
of class voting declined due to increasing inter or intra-generational mobility 
across the boundaries of social classes. Mobile voters are expected adopt a 
middle position between their class of origin and class of destination. Upwardly 
mobile voters are expected to be more right-wing than those who remain in their 
origin class, and more left-wing than those in their destination class. The reverse 
may be expected for downwardly mobile voters (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and 
Heath 1995). W ith respect to religious voting mobility hypotheses are primarily 
concerned with outflow mobility. The boundaries between those who are in church 
and those who or not are expected weaken because those who leave the church 
are more likely to vote for a religious party than second generation non-church 
members (Need 1997).
Heterogenization: Related to mobility is the social structural composition of 
social categories and the heterogenization of specific groups in particular. With 
respect to social class, compositional changes involve transform ations in labor 
market structure of advanced industrial economies. As a result of continuing de­
industrialization and market liberalization the share of manual laborers in the 
workforce sharply declined in Western democracies after the Second World War. 
In the same period, the service class grew rapidly in size and became increasingly 
heterogeneous. This is the reason why scholars of the third generation 
distinguished sub-classes within the ‘non-manual class’ and why scholars of the 
fourth generation even further differentiate within the service class. In this respect, 
the distinction between the manual and non-manual class has become less 
relevant due to changing class structures. With respect to religious voting 
compositional changes are primarily concerned with the growth of the secular 
portion of the population. Due to religious outflow the secular group becomes 
more and more heterogeneous; enlarged by first and second generation church 
leavers from various religious origins. For this reason students of religious voting 
differentiated ‘secular voters’ from ‘church leavers’ or included parental religious 
affiliation (Need 1997). In this respect, the distinction between the church members 
and non-members has become less relevant due to changes in the religious 
structure of societies.
New social divisions: Another type of hypotheses that is put forward to explain 
the decline in cleavage voting is related to the emergence of ‘new’ social divisions. 
A lthough typically raised in relation to class divisions, both industrial (e.g. class) 
and pre-industrial (e.g. religion) cleavage lines are expected to be replaced or
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cross-cut by new ‘post-industrial’ cleavages. Various ‘new ’ forms of social differ­
entiation have been raised, e.g.: gender, ethnicity, education, sector employment 
or new identity and interest groups. Class and religious voting are expected to 
decline in post-industrial democracies as such new social cleavages are 
increasingly relevant for political interests.
Cognitive mobilization: The ‘Cognitive Mobilization Thesis’ implies that voters 
increasingly possess the cognitive skills and resources that enable them to make 
independent political choices w ithout relying on constraining loyalties to political 
parties or specific interest groups (Dalton 2007). Class and religious voting are 
expected to decline as educational expansion and the rise of mass media 
transformed voters from being driven by cleavage-based loyalties into calculative, 
preference- and issue-oriented citizens (Franklin 1985; Inglehart 1990).
Growing affluence: Rising incomes and improved living standards have 
enhanced the economic security of many voters in advanced industrial 
democracies. In class voting research hypotheses about the consequences of 
growing affluence are known as the ‘Embourgeoisement Thesis’. The working 
class-support for left-wing parties declines because workers increasingly have 
incomes, living standards and consumption patterns that overlap with those of 
the middle class and they no longer need to struggle to improve their economic 
situation. (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechfofer and Platt 1968; Knutsen 2006). In 
religious voting research a sim ilar line of reasoning is employed to explain the 
narrowing of differences in voting behavior between Catholics and Protestants in 
the US. This ‘Catholic Dealignment Thesis’ states that Catholic voters are shifting 
away from the Democratic Party as they become more affluent over time, matching 
or even surpassing the economic position of Protestants (Manza and Brooks 
1997). Moreover, increasing economic security may also have undermined the 
importance of religious values (Inglehart 1990; Dogan 1995). General 
secularization theory therefore suggests a decrease of religious voting among all 
religious categories as economic security increases.
Cultural conflict: Hypotheses about cultural conflict often emphasize the 
importance of value change and the rise of ‘new ’ attitudinal cleavages as opposed 
to ‘o ld ’ social-structural cleavages. In the literature this ‘New Politics Thesis’ 
builds upon two arguments to explain the decline in class voting. First, the rise of 
a m aterialist/post-materialist dimension has increased the concern for ‘new ’ 
political issues such as democratization, civil rights and environmental protection 
among the middle class. Traditional left-right class voting declined because of 
middle class realignment away from right-wing parties to ‘new le ft’ parties. The
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primary source for such realignment is so-called ‘middle class radicalism ’. As a 
counter-reaction, some portion of the working class may has shifted to right-wing 
parties to reaffirm the traditional emphasis on material values (Knutsen 2006).
Second, the advent of cultural issues in politics has evoked the rise of ‘new 
right’ parties that appealed to working class voters on non-economic issues, 
such as anti-immigration, anti multiculturalism, nationalism and law and order. In 
either way, new non-econom ic conflict weakens the class basis of traditional 
left-right divisions. The emergence of cultural conflicts has also led to the 
formulation of new hypotheses with respect to religious voting. The most prominent 
is the ‘Culture Wars Thesis’, based on conflicts in the US over social morality and 
ethical issues, e.g.: family values, gay rights, evolutionary biology and abortion. 
This argument is however used to explain both decrease and increase in religious 
voting. On the one hand, growing concern about moral issues is expected to 
further /ntradenominational conflict, therefore breaking down traditional 
denominational alignments. This also taps into the ‘Liberal/Mainline Protestant 
Dealignment Thesis’, which identifies the shifts among liberal Protestants, 
characterized by dropping levels of regular church attendance, as the primary 
source of decline in religious voting in the US (Manza and Brooks 1997). On the 
other hand, cultural conflicts may have increased political divisions by lining up 
religious conservatives of all denominations against both religious liberals and 
secular voters (cf. Manza and Wright 2003).
1.3.2 Top-down: politica l choice explanations
Electoral Trade-off: Parties are unable to successfully appeal to all groups in 
society, and they therefore adopt a trade-off strategy in appealing to different 
groups of voters. Hypotheses in class voting research about the consequences 
of party strategy are often built on what has become known as the ‘Dilemma of 
Electoral Socialism ’ (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Left-wing parties face an 
electoral dilemma if they want to win elections: Since their core constituency, the 
working class, is an electoral m inority left-wing parties must seek support from 
the middle class as well. Following this reasoning, the electoral dilemma causes 
class voting to decline in two ways. First, the working class is shrinking in size, 
and class voting declines as far as working class parties succeed in compensating 
this decline by attracting members from other social classes. Second, as left-wing 
parties extend their appeal they undermine class identity and discourage 
class-based appeals in politics as a whole. Socialist parties become the parties 
of workers as individuals not as a collectivity. “Workers are no longermob/l/zed as
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workers but as consumers, taxpayers, parents, economic prosperity, 'the poor', 
‘the [hard working, own addition] peop le ’, ect." (Sainsbury 1990: 31; Knutsen 
2006: 8). The rise of new issues on the political agenda may have reinforced this 
process. In endeavoring to be more inclusive left-wing parties may appeal to the 
non-material values of the new middle class. In turn they estrange themselves 
from workers that do not share the cultural liberal middle class-values.
The same logic may be applied to religious voting. Kalyvas (1996) has 
translated the electoral dilemma to the consequences of the electoral strategy of 
confessional parties in the nineteenth century. Historically, confessional parties 
gave emphasis to religious issues. But their religious nature hindered Christian 
Democrats to successfully mobilize non-religious voters. In order to maximize the 
numbers of votes Christian parties had to deemphasize religion w ithout destroying 
the confessional character of the party. This ‘Confessional D ilem m a’ led Christian 
parties to redefine the position of religion in politics. They broke their organizational 
dependence on the Church, and reinterpreted their electoral appeal by replacing 
specific and detailed religious doctrines by general and abstract moral values. 
From this view religious voting thus declines as Confessional parties extend their 
appeal beyond their core constituency of religious voters (Kalyvas 1996: 
242-244).
Party system convergence: A second, though related, set of explanations for 
changes in cleavage voting concerns the relative positions of political parties with 
respect to class-related or religion-related policy issues. The emphasis here is on 
the difference between the main party choices that voters face. In their landmark 
publication The American Voter Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960: 
364) write that casting a class vote is more likely if voters ‘perceive that differences 
exist between parties that are relevant to class interest'. Class interests are 
associated with the degree of left-right polarization. Polarization is large when 
parties adopt different, distinguishable positions with respect to socio-economic 
policies. It is hypothesized that class voting declines as parties converge towards 
the political centre, and the socio-econom ic differences narrow between the 
major leftist and rightist parties. Contrary, programmatic divergence (or growing 
political polarization), may increase the levels of class voting. Political campaigns 
may revive old loyalties and re-engage differentiation between groups in society. 
As class-relevant, economic issues are more salient this may give rise to political 
polarization and reveal underlying differences between classes (Weakliem 1993: 
386). Party strategy, programmatic polarization and electoral appeals may 
therefore not only be used to explain a decline, but also tem porary fluctuations or
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increases in the class-vote relationship. When translated to religion it can be 
hypothesized that the levels of religious voting are correlated with the degree of 
polarization on traditional moral policies (Oskarson 2005). The religion-vote 
relationship is expected to decline as confessional parties narrow the differences 
with secular parties by de-emphasizing particular moral issues. In American 
research on religious voting, hypotheses on political strategy have been raised to 
explain increases in the political alignment of conservative Protestants in the late 
1970s/ early 1980s and late 1990s/ early 2000s. The ‘Christian Right Thesis’ 
attributes the reinforcement of the linkages between Evangelicals and the 
Republican Party in these periods to the rise of moral issues on the political 
agenda, the candidacy of openly religious candidates like Ronald Reagan, Pat 
Robertson and George W. Bush, and organized efforts to mobilize Evangelicals 
by Christian Right organizations (Manza and Brooks 1997: 42-43; Claassen and 
Povtak 2010: 13).
1.3.3 Towards a bottom -up and top-down design
In this study we are not able to test all major hypotheses mentioned above. 
Especially the lack of relevant variables on voters’ characteristics restricts our 
ability to test specific hypotheses in the category of ‘bottom -up’ explanations. We 
will therefore use the theoretical insights of various explanations to derive a more 
general expectation about the influence of social changes on the level of cleavage 
voting. We expect social groups, whether class or religious categories, to lose 
their distinctiveness as social mobility, compositional changes, educational 
expansion, value changes and the rise of new political issues have eroded the 
divisions between them. We expect that this process, in subsequent chapters 
referred to as ‘the blurring cleavage boundaries’ diminishes the relevance of 
traditional class and religious conflict for voters’ political choices.
‘Top-down’ explanations differ from ‘bottom -up’ explanations in two ways: 
First, most ‘bottom -up’ explanations implicitly assume that political changes are 
reflections of social changes. Political parties are supposed to respond to 
changing social circumstances: As traditional group boundaries are blurring, or 
as particular social groups shrink in size it is expected that the cleavage-based 
parties adjust their strategy and broaden their appeal. From this line of reasoning 
‘bottom -up’ changes determine both the political strategy of parties and the 
voting behavior of individuals. Contrary to this sociological determinist perspective 
‘top-dow n’ explanations use political changes as the primary source for changes 
in cleavage voting. Sartori (1969: 84), as an early influential advocate of the
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‘top -dow n’ perspective, argues that the politicization of class divisions by parties 
produces class consciousness rather than the other way around. And although 
Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argue that political parties respond to social 
changes, their electoral dilemma implies that the voting behavior of individuals is 
influenced by the party strategy rather than by class conditions. From the 
‘top-dow n’ perspective - as was also a central feature in the Lipset-Rokkan 
cleavage model of party system formation - political and social factors interact to 
produce the social basis of voter alignment. Political changes are thus contributions 
towards, rather than simply reflections of changes political cleavages. Second, 
‘bottom -up’ processes often assume that the decline in cleavage voting is 
relatively gradual as well as unidirectional. Changes in party strategy, electoral 
appeals or programmatic polarization imply that the importance of social 
cleavages for party choice can increase as well as decrease. Explanations for 
more time-specific changes and possible reversals in cleavage voting may 
therefore be attributed to changes in the political circumstances under which 
voting takes place, rather than to sociological conditions. In the next section we 
will formulate the research questions of this study. Theoretically we will draw 
hypotheses based on the premise that political factors may have an autonomous 
influence on the levels of cleavage-based voting additional to the effect of social 
changes. To test our hypotheses we rely on different data analysis strategies. In 
the next section we therefore also pay attention to measurements procedures, 
data collections and analysis techniques used in various chapters.
1.4 Plan of the book
1.4.1 Research questions and data analysis strategy
By reviewing the literature in political sociology, we transposed class voting and 
stratification research to the study of religious voting. On the one hand we have 
shown that the precision of research questions, hypotheses, measures and 
methods in class voting research promises the rise of a new generation. On the 
other hand, we demonstrated that the empirical developments in class voting 
studies are increasingly applied in studying religious voting. By categorizing the 
major hypotheses for class and religion voting simultaneously we showed that 
there are overarching theoretical mechanisms behind how social structure and 
political choices produce variation in cleavage-based voting. However, the review 
has also shown that the emerging fourth generation of class voting research
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raises new or unresolved theoretical and empirical questions, and that in terms of 
comparability the research on religious voting is not yet of the same generation 
as the research on class voting. Because of the lack of integration of the two 
research traditions, and because the fourth generation of class voting research 
has not yet fully crystallized some important questions remain understudied or 
require more stringent empirical tests.
The following chapters are used to answer specific questions about 
cross-national and over-time variation in class and religious voting in Western 
democracies. To improve on previous research problems theoretically as well as 
empirically we subdivide the book into two parts. The first part consists of 
large-scale comparative investigations of cleavage voting in up to 15 modern 
democracies in Western Europe, the United States and Australia in the period 
1960-2008. Using more data than previous studies we are able to make better 
generalized inferences about the variation in class and religious voting from a 
cross-national and over time perspective. For this purpose we have constructed 
a new large-scale dataset, the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV) 
which provides the richest source of pooled individual-level surveys on the 
relations between social position and political choices available for Western 
countries in the post-war period. As we will discuss later, this comparative 
approach has some drawbacks with respect to the level of detail at the respondent 
level and with the availability of comparable variables across surveys.
In the second part of the book we therefore examine trends in cleavage voting 
in one country, i.e.: the Netherlands. For this purpose we use data from the Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) between 1971 and 2006. We focus on the 
Netherlands because there are survey data available for elections over a long 
period in which both the societal and the political circumstances have changed 
considerably. As in many other advanced industrial countries the Dutch 
occupational structure transformed as de-industrialization progressed and the 
service sector grew in size. Dutch society has also rapidly secularized: Both 
church attendance and denominational membership rates substantially dropped 
in the period under study. Moreover, during this period there were remarkable 
changes in the political landscape of the Netherlands. Using more detailed 
measures and more sophisticated analyses techniques than previous studies 
(including part I of this book) we further investigate whether changes in cleavage 
voting can be explained by ‘bottom -up’ and ‘top -dow n’ changes. In this thesis we 
will therefore answer two central research questions:
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(1) To what extent are there cross-national and over-time differences in Western 
democracies in the relative influence of social class and religion on voting?
(2) To what extent are social and politica l changes able to explain (a) the levels of 
and changes in class voting in Western democracies and (b) trends in class 
and religious voting in the Netherlands?
1.4.2 Part I: Cleavage voting in comparative perspective
For the international comparative part of this book we constructed an integrated 
dataset of 196 national surveys. Half of these surveys were originally integrated in 
the International Social Mobility and Politics (ISMP) file (Nieuwbeerta 1995; 
Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom 1996). The ISMP-file contains individual information 
on social class and voting behavior in 16 democracies in Western Europe, North 
America and Australia from 1956 to 1990. For our research we have updated the 
ISMP-file and improved the scope of analysis: We nearly doubled the number of 
surveys, and extended the number of years included for most countries. The 
ISMP file contained only ten countries for which the information covered more 
than ten years, and only five countries covering a period longer than twenty years. 
For three countries the file even included only one survey, and in four countries 
only two. Given these lim itations Evans (1999c) for example doubted the general- 
izability of the finding that class voting declined in most countries (Nieuwbeerta 
and De Graaf 1999). In our updated file all countries have at least five included 
surveys and cover at least a twenty-year period. In ten countries there is information 
covering th irty  years or more, and in two countries even forty years or more. We 
exclude Canada and Ireland from our file because there is only a single survey 
available for Canada (CES 1984) and two for Ireland (ISSP 1989, 1990), and we 
are unable to integrate additional surveys for these countries. Moreover, only four 
out of 113 surveys integrated in the ISMP-file are from Catholic countries in 
Southern Europe (three from Italy and one from France). In this book we aim not 
only to improve the generalized inferences with respect to class voting, but also 
to examine comparative patterns of religious voting. For this purpose we added 
more data from countries outside northwest Europe and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. In our updated file we in total included nine surveys for both France 
and Italy, and expanded the file with nine other surveys from Spain.
In total, we used 105 out of the 113 surveys from the ISMP file, and added 91 
national surveys for 15 countries. The newly constructed dataset, which we label 
the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting, contains information on Australia,
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Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, (former West-) Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the 
United States between 1960 and 2008 (Table 1.2., see appendix A.1 for the 
original data sources). The scope of the CDCV-file in terms of period and countries 
covered is uniquely rich for data on the social bases of politics. However, the 
expansion of the ISMP file comes at the cost of the number of included variables. 
Unlike Nieuwbeerta we did not restrict ourselves to surveys containing information 
about both individual and parental (i.e. fathers’) social class. Because we updated 
the ISMP-file for respondent’s individual variables only we are not able to address 
questions about the effect of social mobility on voting behavior. We also allowed 
a lower level of detail measuring the social class position of respondents. 
Additional variables on the socio-econom ic characteristics of voters (e.g. income, 
home ownership, employment sector) are neither consistently available in the 
ISMP-file nor in all surveys added here. Moreover, also information on religion is 
not consistently available in all surveys. Therefore only 125 out of 196 surveys in 
our updated file contain sufficient information on church attendance and/or 
church membership. Given the discrepancy between the availability of information
Table 1.2 Surveys in the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV)
Country Period Number of surveys
Australia 1965 -  2004 15
Austria 1974 -  2003 7
Belgium 1975 -  2003 5
Denmark 1971 -  2001 13
Finland 1972 -  2003 6
France 1967 -  2007 9
Germany 1969 -  2005 23
Italy 1968 -  2006 9
The Netherlands 1970 -  2006 20
Norway 1965 -  2001 10
Spain 1979 -  2008 9
Sweden 1972 -  2002 11
Switzerland 1971 -  2003 10
United Kingdom 1964 -  2005 17
United States 1960 -  2004 32
Total 1960 -  2008 196
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on social class and religion we are not able to make use of the full range of the 
CDCV dataset in all chapters of part I of this book.
In chapter 2 we aim to connect the trends in class voting with trends on 
religious voting. We therefore only make use of the 125 surveys in the CDCV-file 
which include sufficient information on both class and religion. Still, this 13-country 
analysis provides the largest simultaneous comparison of trends in class and 
religious voting available in the literature. We begin this chapter with an extensive 
overview of literature about the relative influence of class and religion on voting. 
We will show that it is difficult to compare results across studies because there 
are large differences in the way cleavages are measured and how their influence 
on voting is analyzed: Class and religious divisions are measured on the basis of 
different contrasts, categorizations and indicators across studies. The dependent 
variables are often too country-specific to compare internationally. And, above all, 
there is large diversity in the criteria that are used to determine the strength of a 
cleavage. The aim of this chapter is to systematically analyze cross-national 
differences and trends in the magnitude and hierarchy of class and religion as 
social bases of voting behavior in thirteen countries. But unlike the few previous 
studies comparing the magnitude of cleavage voting we uniformly measure 
cleavage-strength based on a multi-category typology of cleavages and parties, 
focus on the relative influence of religion vs. social class, and model changes in 
the effects of class and religion simultaneously. Moreover, we measure cleavage 
strength using appropriate and comparable measures across countries and time, 
the kappa-index. And we compare our results on cleavage strength with the 
differences in explained variance contributed by religion and social class. Further 
details about the operationalization and analysis techniques are discussed in 
chapter 2.
In chapter 3 we shift from descriptive to explanatory questions. In order to 
make use of a broader range of surveys in the CDCV-file we only focus on class 
voting. Most previous studies that explain the class-vote relationship have often 
focused on ‘bottom -up’ social factors, but paid little attention to ‘top-dow n’ 
political factors. In this chapter we estimate the impact of the Left-Right positions 
of parties on the class-vote association through a Two-Step Hierarchical analysis 
of integrated data from 15 countries in Western Europe, the United States and 
Australia (1960-2005) supplemented with data from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The CMP datasets are based 
on content analyses of election programs of political parties contesting in national 
elections. The quantity and direction of statements by parties, measured in
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(‘quasi’)sentences in a program, are classified in 56 policy categories over seven 
policy domains (i.e. external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, 
economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups). Party 
positions in each country are matched to the individual level data on the basis of 
the corresponding election year or the last preceding election. To test our 
hypotheses we select all surveys from the CDCV-file in period for which manifesto 
data is available. This results in a selection of 188 surveys between 1960-2003 
(2004 for the US, 2005 for the UK). In this chapter, instead of reporting the strength 
of class voting as an aggregate kappa-index, we present the log-odds ratios of 
voting left-wing for three classes relative to the manual class. Next, we test cross- 
nationally the two versions of the ‘top-dow n’ thesis as we discussed earlier. The 
first concerns the effect of the ideological position of left-wing parties on the level 
of class voting. The second version involves the differences between the 
ideological positions of various parties, and is concerned with the effect of party 
polarization on the level of class voting between and within countries. In doing so, 
this chapter provides an important step towards expanding the examination of 
cleavage change beyond ‘bottom -up’ processes to those involving the relevance 
of the choices that parties provide for voters.
1.4.3 Part II: Trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands
In the second part of this book we examine class and religious voting in the 
Netherlands. For this purpose we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 
2006. We use information from 11 elections (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N =1.526], 
1977 [N=1.856], 1981 [N=2.305], 1982 [N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 
[N=1.745], 1994 [N=1.812], 1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). 
We excluded the 2003-survey because for that survey no data on occupational 
codings were available. In order to improve on third generation class voting 
research we require detailed information on respondent occupation to use a more 
differentiated measure of social class. The availability of four-digit ISCO scores 
(or CBS84 occupational classifications) allows us to use a modified version of the 
EGP class schema (Güveli 2006). With respect to the surveys of 1989, 1994, and 
2006 we obtained the most reliable and detailed codings directly from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics in Heerlen (the Netherlands). Next to information on social 
class we also harmonized the variables in the 11 DPES-surveys with respect 
to church membership, church attendance, economic ideology, education, 
party choice and some social background characteristics. We supplement the
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integrated DPES-surveys by data of the Comparative Manifesto Project for Dutch 
political parties. The central question of this part of the book is to what extent 
changes in cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands since the 1970s can be 
explained by social and political changes?
In chapter 4 we examine trends in class voting in the Netherlands. Again, we 
especially focus on the effects of political changes on the class-vote association. 
Using multinomial logistic models, more years and better differentiated measures 
of social class and party choice, we reexamine De Graaf et a l's  (2001) question 
whether the emergence of GreenLeft led to any class realignment. Next, using 
conditional logistic regression models we examine the interaction between the 
party positions and social class. We aim to test whether class voting in the 
Netherlands is affected by changes in party's ‘old' social-economic positions and 
‘new' conservative-progressive positions. We set out to examine these ‘top-down' 
changes after accounting for the ‘bottom-up' process of blurring class boundaries. 
To account for the heterogenization of the service class we differentiate between a 
‘new' class of social and cultural specialists and an ‘old' class of technocrats within 
the service class of the traditional EGP class schema (Güveli 2006).
A similar strategy is adopted in chapter 5 with respect to examining changes 
in religious-based voting in the Netherlands. Also in this chapter we investigate 
two types of changes in political choices in the Netherlands. First, we build on 
previous research that demonstrated that there was an abrupt decline in religious 
voting in the Netherlands after the merging of the three main denominational 
parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) (cf. De Graaf et al. 2001). 
Because we investigate a longer time trend we are also able to investigate the 
consequences a more recent political merger in 2002; that of two minor Protestant 
parties into the ChristianUnion. In doing so, we examining time-specific changes 
in the strength of religious voting that coincide with the changes in the party 
system. Second, we include direct measures of party positions in order to account 
for parties' moral traditionalism  using the Comparative Manifesto Data. We again 
employ conditional logistic regression analyses to examine the interaction 
between the party positions and religious denomination and church attendance. 
We investigate the effects of these political changes after accounting for the 
‘bottom-up' process of blurring religious boundaries. Instead of simply inferring 
societal homogenization between religious and irreligious voters we test whether 
trends in religious voting are interpreted by weakening church attendance and 
growing effects of education.
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In sum, this thesis consists of four empirical chapters. The two chapters in the first 
part of the book involve cross-national comparisons of trends in cleavage-based 
voting. Chapter 2 investigates the relative importance of social class versus 
religion on voting behavior in 13 countries between 1960 and 2008. Chapter 3 is 
mainly concerned with the impact of ‘top -dow n’ factors on the class-vote 
association in 15 countries between 1960 and 2005. In the remaining two empirical 
chapters we study trends in cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands. In this 
second part of the book address the question to what extent the changes in 
cleavage-based voting in the Netherlands in the period 1971-2006 are explained 
by ‘bottom -up’ as well as ‘top-dow n’ factors. Chapter 4 investigates over-time 
variation in class voting in the Netherlands, and chapter 5 investigates over-time 
variation in religious voting. In table 1.3 we summarize the organization of the 
empirical chapters: the key questions, explanations, measures, analysis 
techniques and data sources.
47
4^
CD Table 1.3 Organization of the empirical chapters
01>
Chapter 2
Part I
Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Part II
Chapter 5
Question To what extent are there 
cross-national and over­
time differences in the 
relative influence of social 
class and religion on 
voting?
To what extent are the 
levels of and changes in 
class voting in Western 
democracies explained 
by social changes and the 
positions of parties?
To what extent can the 
decline of class voting 
in the Netherlands be 
explained by social and 
political changes?
To what extent can the 
decline of religious voting 
in the Netherlands be 
explained by social and 
political changes?
Explanatory hypotheses 1. education, gender
2. LR-party positions
1. class composition
2. education, ideology
3. party merger
4. party positions
1. religious disintegration
2. education
3. party mergers
4. party positions
Measures 4-category social class 
3-category denomination 
2-category church 
attendance
Standardized 4-category 
social class (based on EGP 
classes)
7-category social class 
(revised EGP schema)
5-category denomination
Techniques Series of nation-specific Two-Step Hierarchical 
Multinomial logistic Regression analysis of log- 
regression analysis (max. 3 odds estimates (2-party 
party contrast), contrast)
Kappa index
Multinomial logistic 
regression (4-party 
contrast),
Conditional logistic 
regression (4-party 
contrast)
Logistic regression
Conditional logistic 
regression (4-party 
contrast)
Data 125 surveys from 13 
countries, 1960-2008
188 surveys from 15 
countries, 1960-2005
Dutch Parliamentary Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Studies, 1971-2006 Election Studies, 1971-2006
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Part I
Cleavage Voting in Comparative Perspective

Chapter 2
Revisiting Lijphart’s Crucial Experiment
A Comparison of the Relative Influence of Class and Religion on Party Choice 
in 13 Modern Democracies, 1960 -  2008.
* A slightly different version of this chapter was presented at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology, 
July 16 2010: Gothenburg, Sweden. Co-authors are Ariana Need, Nan Dirk de Graaf and Wout Ultee.

REViSiTiNG LIJPHART’S CRUCiAL EXPERiMENT
2. 1 Introduction
‘Social class is clearly no more than a secondary and subsidiary influence of party  
choice, and it can become a factor o f importance only in the absence of potent 
rivals such as religion and language’ (Lijphart 1979: 53). More than three decades 
have passed since Lijphart presented this conclusion. This conclusion was 
derived from his ‘crucial experiment’ on cleavage politics studying the impact of 
religious divisions, linguistic divisions and class divisions on voting in a 
four-country comparison (Belgium, Canada, South Africa and Switzerland) where 
these cleavages were sim ultaneously present. A lthough Lijphart was not the first 
to suggest that religious divisions are more important for voting than social class 
(Sartori 1969; Rose and Urwin 1969; Converse 1974), he pioneered in systematically 
addressing this question in terms of a hierarchy between social cleavages.
Lijphart (1979: 53) interprets the relative importance of religion over social 
class by stressing that religious divisions are accompanied by ‘prim ordial’ 
communal loyalties stemming from a pre-industrial age. Several studies have 
referred to Lijphart’s claims to emphasize the enduring relevance of religion in 
contemporary politics (Broughton and Rudd 1984; Breen and Hayes 1997; 
McDonough, Shin and Moisés 1998; White and McAllister 2000; Liddle and Mujani 
2007). Above all, L ijphart’s study contributed to establishing the idea that religious 
divisions generally outweigh class divisions (e.g. Schubert 1980; Bakvis 1981; 
Zuckerman 1982; Ragsdale 1983; Jennings 1984; Inglehart 1988; Kim and Ohn 
1992; Weakliem and Biggert 1999; Ventura 2001; Belanger and Eagles 2006; 
Reed 2007). A lthough his experiment is often cited, surprisingly few studies have 
followed Lijphart’s lead in addressing the question on the relative influence of 
class and religion on voting. There are however good grounds to do so.
First, with reference to Sartori (1969) Lijphart portrays the strength of social class 
as depending on a society’s religious divide. ‘Class is a major determinant o f voting 
behavior only if no other cleavage happens to be present’ (Sartori 1969: 76). 
Consequently, the relevance of class voting is conditional upon the presence or 
absence of religious divisions. However, this condition may be too demanding. There 
is almost certainly no country, not even in the “secularized” West where religious 
differences are entirely non-existent. Even in the predominantly Protestant countries 
of Northern Europe and in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe there are 
differences among voters in their religiosity and church attendance. In this chapter 
we therefore examine to what extent stronger effects of class on voting are associated 
with weaker effects of church membership and church attendance on voting.
55
CH APTER 2
Second, after Lijphart compared four countries using 1970s data, new data 
allowing a more stringent test of the hierarchy between class and religion have 
become available. Since Lijphart put forward his study of what he called the 
‘prime determinants o f party choice' (1979: 43) many scholars have used these 
new data to demonstrate that the role of social class is waning in contemporary 
modern democracies (Clark and Lipset 1991; Franklin 1992; Nieuwbeerta 1995). 
A universal downward trend in religious voting is empirically however less 
clear-cut. Comparative studies have presented evidence for stable associations 
between religious divisions and party choice in Western Europe (Knutsen 2004; 
Elff 2007) or recently even reported a slight increase of the effect of religion on 
party choice (Van der Brug, Hobolt and De Vreese 2009).
Third, despite the persistent and widespread scholarly attention for the 
magnitude of class and religious-based voting, there has been little systematic 
attention for questions on the hierarchy between social cleavages. In this chapter 
we will start by reviewing the literature in order to show that it is difficult to compare 
results across studies because there are large differences in the way cleavages 
are measured and how their influence on voting is analyzed: First, class divisions 
are measured on the basis of different class contrasts and different class schemas 
or derived from related variables such as union membership, class identification 
and income. And whereas religious divisions are sometimes measured on the 
basis of church membership, other studies use church attendance or religious 
beliefs. Second, the dependent variable, what party contrast(s) is/are studied, are 
often too country-specific to compare internationally. Third, there is, above all, 
large diversity in the criteria that are used to determine the strength of a cleavage, 
i.e.; explained variance, Alford-index, beta-coefficients, sheaf-coefficients, (log) 
odds ratios, kappa-index. Our review shows that the study of Brooks, Nieuwbeerta 
and Manza (2006) is among few studies to systematically investigate variation in 
the impact of class and religion on party choice for six countries over long time 
period.
Brooks et al. (2006) argue that most previous studies assess the relevance of 
social cleavages for voting by considering modest numbers of over-time and 
cross national comparisons, often focusing on single country cases investigating 
one particular cleavage and ignoring the possibility that changes in one cleavage 
may be related to changes in other cleavages. To a large extent they overcome 
such lim itations by analyzing comparable survey data from six Western countries 
in the period 1964-1998. For each country Brooks et al. simultaneously modeled 
changes in the impact of the class and religious cleavage. Using the kappa-index
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(Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995) they systematically measured the magnitude of 
the cleavages, and thus were able to compare their relative weight across 
countries and time.
Brooks et al. cross-nationally compare cleavage strength based on a 
m ulti-category typology of cleavages with multinomial logistic regression models. 
Their study, therefore, is an important contribution to the literature on cleavage 
voting. We intend to improve on this line of research in four ways. First, we extend 
the analysis to a larger pool of countries. We examine the effects of social class 
and religion on party choice in thirteen modern democracies in the period 
1960-2008: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, (former West-) Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the 
United States. For this purpose we constructed the Comparative Dataset on 
Cleavage Voting (CDCV). This new file is a large source of pooled surveys with 
m ulti-category variables of social class, religion and party choice1, available for 
Western countries since the 1960s. We constructed this file by updating the 
International Social Mobility and Politics file (Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom 1996). 
Second, the CDCV-file enables us to differentiate between two aspects of religious 
division: church membership and church attendance. Third, we systematically 
and more elaborately than in previous studies model a vast amount of scenarios 
of cleavage change to evaluate the interrelationship in class and religious voting, 
and changes therein. And fourth, we will not only report the kappa-index to 
measure cleavage strength, we will also compare these results with the contributed 
proportion of variance explained by social class and rel igion. As we will discuss 
later, using explained variance as the decisive criterion to determine which 
cleavage is more im portant can lead to different conclusions than with evaluations 
of indices derived from regression coefficients.
Finally, we argue that our country-sample and the distinction we make between 
church membership and church attendance allow more generalized inferences 
about the relative influence of class and religion on voting compared to previous 
studies. The scope of our analyses is not only uniquely rich in terms of countries 
and period covered, the thirteen countries in our study are also good cases to 
test the relative influence of religion and social class on party choice. Class 
differences are rooted in the contrast between workers and owners and arose 
from transform ations in the occupational structure during the Industrial Revolution 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The origin of class divisions across our (post-)industrial 
democracies is therefore similar. Religious cleavages in the West can generally 
be traced back to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation which brought about
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different religious structures across Europe (and indirectly in the New World). 
Brooks et al. (2006) presented evidence from five predominantly protestant and 
religious-mixed countries (Australia, Britain, Germany, Netherlands and the United 
States) but only one Catholic country (Austria). They concluded that religion 
outweighs class in only two countries, the Netherlands and the US, and not in 
Australia, Austria, Britain and Germany. In this chapter we extend the analysis 
with four extra traditionally Catholic countries (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain), 
two Protestant Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden) and an additional religious 
mixed country (Switzerland).
In sum, in this chapter we will investigate to what extent there are cross-national 
and over-time differences in Western democracies in the level of and change in 
the influence of social class and religion on voting. Ultimately we aim to answer 
two central questions with respect to the strength of the class cleavage relative to 
the strength of the religious cleavage, and the changes therein. (1) To what extent 
is a strong class-vote relationship in a country accompanied by a weak religion-vote 
relationship? (2) To what extent are the differences between the strength o f the 
religion-vote relationship and the class-vote relationship in countries declining, 
increasing or stable? In the next section we present an overview of previous 
research concerning the relative influence of class and religion on party choice. 
In section 2.3 we discuss the scope of our pooled dataset and the measurement 
of class, religion and party choice. In section 2.4, using multinomial logistic 
regression models we analyze for each country separately over time changes in 
class and religious voting. Section 2.5 discusses the central conclusions with 
respect to the strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength of the religious 
cleavage.
2.2 Social Class or Religion: What do we know?
2.2.1 L ijphart’s experiment in the literature
We examined all studies that cite Lijphart (1979) to assess whether they test the 
dominance of religion over class. In total we consider the results of 68 studies2 in 
the period 1979 to 2010. Only 9 of these studies report findings which shed light 
on the relative impact of class versus religion in (post-) industrial societies. The 
most relevant findings with respect to the 13 countries in this chapter are discussed 
below in order of publication. We in particular report the operationalization of 
social class and religion and the measurement of cleavage strength.
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McDonough, Pina and Barnes (1981) and McDonough, Barnes and Pina 
(1988), comparing beta weights, suggest that political choices in Spain in the 
early 1980s are more strongly determined by religiosity - measured as church 
attendance - than by subjective class identity. Eisinga, Felling and Lammers 
(1994) study the log-odds ratios of religious denominations and income groups 
on party preferences in the Netherlands (1964-1992). They show that religious 
denomination was more im portant to predict party choice than income. However, 
Eisinga et al. demonstrate that both the effect of religion and the effect of income 
declined over time. Heath, De Graaf and Need (1997) investigate the British 1992 
elections and report a stronger effect of class (5-class schema) compared to 
denomination (6 categories) in England. W ith respect to the association between 
religion and voting (measured as kappa-indices) in US presidential elections 
(1960-1992) Manza and Brooks (1997) find that the religious political cleavage 
declined in magnitude. W ith reference to their other findings on cleavage voting 
(Brooks and Manza 1997) they conclude that the effect of religion on voting is 
twice the size of the class effect (1997: 73). Comparing the social bases of voting 
in Britain and the US between 1992 and 2000 Andersen and Heath (2003) find 
that whereas class has a strong effect in Britain, the regression coefficients of 
class in the US are hardly significant.
As mentioned, contrarily to most other studies Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and 
Manza (2006: 109) do not find that the impact of religion (protestant vs. catholic 
vs. non-affiliation) on party choice measured as kappa-indices is generally larger 
than the impact of social class (5-class schema). They find that the class cleavage 
is typically larger than the religious cleavage in Australia (1965-98), Austria 
(1974-95), Britain (1964-97) and Germany (1969-98), but that religion is stronger 
in the US (1964-98) and the Netherlands (1970-98). Contrarily to Lijphart they 
suggest that class voting may condition religious voting instead of the other way 
around: ‘declining class divisions may encourage individual voters to distinguish 
among parties on the basis of other social identities such as religion or gender 
(2006: 93).
McAllister and White (2007) investigate the importance of social cleavages in 
20 democracies. They measure religious and class divisions respectively as 
affiliation vs. non-affiliation and worker vs. owner. They report the relative weight 
of these contrasts on the basis of their share in the proportion of explained 
variance predicting left-right self-placement. McAllister and White show that class 
adds more to the explained variance than religion in Sweden, Switzerland, 
Australia, the US and Britain). In the Netherlands class and religion contribute
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about equally to the proportion of explained variance. In Belgium, and Germany 
the effect of religion adds more to the explained variance than class. McAllister 
and W hite ’s findings demonstrate that using explained variance as the decisive 
criterion to determine which cleavage is more important can lead to different 
conclusions than when regression coefficients are evaluated. As Heath et al.
(1997) pointed out m inority groups can produce large regression coefficients but 
may contribute little to the explained variance.
2.2.2 Findings on class and religion in thirteen countries
Next, we more closely examine the thirteen countries in this chapter. Most studies 
do not explicitly aim to assess whether religion or class is more important for 
party choice. Nevertheless, we will try to identify whether social class and religion 
are relevant cleavages in each country, whether or not they retained their initial 
impact on vote choice and whether such changes caused the dominance of 
either class or religion to diminish.
In Australia class and religion were both influential in shaping the political 
party system. Typically, social class is identified as being more important for 
Australian politics than religion (McAllister 1992; Kelley and Evans 1995; Charnock 
1997). But, especially class differences are weakening and evidence suggests 
that gap between the religious cleavage and the class cleavage has narrowed 
over time (Bean 1999; Brooks et al. 2006).
In Austria the image is somewhat mixed. On the basis of late-1980s survey 
data Kelley and Evans (1995: 173) conclude that not class but religion is the most 
striking political difference in Austria. However, as mentioned earlier, Brooks et al. 
(2006) find that in general the class cleavage is larger than the religious cleavage 
in Austrian politics (1974-95). Furthermore, their analysis demonstrates that the 
difference between the two cleavages is not particularly large. But they argue that 
the class cleavage neither increased nor decreased, whereas religious voting 
slightly declines, mainly due to the 1995-survey.
In Belgium  the hierarchy between social class and religion ends in favor of the 
religious cleavage. Not only Lijphart (1979) concluded that religion emerged as 
the strongest factor, but Hill (1974) and Knutsen (1988) reached the same 
conclusion. Moreover, Knutsen (2004) showed that the association between 
religious denomination and party choice in Belgium is quite stable and that 
long-term decreases are small.
Also in France the association between religious denomination and party 
choice is fairly stable (Knutsen 2004). Several studies have argued that religion is
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a prominent determinant of party choice in France, and is more im portant that 
social class (Lewis-Beck 1984; Knutsen 1988). Lewis-Beck and Skalaban (1992) 
demonstrate that the relative importance of religion and class is stable over time, 
and that the impact of religion in French elections is generally twice as large as 
the impact of social class.
Although research on Germany consistently identified the religious cleavage 
as relatively more important than social class (Janowitz and Segal 1967, Knutsen 
1988; Kelley and Evans 1995; Oskarson 2005) Brooks et al. (2006) deem the class 
cleavage to be generally more important than the religious cleavage, although the 
differences between the two cleavages in their analysis are small. Nevertheless, 
both Oskarson and Brooks et al., show that in the long run especially the 
importance of class has declined somewhat whereas religious voting remained 
stable.
In the 1960s religion and class were of crucial importance in Italian politics 
(Mackie, Mannheimer and Sani 1992). With respect to the relative impact of both 
cleavages Hazelrigg (1970) suggested that the association between religion and 
political orientation was twice as strong as the association between class and 
political orientation. The trends reported by Bellucci and Heath (2007) in Italy 
(1968-2006) suggest that the magnitude of the religious cleavage, although 
declining, was far stronger than the class cleavage until the 1990s. It has been 
found that after the collapse of the Christian Democratic party (d c ) in 1994 there 
was a large and sudden decline of the effect of religion on voting (Segatti and 
Vezzoni 2008) eventually nullifying the dominance of religion over class in 2006 
(Bellucci and Heath 2007).
In the Netherlands it has been systematically found that religion is more 
important than social class (Knutsen 1988; Oskarson 2005; Brooks et al. (2006). 
According to De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) both the influence of social class 
and religion on party choice declined since the 1970s. As in Italy, this decline can 
partially be attributed to party changes. De Graaf et al. show that the levels reli­
gious-based voting in the Netherlands abruptly declined after the merger of three 
denominational parties into a single Christian Democratic party (c d a ) in 1977.
Although Norway is commonly put forward as a textbook example of a class- 
dominated political system Oskarson (2005) shows that this picture may be 
misleading: In Norway there is not only a considerable and steady decline of 
class voting, but religious voting is both continually relevant as well as more 
important. The latter is supported by Knutsen (1988) who demonstrates on the 
basis of 1981 -Eurobarometer data that of all social divisions in Norwegian politics
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religion had the strongest impact on party preferences.
As mentioned, McDonough et al. (1981, 1988) have shown that political 
choices in Spain during the 1970s and 1980s were more strongly determined by 
religion than by social class. Lancaster (1992) even argues that church attendance 
explains more variance than any other socio-dem ographic variable when 
predicting left-voting in Spain’s 1984-elections. In the face of accounts announcing 
the decline of religious voting Calvo and Montero (2002) show that religion was 
still a strong determinant of party choice in Spain during the 2000-election.
Social class has been a key factor in Swedish politics, although the class-vote 
association has decline substantially since the 1970s (Stephens 1981). Long-term 
decline in class voting is also reported by Oskarson (2005) who notes that the 
decrease is most pronounced in the 1960s and 1980s. The role of religion in 
politics has traditionally been far less prominent in Sweden. The Swedish Christian 
Democrats ( k d ) passed the electoral threshold relatively late in 1991, more than a 
quarter-century after their formation in 1964 (Madeley 2000). However, already in 
the 1960s, as Särlvik (1970) remarked, specific linkages existed between members 
of the “free churches” (minor protestant denominations) and the Swedish Liberal 
Party ( f p ) and between the Church of Sweden and the Conservative Party (m). But 
Särlvik concluded that religion was merely a subsidiary factor in Swedish 
politics.
In Switzerland  religion was an important factor shaping the party system, but 
the religion-vote association has continuously declined since the 1970s (Nicolet 
and Tresch 2009). Using the same 1972-survey data Lijphart (1979) and Kerr 
(1974) reached different conclusions about the relative importance of class and 
religion for party choice in Switzerland. Lijphart attributed this discrepancy to the 
different party contrasts they analyzed, and argued that Kerr did not give religion 
a fair chance by dichotomizing party choice in Socialist and Communist versus all 
other parties. And conform Lijphart’s study Trechsel (1995) and Hug and Trechsel
(2002) show that the influence of religion on electoral behavior was stronger than 
the influence of social class, although both cleavages weakened (1971-1991).
In politics of the United Kingdom  it is w idely held that class differences play a 
larger role than religion (Janowitz and Segal 1967; Books and Reynolds 1975; 
Knutsen 1988). Since the 1960s class divisions declined in Britain, whereas 
religious voting has been rather stable (Evans and Tilley 2011). But despite the 
narrowing of the gap between class- and religious voting the impact of class 
continues to exceed the impact of religion on party choice (Oskarson 2005; 
Brooks et al. 2006).
62
REViSITING LUPHART’S CRUCiAL EXPERiMENT
In the United States religion has a lways been more im portant than social 
class. Various studies have reported about declining levels of trad itiona l class 
voting in the US since the 1940s (Books and Reynolds 1975; Dalton 2008) and 
1960s (Hout, B rooks and Manza 1995; Brooks et al. 2006). A lthough Books and 
Reynolds reported relatively stable patterns of re lig ious-based voting between 
the 1940s and 1970s3, Dalton show s that the denom inationa l basis of voting 
declined since the 1970s. Manza and Brooks (1997) argue that the single factor in 
the decline of re lig ious-based voting in the US is the political de-a lignm ent of 
liberal Protestants, because the political a lignm ent of both conservative 
P rotestants and C atholics is very stable.
2.2.3 Findings from comparative studies
Som e of the a forem entioned stud ies are part of larger com parative researches. 
Typically, com parative books are set up by a series of single country chapters 
w ritten by country experts (Evans 1999, Broughton and Ten Napel 2000, C lark 
and Lipset 2001). And a lthough these books are valuable for assessing changes 
in the im pact of class or religion in m odern dem ocracies, they are in general not 
ideal for form al cross-nationa l com parisons. Because these studies usually focus 
on one phenom enon, class and religion are typ ica lly  not studied sim ultaneously, 
m aking an investigation of the ir relative im pact on party choice im possible.
Franklin et al. (1992) present analyses w ith  m ultip le social and attitud inal 
variab les predicting left-w ing voting behavior. In each of the 16 country-specific  
chapters they e laborate ly assess the influence of soc ia l-structura l variables, 
including class (i.e. w orking class occupation) and religion (i.e. church attendance) 
on voting (i.e. left vs. non-left). However, Franklin et al. do not com pile the coun­
try-specific  results on the relative influence of soc ia l-structura l variab les in a final 
com parison. Because the com parisons am ong countries remain restricted to the 
percentage of variance in voting behavior explained by social variab les they 
bypass the question about d ifferences between countries w ith regard to the 
relative effect of social class and religion (N ieuw beerta  and Ultee 1993).
O skarson (2005) reports the trends in the associa tion between social position 
and party choice in six W estern European countries, and explic itly notes whether 
class or relig ious voting is stronger in four of these countries4. She measures 
class voting as log-odds of the working class to vote left-w ing rather than anything 
else com pared to the non working class. Relig ious voting is m easured as the 
odds that a frequent church attendee votes for a Christian D em ocratic party rather 
than another party com pared to non-re lig ious people. The results presented by
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O skarson (2005: 94-95) reveal tha t in general the d ifference between class and 
relig ious voting are the sm allest in G erm any and are relatively large in Britain, 
Netherlands and Norway.
2.3 Data and measurement
To provide a uniform  and system atic test of the relative influence of social class 
and religion on voting we constructed the new dataset, the Comparative Dataset 
on Cleavage Voting. See C hapter 1 and appendix A.1 for fu rther details about the 
CDCV-file. For th is chapter we only use surveys and respondents for which 
inform ation on both class and relig ion (denom ination and/or church attendance) 
is available, see tab le 2.1.
Social class: A lthough the scope of the CDCV-file is uniquely rich for data on 
the social bases of politics in te rm s of period and countries covered, the num ber 
of pooled surveys com es at the cost of detail at the respondent level. Consequently, 
we use a sim plified version of the Erikson, G old thorpe and Portocarero (1979) 
class schema. We distinguish between four social classes: (1) the m anual working 
class (collapsing the skilled and the unskilled workers), (2) the self-em ployed 
(petit bourgeois and farmers), (3) the routine non-m anual class and, (4) the 
service class (lower and higher service class). W here possible the EGP class 
position is derived directly from  the orig inal file, e ither on the basis of an orig inally 
included EGP variable, or otherw ise on the basis of an occupational code. In the 
latter case we converted ISCO -68 or ISCO -88 codes into EGP categories 
(Ganzeboom  and Treiman 2009). Som e surveys contained class- or occupational 
in form ation on the basis of nation specific or sim plified coding schem as. In such 
cases we used national conversion tab les to recode the national categories into 
the m ost appropriate EGP category.
Church attendance: We distinguish between church a ttendees and 
non-attendees. R espondents are categorized as ‘non-church-goer’ if they never 
or seldom  attend relig ious services, and are labeled ‘church-goer’ if they attend 
church at least a few tim es a year.
Denomination: on the basis of the resp onden t’s reported church m em bership 
we d istinguish between Protestants (including Anglicans), C atho lics and 
respondents w ith no (or another) re lig ious affiliation. In N orway and Sweden m ost 
surveys do not contain in form ation on denom ination, but because of the religious 
trad ition of state churches in these countries it is plausible tha t m ost religious
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Table 2.1 Surveys in C om para tive  D ataset on C leavage Voting conta in ing 
re levant in fo rm ation  on socia l class, denom ina tion  and church 
attendance
Country Period Surveys N
Australia 1965 -  2004 14 20,645
Austria 1974 -  2003 7 3,227
Belgium 1991 -  2003 4 6,766
France 1967 -  2007 8 17,872
Germany 1969 -  2005 22 25,244
Italy 1968 -  2006 9 9,989
The Netherlands 1970 -  2006 18 18,049
Norway 1981 -  1997 5 7,563
Spain 1979 -  2008 5 12,725
Sweden 1985 -  2002 6 9,958
Switzerland 1971 -  2003 6 9,115
United Kingdom 1964 -  2005 9 16,564
United States 1960 -  2004 12 10,585
Total 1960 -  2008 125 157,728
respondents belong to a P rotestant denom ination. In these countries we only 
investigate the cleavage between church-going and non-church going 
respondents. We fo llow ed a sim ilar procedure in p redom inantly C atholic  countries 
(Spain and Italy) where in form ation on denom ination is not available. In the other 
predom inantly Catholic  countries, Austria, Belgium  and France, we divide 
respondents into C atholics vs. non-C atho lics and church-goers vs. non-church 
goers.
Party choice: In m ost surveys respondents were asked to name to the party 
they voted for in the m ost recent e lection or vote intention for the upcoming 
election. W hen available, one of these variab les used to m easure voting behavior. 
In other, non-election, surveys, political party choice is m easured as voting 
intention “w hat would you vote if e lection were today/ next S un d ay?” or party 
identification. Because the party structure in som e countries has changed 
substantia lly over tim e (e.g. France, Italy, Netherlands) it is im possib le to 
d istinguish between individual parties in a m ultinom ia l logistic regression analysis 
when covering long tim e periods. And because for each country we aim to model 
over tim e changes that are com parable to other countries it is unavoidable to
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consistently group political parties across countries. In order to a llow  a cross 
national and over tim e com parison of c lass and relig ious voting we distinguish 
three categories of party choice: (1) left-w ing parties (socialist, com m unist, left- 
socialist), (2) right-w ing parties (liberal, conservative, agrarian, and new/far right) 
and (3) Christian parties (Christian D em ocrats and other denom inationa l parties). 
We prim arily relied on party categorizations by Lane and Ersson (1999). For 
details consult Appendix A .2. Respondents who voted for another party are 
excluded from  the analyses.
2. 4 Analysis
2.4.1 Modeling over time changes in class voting and religious voting 
simultaneously
In th is chapter we m odel changes in the c lass-vote re lationship and relig ion-vote 
re lationship on the basis of m ultinom ia l logistic regression analysis. We start with 
m odeling the changes in each of the 13 countries separately. In each country- 
specific m odel we sim u ltaneously include categories for the groups com prising 
the three cleavage lines: three dum m y-variab les for social class (with the manual 
working class as the reference category), dum m y-variab les for denom inations 
(with non/other religion as the reference category), and a dum m y-variab le for 
church attendance. We also include dum m y-variab les for all years in which the 
surveys in a country were held, w ith the first survey as the reference category. 
Next, we assum e tha t over tim e changes in the m agnitude of a particular cleavage 
may take three possible forms: stability, gradual change, and non-gradual 
change. Gradual changes are m odeled as in teractions between a linear m easure 
of year and the categories com prising a particular cleavage. Because cleavage 
changes are not necessarily linear processes we m odel non-gradual changes by 
including interactions between the groups com prising a cleavage and year-dum m y 
variables. In th is way we im pose no tim e constra in ts on the effect of a cleavage 
on party choice. Assum ing tha t the over tim e pattern of each of the three cleavages 
may take three possib le fo rm s we have to evaluate 27 m odels of cleavage change 
for each country, see tab le 2.2. It is however possib le that the im pact of social 
class is weakening w ith  respect to the left vs. right party contrast but that th is not 
the case w ith respect to voting for a relig ious party. On the other hand, changes 
in the effect of religion may be relevant for voting religious, but irrelevant for voting 
left vs. right. Therefore, we estim ated the 27 m odels of cleavage change tw ice in
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Table 2.2 A ssum ed m odels of over tim e  changes in the assoc ia tion
between socia l class, denom ina tion , church attendance and 
party choice
Model Social Class 
(C)
Denomination
(D)
Church attend. 
(A)
Model Constraint 
changes *
1 stable stable stable
2 stable stable gradual change 2b A
3 stable gradual change stable 3b D
4 stable stable unconstrained 4b A
5 stable unconstrained stable 5b D
6 stable gradual change unconstrained 6b D, A
7 stable unconstrained gradual change 7b D, A
8 stable gradual change gradual change 8b D, A
9 stable unconstrained unconstrained 9b D, A
10 gradual change stable stable 10b C
11 gradual change stable gradual change 11b C, A
12 gradual change gradual change stable 12b C, D
13 gradual change stable unconstrained 13b C, A
14 gradual change unconstrained stable 14b C, D
15 gradual change gradual change unconstrained 15b C, D, A
16 gradual change unconstrained gradual change 16b C, D, A
17 gradual change gradual change gradual change 17b C, D, A
18 gradual change unconstrained unconstrained 18b C, D, A
19 unconstrained Stable stable 19b C
20 unconstrained Stable gradual change 20b C, A
21 unconstrained gradual change stable 21b C, D
22 unconstrained stable unconstrained 22b C, A
23 unconstrained unconstrained stable 23b C, D
24 unconstrained gradual change unconstrained 24b C, D, A
25 unconstrained unconstrained gradual change 25b C, D, A
26 unconstrained gradual change gradual change 26b C, D, A
27 unconstrained unconstrained unconstrained 27b C, D, A
[Stable = no over time change in effect, gradual change = linear change in effect, unconstrained = no 
time constraints in effect]
* for social class effects (C) changes are constrained for religious voting, for denomination (D) and church 
attendance effects (A) changes are constrained for voting left vs. right
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countries w ith relig ious parties. In the second series we constra ined the changes 
in the class effects w ith respect to voting for a relig ious party, and we constrained 
the changes in the effects of religion w ith respect to voting left vs. right-wing. For 
som e countries we are not able to estim ate the full series of 27 models. In the four 
countries where the denom inationa l cleavage is not m easured (Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden), we are only able to exam ine changes in church attendance. Due 
to small num ber of relig ious votes in Sweden, we do not consider m odels w ithout 
tim e constra in ts in the Swedish case.
On the basis of goodness-o f-fit s tatis tics we select the m ost optim al m odel for 
each country. In Appendix B.1 we report for each estim ated model, the num ber of 
respondents (N), -2LL, the num ber of consum ed degrees of freedom  (df), as well 
as Schw arz’ Bayesian Inform ation C riterion (BIC). The BIC statis tic  takes the -2 
Log-Likelihood into account together w ith parsim ony of the m odel and the sam ple 
size: BIC = -2 log-like lihood + log(N)df. For each country we rank order the 
estim ated m odels of cleavage change according to the ir BIC value. The model 
w ith the lowest BIC index is often considered to be the preferred model. Because 
the BIC leads to the selection of more sim ple m odels (Lam m ers, Pelzer, Hendrickx, 
E isinga 2007) we test w hether the decrease in -2LL between subsequent m odels 
on the ranking list is significant. Som etim es it thus happens tha t the m odel with 
the second or third lowest BIC index is selected as the m ost optim al model in 
favor of the best ranking model.
In table 2.3 we sum m arize the preferred m odels for cleavage change. Given 
the d ifferent re lig ious structures between countries, we categorize our results on 
the basis of a co un try ’s relig ious trad ition, i.e.: Catholic, P rotestant and relig ious- 
mixed countries. On the basis of the m ultinom ia l log it-estim ations of these m odels 
(see appendix B.2) we indicate w hether the effect of a cleavage has remained 
stable, gradually declines or changes non-gradually over time. Table 2.3 clearly 
shows that, in support of the thes is  of the decline of class voting, in 8 out 13 
countries (i.e. all but Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Spain) the most 
optim al m odel assum es gradual decline in the c lass-vote relationship. W ith 
respect to the relig ious cleavage our m odel selection procedure suggests that in 
only 3 countries (Austria, Spain and United Kingdom) the effect of both church 
attendance and denom ination (if m easured) on voting has remained stable in the 
period covered. Interestingly, we find that the preferred m odels often assum e 
stable re lationships between denom ination and vote, but the effect of church 
attendance declines over time.
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Table 2.3 M ost op tim al m odel of c leavage change in 13 countries on the 
basis of the S ch w arz ’ Bayesian In form ation  C rite rion  (BIC)
Country (period) Social Class Denomination Church
attendance
Catholic countries
Austria (1974-2003) Stable Stable Stable
Belgium (1991-2003) Stable Gradual decline(b) Stable
France (1976-2007) Gradual decline Stable Gradual decline
Italy (1968-2006) Gradual decline(a) - Gradual decline(b)
Spain (1979-2008) Stable - Stable
Protestant countries
Australia (1965-2004) Gradual decline Stable Gradual decline
Norway (1981-1997) Gradual decline(a) - Gradual decline(b)
Sweden (1985-2002) Stable - Gradual decline(b)
United Kingdom (1964-2005) Gradual decline Stable Stable
United States (1960-2004) Gradual change(c) Gradual decline Stable
Religious mixed countries
Germany (1969-2005) Stable Stable Gradual decline(b)
The Netherlands (1970-2006) Gradual decline(a) Gradual change(b) Gradual decline(b)
Switzerland (1971-2003) Gradual decline Stable Gradual decline
[Stable = no over time change in effect on party choice, gradual decline = linear decline in effect on 
party choice, gradual change = contradictory changes among groups comprising a cleavage]
(a) class voting time trend constrained to zero for religious parties
(b) religious voting time trend constrained to zero for left vs. right-wing parties
(c) in the US class differences vs. working class are declining with exception of the self-employed
(d) in the Netherlands, religious differences are declining vs. non-religious, with exception of Protestants
For the Catholic countries we find in table 2.3 that the preferred m odels allow 
gradual decline in the class-vote relationship in France and Italy, but assum e no 
changes in the class-vote relationship in Austria, Belgium and Spain. In Austria and 
Spain also the religious cleavages are assumed to be stable over time. Only in 
Belgium the m ost optimal model suggests a gradual decline in the effect of having 
a Catholic denom ination. In France and Italy we find that the preferred model allows 
a gradual decline in the church attendance-vote association. The selected models 
in the Protestant countries allow the effects of social class to decline over time. 
Exceptions are the estimates for Sweden where the most optim al model assumes 
no over tim e change in the class-vote association, and the contrast between the
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working class and the self-employed in the U.S. The U.S. are the only Protestant 
country where the m ost optimal model allows a decline of denom ination-vote 
relationship, but assum es the effect church attendance to be stable over time. In 
Australia, Norway and Sweden the parameter estimates according to the optimal 
model suggest that the effect of church attendance is declining over time. The 
preferred model selected for the UK suggests that both the effects of church 
attendance as well as denom ination are stable over time.
In all three re lig ious-m ixed countries the optim al m odel suggests tha t the 
effect of church attendance is gradually declining. In the N etherlands also the 
effects of social c lass and denom ination are w eakening. In Sw itzerland the 
preferred model a llows the effect of class to decline gradually, but the effect of 
denom ination is assum ed to be stable. In Germany, the effects of both 
denom ination and social class are assum ed to be stable over time.
2.4.2 Measuring cleavage strength
In order to assess the m agnitude of the effect of the social cleavages on voting 
we use the kappa-index (Hout et al. 1995) as a m easure of cleavage-strength. 
The kappa-index is calculated using the standard deviation of the log-odds or 
predicted probabilities of all possible com binations groups (e.g. social classes, 
relig ious groups) and parties. Th is m easure was introduced by Hout et al. to 
provide “a uniform metric for comparative and historical analyses based on 
suitable class and voting typologies" (1995: 814). We calculate the kappa-index 
on the basis of the m ost optim al m ultinom ia l logistic regression model. Therefore 
we define the kappa-index as fo llow s (cf. Brooks et al. 2006; Lachat 2006):
Kot =
P=1S=1
1/2
[1]
where, I ts  is the average predicted probability of a m em ber of social group S to s — p
vote for party P and where is the mean probability of all S groups comprising 
a cleavage to for vote P Because we estimate m ultinom ial regression m odels with 
three vote outcom es we sum across both social groups and categories of party 
choice. The ct subscript for K  indicates tha t there is a single kappa-score for each 
country-year com bination based on the pattern of change resulting from  the most 
optim al m odel selected for each country. The calculated kappa-ind ices range 
between 0 and 0.5, and a higher value indicates a stronger associa tion between 
a cleavage and party choice.
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We set out to com pare the strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength 
of the relig ious cleavage across countries and over time. Because we disentangled 
church attendance and denom ination as tw o distinct aspects of the religious 
cleavage we have to integrate the tw o kappa-ind ices again into a single overall 
m easure for the strength of re lig ious voting. To do so, we rely on a m easure 
introduced by B rooks and Manza (1997) for the to ta l size of cleavage voting. This 
measure, the so-ca lled lam bda-index, is calculated as the m ean of separate 
kappas in order to determ ine the to ta l m agnitude of all cleavages w ith in  a 
particular country at a given point in tim e (Brooks and Manza 1997; B rooks et al.
2006). We use th is m easure not to analyze the total m agnitude of all cleavages 
but rather the overall m agnitude of the religious cleavage. We therefore define the 
lam bda-index as follows:
[2]
*  R
In th is equation there are R relig ious cleavages w ith  kappa score K. In our case R 
is 2 (r=1 the denom inational cleavage, r=2 the church attendance cleavage) and 
thus Xct expresses the average size of the religious cleavage in country c at time t.
Lambda is the mean of separate kappas, and accordingly kappa and lambda 
both have the sam e metric. We are therefore able to com pare the strength of the 
class cleavage w ith the overall strength of the relig ious cleavage. Next, we also 
exam ine w hether using explained variance instead of effect size as a decisive 
criterion for the com parative strength of cleavages leads to d ifferent conclusions. 
We obtained the contributed proportion of variance explained by social c lass and 
religion by conducting separate series of m ultinom ia l logistic regression for each 
country-year com bination. We look at the decrease of the Nagelkerke pseudo-R 2 
when excluding the class or relig ious variab les (taking denom ination and church 
attendance together) from  the model.
2.4.3 Comparing the strength of social class relative to religion
Our first research question is w hether stronger levels of class voting are associated 
w ith w eaker levels of relig ious voting, and vice versa. In the literature we found 
that th is assum ption is often not supported. A lthough the re lationship between 
religion and vote is found to be declining in som e countries, th is  developm ent is 
rarely accom panied by an increase of class voting. Here we present for each 
country the corre lation between the kappa-index of class voting on the one hand 
and on the other hand the kappa-index of denom inationa l voting, church
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attendance and the lam bda-index of overall re lig ious voting. The corre lations 
presented in tab le 2.4 suggest tha t the levels of class voting are generally positively 
associated w ith the levels of re lig ious voting. Negative corre la tions are found in 
four countries, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and the US. W ith respect to the 
corre lation between class voting and denom inationa l voting we only find negative 
corre lation in Belgium  and the U.S. By and large, the results therefore indicate 
that class d ifferences are m ore im portan t for voting when also relig ious d ifferences 
are larger. The prem ise that c lass may have a strong influence on voting on ly if 
there is no com peting influence of o ther cleavages is therefore not very sound, 
given that in m ost countries the corre lation between class and its m ost obvious 
rival is positive rather than negative. We now turn to answering our second 
research question about the trends in the d ifferences between the strength of the 
re lig ion-vote re lationship and the class-vote relationship.
Table 2.4 Co rre la tions between kappa-ind ices of c lass and re lig ious voting  
in 13 countriese
Country (period) N
Kappa index of class voting
. . Kappa-index lambda-index Kappa-index
denomination ttchudrch t5'vi^ riaN attendance religion
Catholic countries
Austria (1974-2003) 7 0.81 0.87 0.85
Belgium (1991-2003) 4 -0.45 -0.39 -0.42
France (1976-2007) 8 0.72 0.51 0.63
Italy (1968-2006) 9 - 0.06 0.06
Spain (1979-2008) 5 - 0.53 0.53
Protestant countries
Australia (1965-2004) 14 0.62 0.92 0.87
Norway (1981-1997) 5 - -0.06 -0.06
Sweden (1985-2002) 6 - -0.54 -0.54
United Kingdom (1964-2005) 9 0.70 0.56 0.83
United States (1960-2004) 12 -0.60 0.44 -0.45
Religious mixed countries
Germany (1969-2005) 22 0.50 0.43 0.47
The Netherlands (1970-2006) 18 0.51 0.64 0.60
Switzerland (1971-2003) 6 0.88 0.88 0.90
72
REViSITING LUPHART’S CRUCiAL EXPERiMENT
Catholic countries: In figure 2.1a we report the over tim e changes in the 
kappa-index of the class cleavage, church attendance and - if m easured - the 
denom inationa l cleavage in the five trad itiona lly  C atholic  countries. Figure 2.1b 
presents the contributed p roportion of explained variance by social c lass and 
religion. And in figure 2.1c we com pare the d ifference in contributed explained 
variance between class and religion w ith the d ifference in cleavage strength. The 
d ifference in contributed explained variance is calculated as the p roportion of 
Nagelkerke R2 explained by religion m inus the p roportion explained by social 
class. The d ifference in cleavage strength is calculated as: lam bda-index of 
re lig ious voting m inus kappa-index of class voting. In figure 2.1c values on the 
y-axis above 0 therefore present the extent to w hich the religion is m ore im portant 
for voting than class, and values lower than 0 represent the extent to w hich class 
is more im portant than religion.
Figure 2.1a shows that in three Catholic  countries, Belgium, France and Spain, 
re lig ious cleavages are m ore im portant than social c lass th roughou t the whole 
period in term s of kappa-index. In Spain we find that the d ifference between the 
strength of the class cleavage and the relig ious cleavage are stable over time. 
Throughout the w hole  period the cleavage strength of church attendance is about 
1.5 tim es the strength of social class. A lso w ith respect to the contributed 
proportion of explained variance we generally find that religion outw eighs social 
class, w ith the exception of the 1986 election, see figure 2.1b. In Belgium  and Italy 
the dom inance of religion over class is waning in te rm s of cleavage strength as 
well as explained variance. As indicated by figure 2.1a the cleavages based on 
denom ination and church attendance were about 2 tim es stronger than the class 
cleavage in Belgium  in 1991, but religion had lost th is relative strength during the 
2003-elections. Figure 2.1b and 2.1c suggest a sim ilar pattern w ith  respect to 
d ifferences in contributed explained variance. In the Italian case we observe 
(figure 2.1a) a sharp and sudden decline in 1994 of the im pact of church attendance 
on voting. The strength of the class cleavage on the other hand increased after 
the 1994 election. Consequently, the relative strength of religion in Italy has 
declined from  being about tw o or three tim es stronger than class in the period 
before 1994, to being about 1.5 tim es less im portant in 2006. We do not observe 
a sudden drop of religious voting with respect to the explained variance. A lthough 
figures 2.1b and 2.1c suggest that the variance explained by religion is decreasing, 
the process appears to be more gradual in nature than the decrease in kappa. In 
France denom ination and church attendance were about 1.5 tim es more im portant 
than the social class in the 1960s. We find that especia lly the strength of church
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Figure 2.1a C hanging streng th (m easured as kappa-index) of the
socia l class, denom ina tion  and church attendance c leavage in 
5 p redom inantly  C atho lic  countries
Figure 2.1b C ontribu ted  expla ined variance (N agelkerke R2) of socia l c lass 
and re lig ion predicting party choice in 5 p redom inantly C atho lic  
countries
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Figure 2.1c D ifference in cleavage streng th (a) and contributed  explained 
va riance (b) by socia l c lass and relig ion in 5 p redom inantly  
C atho lic  countries
Austria
I ' m
0 .15 0 .3 5 Belgium -r 0 .15 0 .3 5 -1 France •
-0.15 -0 .3 5 -0 .15  -0 .3 5  ■
1960  19 80  2 0 0 0
0 .2 5 Italy
1960  19 8 0  20 00
Spain
-0.15 -0 .3 5
19 6 0  19 8 0  2 0 0 0
difference in contributed 
explained variance (y1)
. difference in cleavage
strenght (y2)
1960  1980  20 0 0 19 60  19 80  20 0 0
(a) Relig ious voting (lambda-index) -  class voting (kappa-index)
(b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2)
attendance gradually dropped to the level of class voting in 2007. The d ifference 
between class and religion in explained variance has not changed substantia lly in 
France. A lthough the exp lanatory power of both cleavages declined, religion 
rem ains relatively more im portant com pared to class. In Austria  the class cleavage 
outweighs the tw o re lig ious cleavage lines th roughou t the w hole period, but only 
by a factor sm aller than 1.5. We find d ifferent results in term s of contributed 
explained variance (see figure 2.1b-2.1c). In the period 1989-1995 religion 
contributes more to the explained variance than social class.
Protestant countries: In figure 2.2a we report the changing strength of class, 
denom ination and church attendance in five predom inantly Protestant countries. 
Figure 2.2b shows the proportion of explained variance contributed by social 
class and religion. And in figure 2.2c we present the difference between class and 
religion in contributed explained variance together the d ifference in cleavage 
strength. For Austra lia  we observe in figure 2.2a that class d ifferences are 
consistently more im portant than both denom ination and church attendance.
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Figure 2.2a C hanging strength (m easured as kappa-index) of the
socia l class, denom ina tion  and church attendance cleavage in 
5 p redom inantly  P ro testan t countries
Figure 2.2b C ontribu ted  explained variance (Nagelkerke R2) of socia l class 
and re lig ion predicting party choice in 5 p redom inantly  
P ro testan t countries
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Figure 2.2c D ifference in cleavage streng th (a) and contributed  explained 
va riance (b) by socia l c lass and re lig ion in 5 p redom inantly 
Pro testan t countries
(a) Relig ious voting (lambda-index) -  class voting (kappa-index)
(b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2)
A lthough all three cleavages lines are declining the class cleavages remains 
about 1.5 to 2 tim es stronger than the denom inationa l cleavage. The impact of 
church attendance is declining the m ost in Austra lian politics and therefore the 
strength of the class cleavage relative to the strength of church attendance has 
nearly doubled between 1965 and 2004. A lso in te rm s of explained variance, see 
figure 2.2b, we find that class and religion lost the ir much of the ir power to predict 
voting. Overall, as indicated by figure 2.2c the relevance of class over religion has 
largely been stable in Austra lian politics in term s of cleavage strength. A lso in the 
United K ingdom  we find social class to be the dom inant political division, although 
it has particu larly decreased in strength (figure 2.2a) between the 1960s and 
1980s. Before the 1980s the class cleavage was about tw o tim es stronger than 
the denom inationa l cleavage and even nearly four tim es stronger than church 
attendance. A fter the 1980s th is was respective ly 1.5 and 3 tim es stronger. Figure 
2.2a-2.2c suggest that also w ith respect to explained variance the com parative 
influence of class relative to religion is decreasing. For N orway we find tha t the 
relative im portance of social class and relig ion has reversed over time. Figure
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2.2a indicates that the class cleavage in N orway declined from  being about 1.5 
tim es stronger than religion in 1981 to about 1.5 less im portant than religion in 
1997. We find a sim ilar reversal regarding the p roportion of explained variance in 
figure 2.2b. In Sweden class voting outw eighs relig ious voting th roughou t the 
1985-2002 period, in te rm s of cleavage strength as well as exp lanatory power. We 
find tha t class d ifferences were about 2.5 tim es more im portant than church 
attendance in 1985, and th is dropped to 1.75 in 2002. A lso the d ifferences in 
explained variance between class and religion are decreasing in Swedish 
elections. The US case stresses the im portance of d istinguishing between 
denom ination and church attendance. D enom inationa l d ifferences are, although 
declining, generally 1.5 to 2 tim es m ore im portan t than class d ivis ions in the 
United States, as indicated by figure 2.2a. Church attendance on the other hand 
is about 2.5 tim es less im portant than social class th roughout the w hole  period 
but the cleavage is re latively growing in strength. The increasing effect of church 
attendance however cannot com pensate the decline of the denom inationa l effect. 
This im plies that overall the class cleavage has come to outweigh the relig ious 
cleavage in US politics, as is indicated by figure 2.2c. In te rm s of explained 
variance we find that the d ifferences between class and relig ion are not particularly 
declining nor increasing.
Religious-mixed countries: In figure 2.3a we report the changing strength of social 
class, denom ination and church attendance in three re lig ious-m ixed countries. In 
the Netherlands and to a lesser extent also in Sw itzerland we observe that the two 
relig ious cleavages are generally m ore im portan t than the class cleavage. We find 
that in the Netherlands, denom ination and church attendance are about 2 tim es 
more im portan t than social class th roug hou t the period 1970-2006. In Sw itzerland 
the relative im portance of denom inationa l d ifferences has gradually declined 
from  being about 1.5 tim es more im portan t than class in 1971 to nearly no 
d ifference in 2003. Church attendance and social class were about equally strong 
in the 1970s, a lthough church attendance seem s slightly more im portan t over the 
w hole period. The dom inance of religion over social c lass in the Netherlands and 
Sw itzerland is also illustrated by the share in explained variance of the two 
cleavages in figure 2.3b. For G erm any we find d ifferent results when comparing 
the d ifferences in cleavage strength w ith the d ifferences in explained variance. In 
term s of kappa the class cleavage and the tw o relig ious cleavages were about 
equally strong in the 1960-1980s, see figure 2.3a. Throughout the w hole period 
we find that denom inationa l d ifferences are in general som ew hat stronger than
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class-based differences, and tha t particularly after the 1980s church attendance 
has gradually becom e 1.5 tim es less strong relative to the class cleavage. Overall, 
as indicated by figure 2.3c we find that from  the 1990s onwards class has become 
a stronger cleavage than religion. On the basis of contributed explained variance 
we find that the exp lanatory power of both class and religion declined, but that 
religion continued to outweigh class over the entire 1969-2005 period.
Figure 2.3a C hanging streng th (m easured as kappa-index) of the
socia l class, denom ina tion  and church a ttendance c leavage in 
3 re lig ious m ixed countries
Figure 2.3b C ontribu ted  explained variance (N agelkerke R2) of social
c lass and re lig ion predicting party choice in 3 re lig ious mixed 
countries
0 .5  H (West-) Germany 0.5  -i Netherlands 0 .5  n SwitzerlandWlM Ik
I contributed explained 
variance by social class
I contributed explained 
variance by religion
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Figure 2.3c D ifference in c leavage s treng th (a) and contributed  explained 
va riance (b) by social c lass and re lig ion in 3 re lig ious-m ixed 
countries
(a) Religious voting (lambda-index) -  class voting (kappa-index)
(b) Contributed explained variance (Nagelkerke R2)
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion
2.5.1 Conclusion
The aim of th is chapter was to system atica lly analyze cross-nationa l d ifferences 
and trends in the m agnitude and hierarchy of class and religion as social bases 
of voting behavior in th irteen countries. But unlike the few  previous studies 
com paring the m agnitude of cleavage voting we un iform ly m easured cleavage- 
strength based on a m ulti-ca tegory typo logy of both cleavages and parties, 
focused on the relative influence religion vs. class, and m odeled changes in the 
effects of class and relig ion sim ultaneously. Moreover, we m easured cleavage 
strength using appropriate and com parable m easures across countries and time, 
the kappa-index. And we com pared our results on cleavage strength w ith the 
d ifferences in explained variance contributed by religion and social class.
We answered tw o  questions. First, we set out to exam ine to w hat extent a 
strong c lass-vote re lationship in a country is associated w ith a w eak relig ion-vote 
relationship. We answered th is question by analyzing data on social class, religion 
and party choice from  13 countries in the period 1960-2008. Our results indicate 
that the relevance of class d ifferences and relig ious d ifferences on voting often 
run m ore or less parallel. We generally find positive corre la tions between a 
c oun try ’s degree of class voting and degree of re lig ious voting. These findings 
contest L ijp hart’s claim  that class m ay have a strong influence on voting only if
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there is no com peting influence of religion. Nevertheless, in five countries we find 
that social c lass is more im portant than religion, i.e.: Australia, Austria, Sweden 
and the United K ingdom. In six countries, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sw itzerland, the relig ious basis of voting is stronger than the class 
basis.
Second, we focused on over tim e changes in the relative influence of social 
class and religion on party choice. In support of reports proclaim ing the decreasing 
significance of trad itiona l cleavages we find tha t in m ost countries the association 
between party choice and both class as well as denom ination  and/or church 
attendance is w eakening. However, despite the decline of the m agnitude of 
cleavage voting in m ost countries, the hierarchy between class and religion for 
the m ost part endures. Relig ion nowadays is m ore im portant than social class in 
the largely sam e countries as in the 1970s. However, we find that the relative 
influence of religion over class is waning in Belgium  and Italy and is even reversing 
in G erm any and the US. In the other countries, the dom inance of religion over 
class generally persists. C lass continues to be more influential relative to religion 
in Austra lia  and Austria. In Sweden and the UK the relative effect of class over 
religion decreased considerably. Yet, in the last decade under study (1997-2007) 
we find the strongest relative effect of social class in Sweden: In Sweden the 
kappa-index of class voting and the contributed proportion of explained variance 
is found to be tw ice as strong when com pared to the effect of religion. In the 
sam e period we find the strongest relative effect of religion in the Netherlands, 
where the effect of re lig ious voting com pared to that of social c lass is about two 
tim es stronger, and nearly 15 tim es in te rm s of explained variance.
2.5.2 Discussion
We faced unavoidable lim ita tions in our large-scale com parison. First, a lthough 
we set out to keep away from  unnecessary d ichotom ies, the num ber of countries 
and period covered im posed restric tions to the level of detail m easuring cleavage 
groups and vote outcom es, such as the suboptim al four-ca tegory m easure of 
social class. It has been argued that also the d istinction between Protestants, 
C atholics and those w ith another/no religion overs im plifies the com plex religious 
structure in som e countries, such as the w ith in -P ro tes tan t d ifferences in the US 
(M anza and Brooks 1997) or the N etherlands (De Graaf et al. 2001). In th is chapter 
we merged all d ifferent types of P rotestant denom inations into a single category. 
In chapter 5 we will show that there are considerable d ifferences between orthodox 
and liberal P rotestant groups in the N etherlands in the sense that orthodox
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Protestants are much more likely to vote for a Christian party. For the Netherlands 
the use of a more d ifferentiated denom inationa l c lassification in th is chapter 
would therefore not have substantia lly changed the fact that religion outweighs 
social class. For other countries w ith a large varie ty of P rotestant groups the 
im plications of lum ping them  together m ight be more serious. According to the 
‘L iberal/M ain line P rotestant D ealignm ent Th e s is ’ (M anza and Brooks 1997) 
relig ious voting in the US is on ly declining am ong liberal Protestants, and is stable 
(or even increasing) am ong conservative Protestants. Moreover, research has 
shown tha t there is little change in the extent to w hat Jew ish voters in the US 
support the D em ocratic Party (M anza and Brooks 1997). By only d ifferentiating 
between C atholics and Protestants we therefore have underestim ated the 
associa tion between religion and party choice in the US, and over-estim ated the 
decline in th is association. Our finding tha t class has come to outweigh religion in 
US politics in recent years may therefore be approached w ith care. We were, 
however, able to d istinguish between frequent and infrequent church attendees. 
Our finding that the associa tion between church attendance and political 
preferences in the US, as one of the few  countries, has increased over tim e 
supports earlier find ings by Norris and Inglehart (2004). Identifying church 
attendance as a distinct aspect of the relig ious cleavage next to church 
m em bership allows including relig ious hom ogeneous countries into cross-nationa l 
com parisons of relig ious voting w ithou t neglecting denom inationa l d ifferences in 
relig ious heterogeneous countries. Moreover, w ith in -d enom ina tion  d ifferences 
between m oderate and conservative church m em bers are roughly accounted for. 
In th is way, we were able to broaden the scope of our research beyond previous 
studies and account for the relevance of the ties of church m em bers to their 
relig ious com m unities.
Second, som e have criticized the kappa-index calling it a “naïve” measure 
(Clark 2001; H outm an 2003) because it ignores the direction of g roup-party 
relationships. We are aware that the kappa-index does not reveal associa tions 
between specific social groups and parties. In the next chapters, we use log-odds 
ratios to m easure the g roup-specific  assoc ia tions of c lass and relig ious voting. 
Log-odds ratios are perhaps more in form ative for specific g roup-party 
associations, but they are not necessarily useful if one w ants to com pare the total 
m agnitude of cleavages c ross-nationa lly  and over tim e. For tha t purpose we 
consider the kappa-index to be appropriate; as the ‘aggregate ’ effect of all groups 
com prising a m ulti-categorica l cleavage on m ultip le vote outcom es. We have 
com pared the relative strength of kappa for social class and religion w ith the
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differences in contributed explained variance. On average, we found sim ilar 
results using tw o d ifferent criteria to evaluate the hierarchy of social c lass and 
religion in determ ining party choice.
Third, in th is chapter we m odeled up to 27 scenarios of cleavage change for 
each country. Point of departure for th is  exercise was our assum ption tha t there 
are three possible form s of changes: gradual-changes, non-gradual changes 
and stability. A lthough m ost of the preferred m odels assum ed either gradual 
changes or stab ility in the effects of class and religion on voting, we do not rule 
out the poss ib ility that other fo rm s of non-linear change may fit the data better for 
som e countries. For the Netherlands and Italy for exam ple we earlier referred to 
discrete in terruptions of continuous changes in relig ious voting (De Graaf et al. 
2001; Segatti and Vezzoni 2008). We leave it to future research to more exhaustively 
investigate the country-specific  scenarios of cleavage change beyond the m odels 
evaluated in th is chapter.
For future research, our approach can easily be applied to analyze the 
hierarchy between other (m ulti-)categorical determ inants of party choice. The 
analytical approach taken in th is research could therefore provide useful insights 
for the study of old vs. new social inequalities, e.g.: social c lass vs. education, or 
religion vs. ethnicity. Next to descriptive questions on the relative influence of 
other social cleavages on party choice, fu ture com parative research could 
address exp lanatory questions. In th is chapter we have shown tha t the class 
cleavage is only likely to be m ore im portant than relig ion in predom inantly 
Protestant countries. But our results do not suggest that the relig ious trad ition in 
a country plays a role in w hether the d ifferences between the strength of the 
relig ion-vote re lationship and the c lass-vote relationship in countries are declining 
or not. We w elcom e studies that aim to determ ine under w hat cond itions religion 
outw eighs social class, and vice versa. In the other chapters of th is book we 
consider the role of both social and political factors cond ition ing the processes of 
c lass- and relig ious de-alignm ent. But these exp lanations are hardly ever used to 
investigate the changing hierarchy between cleavages. The next chapters of this 
thesis make clear that next to social factors political factors may be im portan t to 
understand why social cleavages translates into voting behavior d ifferently from 
one country to another.
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Notes
1 Our comparative setting does not allow the investigation of language as a third factor because the 
necessary information is not included in our data. Because Lijphart selected four countries on the basis 
of the presence of linguistic minorities we do not examine the same countries. Our investigation does 
not include Canada and South Africa. The political and economic history of South Africa is evidently 
different from the advanced industrial democracies in the United States, Australia and Western Europe. 
For Canada we were unable to match the relevant information on social class to our pooled dataset 
because several waves of the Canadian Election Studies do not include the relevant information on self­
employment.
2 Web of Science listed 60 articles. Additionally, we found 8 published articles using Google Scholar. We 
excluded unpublished working papers or conference papers and books in which only short references 
are made to Lijphart's study.
3 With the exception of the high index-score of religious voting in 1960 when the association between 
Catholics and Democratic voting was exceptionally high due to Kennedy's presidential candidacy, see 
also Manza and Brooks (1997).
4 Oskarson (2005) studies cleavage voting in (Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark), but does not report about religious voting in Sweden and Denmark due to insufficient data on 
church attendance or insufficient votes for Christian parties.
84
2REViSiTiNG LIJPHART’S CRUCiAL EXPERiMENT
85

Chapter 3
Class Voting and Left-Right Party Positions
* A slightly different version of this chapter is forthcoming in: G. Evans and N.D. De Graaf (Eds.J. Political 
Choice Matters. Explaining the evolution of class and religious bases of party preference in cross-national 
perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming). Co-authors are Geoffrey Evans and Nan 
Dirk De Graaf.

CLASS VOTiNG AND LEFT-RiGHT PARTY POSiTiONS
3.1 Introduction
“in all democratic nations, including the United States, there has been a correlation 
between socioeconomic status and political beliefs and voting. The less privileged 
have supported parties that stood for greater equality and welfare protection, 
through government intervention, against the strain of a free enterprise economy. 
(...) This pattern has changed in recent decades" (Lipset 1991: 208). This statem ent 
by Seym our Martin Lipset parad igm atically encapsulates the central concern of 
class voting as a research subject for com parative political socio log ists. It not 
only identifies soc ioeconom ic  inequality between groups as a driving force of 
political d isagreem ent in societies, but also stresses interest in red istributionist 
polic ies as the rationale for the support of left-w ing parties. Moreover, much of 
the scholarly debate on the politics of c lass has concerned the strength of the 
corre lation between class and vote, and in particu lar the alleged decline or 
persistence of th is  associa tion (cf. Evans 1999b; Knutsen 2007). M any scholars 
have deem ed social class to be on the wane as a basis for voting behavior (C lark 
and Lipset 1991; Franklin 1992; N ieuw beerta  1995, Knutsen 2006) while  a 
universal decline is rejected by others (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1987; Manza, 
Hout and Brooks, 1995; Evans 1999b; Brooks, N ieuw beerta and Manza 2006; Elff
2007). W hat Lipset also makes clear however, and th is has been less frequently 
observed, is that students of mass political behavior should concentrate upon 
parties as m uch as voters. The structure of political supply is not constant: Policy 
positions of parties as well as the range of party positions w ith in  party system s 
vary across countries and over time. Such d ifferences in political supply can 
affect voter decis ion-m aking  by providing them  w ith choices of varying relevance 
to the ir econom ic interests.
This thesis has become known as the ‘to p -d o w n ’ perspective on class voting 
(cf. Evans 2000). From th is perspective patterns in class voting reflect the 
outcom es of party behavior rather than ‘bo ttom -up ’ changes in social structure. 
As Evans (2000: 411) points out, ‘the adoption of class-relevant policy programs 
should be associated with an increase in the class basis of partisanship' and vice 
versa. Thus varia tions in class voting are argued to derive from  difference in the 
redistributive policy choices offered to voters. Th is raises a problem  for 
com parative analyses of class voting, w hether over tim e or space, as the extent 
to which le ftist parties advocate red istributionist polic ies and non-le ftis t parties 
oppose them  is assum ed to be fixed. Many com parative studies on class voting 
use a generic categorization of parties or party fam ilies (often ‘ le ft ’ versus
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‘n o n -le ft’) regardless of the fact tha t parties change the ir positions on polic ies or 
that d ifferent parties w ith in  the sam e ‘party fa m ily ’ are perhaps sim ilar but often 
far from  equal (Knutsen 1998; Mair and M udde 1998; cf. E lff 2009).
In th is chapter we address th is concern by estim ating the im pact of the 
Left-R ight positions of political parties on the association between class and vote 
through a broad com parative analysis of integrated data from  15 countries in 
W estern Europe, the United States and Austra lia  between 1960 and 2005. We aim 
to answer the question: To what extent are social and political changes able to 
explain the levels of and changes in class voting in Western democracies? For this 
purpose we make use of our large-scale dataset, the Comparative Dataset on 
Cleavage Voting (CDCV) w hich provides the richest source of pooled individual- 
level surveys on the relations between class position and political choices 
available for W estern countries since the 1960s. Left-R ight positions of parties are 
estim ated using data from  the C om parative M anifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; 
K lingem ann et al. 2006). In com bination th is evidence a llows us to examine 
patterns of class voting across both countries and tim e, and test the general 
claim  that varia tions in pa rties ’ Left-R ight positions account for varia tions in the 
class-vote association.
3.2 Two approaches to the decline of class voting
3.2.1 Bottom-up
The salience of social c lasses in contem porary W estern societies seem s in many 
respects to have decreased in recent decades. Unsurprisingly, social c lass has 
also lost ground as a predictor of political behavior (Clark and Lipset 1991; 
Franklin 1992; N ieuw beerta 1995). Many of the exp lanations offered for this 
decline in class voting are driven by social structura l argum ents (for e laboration 
see C hapter 1). We will refer to these exp lanations as the ‘b o ttom -up ’ approach to 
class voting. ‘B o ttom -up ’ exp lanations of declining class voting have taken various 
forms: rising living standards and the spread of affluence (Clark and Lipset 1991), 
the changing gender com position  of class positions (K itschelt 1994), the decline 
of trad itiona l com m unities w hich has underm ined class so lidarity  and led to more 
privatized, ind ividualistic  and instrum ental voters (Franklin 1985; Rose and 
M cAllister 1986); growing intra- and intergene rational social m ob ility  (N ieuwbeerta, 
De Graaf and Ultee 2000), w ith  upwardly m obile voters being more right-wing 
than those w ho remain in the working class, but also more left-w ing than those in
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the ir destination class (De Graaf, N ieuw beerta  and Heath 1995). C lass conflic t is 
also believed to be replaced by new social cleavages such as gender, ethnic ity 
and sector em ploym ent, or to have been cross-cut by new value cleavages 
(Knutsen 1988; K itschelt 1994; Ing lehart 1997; Van der Waal, Achterberg and 
Houtm an 2007). From th is perspective the associa tion between class and vote is 
declining because cultural (conservative) issues are increasingly relevant to party 
choice for the working class. Finally, it has been claimed that educational 
expansion, accom panied by a general increase of ‘cognitive m ob iliza tion ’ has 
transform ed voters from  being driven by particularistic  loyalties (such as social 
class) into calculative, preference- and issue-oriented citizens (Franklin 1985; 
Inglehart 1990), thus fu rther weakening class divisions.
In sum, the ‘b o ttom -up ’ approach to class voting has assum ed that structural 
changes run parallel to, and account for, levels of class voting. C lasses have lost 
the ir d istinctiveness as social mobility, educational expansion, and com positiona l 
changes on the labor m arket have eroded the d ivis ions between them. Th is in 
turn d im in ishes the relevance of trad itiona l class conflict for vo te rs ’ political 
choices, causing a gradual decline of class voting in W estern countries. W ith our 
dataset we cannot test each of these exp lanations directly, but we can infer the 
pattern of decline produced by such changes. Their gradual, s low ly changing 
character should produce a relatively slow ly changing im pact on class politics. 
Any observed changes consistent w ith ‘bo ttom -up ’ processes should take the 
form  of a gradual decline, w hich should not include reversals (i.e. increases) in 
the strength of association. Hence we form ulate  the ‘gradual change hypo thesis ’: 
The association between class and vote for left vs. right-wing parties has 
monotonically declined since the 1960s (H1).
To infer the causes of changes in class voting from  the patterning of such change 
is not novel. O ther studies of class voting (see Evans et al. 1991; Gold thorpe 
1999; De Graaf, Heath and Need 2001) have also relied on evidence concerning 
the vo la tility  and abruptness of changes in the c lass-vote associa tion to indicate 
the likelihood that changes in associa tion can be seen as social or political in 
origin. We can go fu rther however and include in our m odels som e ind icators of 
social change that have been though t to contribute to the weakening of class 
voting. This ‘social change hypo thesis ’ contends tha t the blurring of social 
boundaries through processes of social and econom ic change as dem onstrated 
by the growing spread of fu rther and higher education through the class structure 
and the growing im pact of gender d ivis ions can be expected to have weakened
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the effects of class position on party choice. We can therefore hypothesize that 
controlling for changes in the re lationship between these social characteristics 
and social class should reduce the observed pattern of changes in the c lass-party 
association, i.e.: Over-time differences in the association between class and vote 
are (partly) explained by accounting for individual social characteristics of voters, 
such as education and gender (H2).
3.2.2 Top-down
If social change is assum ed to be relatively gradualist and unid irectional, political 
change is considered to take a more discrete form, traceable to changes in party 
strategies and the em ergence of new parties that shape the focus of political 
debates and interest representation. The degree to w hich parties o ffer choices 
that are more or less relevant to d ifferences in interests between c lasses should 
condition the extent of class voting. From a ‘top -dow n perspective ’, c lass voting 
is not only a consequence of the strength of the class divide in societies, but is 
also conditioned by the extent to which political parties are seen to be associated 
w ith interests of d ifferent social c lasses (Evans, Heath and Payne 1999; Oskarson 
2005; E lff 2009). An influential advocate of the ‘to p -d ow n ’ perspective Sartori 
(1969: 84) even argues tha t the politic ization of class d ivis ions by parties produces 
class consciousness rather than the other way around. From th is perspective the 
salience of social class in politics depends on party strategy. As class-relevant, 
econom ic issues are more salient th is may give rise to political po larization and 
reveal underlying d ifferences between c lasses (W eakliem  1993: 386). Similarly, 
as Berelson, Lazarsfeld and M cPhee (1954: 147) argue, political cam paigns 
revive old loyalties and re-engage d iffe rentia tion between groups in society. In 
th is respect the strength of class voting is cond itioned by the extent to which 
political parties present them se lves as representatives of working class interests, 
and to the extent they incorporate class-re lated issues in the ir political messages. 
By adopting a m ore m iddle class orientated appeal left-w ing parties weaken their 
support am ong the m anual w orking class and increase it am ong the m iddle 
class.
A sim ilar argum ent is made by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) in their 
d iscussion of the ‘D ilem m a of E lectoral S o c ia lism ’. They argue tha t because 
m anual w orkers are not the num erical m ajority  in m ost societies, Socia lis t parties 
aim to assure long-term  survival by appealing to m iddle class voters as well. This 
strategy underm ines working class political identity (Przeworski and Sprague 
1986). Of course, th is  approach is not exclusively ‘to p -d ow n ’ because it argues
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that party strategy itself is dependent on class conditions. The policy orientation 
of parties reflects to som e degree the com position  of electorates. Processes like 
de-industria liza tion, m arket libera lization and g lobalization transform ed the highly 
industria lized econom ies of W estern Europe of the 1960s into the contem porary 
post-industria l econom ies (Esping-Andersen 1999). W hereas the new service 
and m iddle c lasses expanded, the m anual class shrunk substantive ly (K itschelt 
1994; Knutsen 2006). On average, the size of the labor force em ployed in industry 
fell by nearly 40 percent between 1960 and 2005. Conversely, the share of the 
labor force em ployed in services has gradually risen over the sam e period to an 
average of approxim ate ly 65 percent of the labor force (own calcu la tions on the 
basis of CPDS data; A rm ingeon et al. 2008). Left-w ing parties can be expected to 
place less em phasis on trad itiona l working class issues as the p roportion of 
manual laborers in the population is sm aller5.
However, the em pirical va lid ity  of the ‘to p -d o w n ’ approach to class-based 
voting rem ains uncertain. In support of the approach, Evans, Heath and Payne 
(1991) and de Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) show evidence of marked d isconti­
nuities between d ifferent e lections tha t are consistent w ith party sh ifts  not social 
change, while Andersen and Heath (2003) suggest that political representation of 
social groups by parties enables social conflic t to become politica lly relevant. 
They state that the impact of race in U.S. elections is a reflection of firm Democratic 
standpoints on racial issues (Andersen and Heath 2003: 322). Furtherm ore, Hill 
and Leighley (1996) argue that, at US state-level, the D em ocratic  Party is better 
able to m obilize lower class voters if it is m ore liberal. But these studies all rely on 
the observation of d iscontinu ity  in the strength of c lass voting effects to infer a 
‘to p -d o w n ’ influence. They do not m easure actual party positions. S tud ies that 
have done th is show  less conclusive results. Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), 
O skarson (2005) and Elff (2009) find evidence of party position effects, but 
W eakliem  and Heath find no support for the idea tha t the ideolog ical difference 
between parties influences class voting. They find that class voting is not higher 
w hen voters perceive real ideolog ical d ifferences between parties (W eakliem  and 
Heath 1999).
In th is chapter we specify and test c ross-nationa lly  tw o  vers ions of the 
‘to p -d o w n ’ thesis. The first concerns the absolute ideolog ical position of left-w ing 
parties. If parties are econom ica lly  m ore to the left (e.g. support typ ical class 
related issues, m aintain strong ties to labor unions and call fo r a strong welfare 
state to protect d isadvantaged groups) it may fu rther the salience of class in 
politics. And w ithou t such class orientated party strategy Evans, Heath and Payne
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(1999: 88) argue class and vote are less strong ly associated: ‘Party positions 
therefore create class allegiances' and show  in the ir study of Britain between 
1964 and 1997 that class voting d im in ishes when the Labour Party m oves to the 
political centre. Th is thus im plies that the effect of belonging to a particular social 
class on the p robability of voting left-w ing will be sm aller when left-w ing parties 
are positioned closer to the ideolog ical centre. Therefore we form ulate  the 
‘left-w ing party position hyp o thesis ’: The association between social class and 
vote for left vs. right-wing parties is weaker as the Left-Right position of left-wing 
parties is more centrist (H3).
The second version of the ‘to p -d o w n ’ thesis concerns the relative positions of the 
parties on the le ft-right ideolog ical d im ension. The em phasis here is on the 
d istance between the main party choices that voters face, rather than the degree 
to w hich Left-w ing parties are ‘anchored ’ in left-w ing positions. Thus the British 
Labour Party is not unique in its attem pt to renew its soc ia l-dem ocra tic  principles 
in an era of post-industria lization, market libera lization and g lobalization (K itschelt 
1999). A fter 1989 m ost soc ia lis t parties no longer advocate the socia lization of 
industry but strive instead for a more humane form  of cap ita lism  (Esp ing-Anders- 
en 1999; Lipset 1991; Przeworski 1985). Keman and Pennings (2006) have shown 
that m any Social D em ocratic parties in W estern Europe have experienced moves 
to the centre of the ir party system s during the 1990s. They also argue that 
Christian D em ocratic parties moved to the centre of party system s as well, 
causing political choices to converge. Keman and Pennings argue that 
convergence of trad itiona l political parties creates the opportun ity  for new parties 
from  both the left and right to fill the void on the w ings of party system s or to 
challenge the positions of established parties.
Therefore the polarization of a party system, as an aggregate of all party 
positions, may affect class voting. If underpriv ileged classes support le ftist parties 
because they favor red istributionist polic ies then the voting decision is dependent 
on the proxim ity between voter and party on soc io -econom ic  issues. From a set 
of a lternatives a voter w ill pick the party c losest to h is /her own political beliefs 
(Downs 1957). Campbell, Converse, M iller and S tokes (1960: 364) write that 
casting a class vote is more likely if voters ‘perceive that differences exist between 
parties that are relevant to class interest' and W essels and Schm itt (2008) have 
shown that the m ore polarized party system s are, the more relevant proxim ity is 
for voting. We expect that class d ifferences in support for left-w ing parties are 
sm aller when the Left-R ight po larization of a party system  is weaker. Hence, our
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‘po larization hypo thesis ’ reads that: The association between social class and 
vote for left vs. right-wing parties is lower in less polarized party systems (H4).
A final im plication of the ‘to p -d o w n ’ approach is tha t party changes in ideological 
positions can explain patterns of change in class voting. Thus if there has been a 
general pattern of m ovem ent to the centre by Left-w ing parties or a convergence 
in the Left-right d iv is ions between parties over time, th is can explain over tim e 
changes in the class-vote relationship. By controlling for over tim e changes in the 
ideolog ical position of Left-w ing parties or the extent of ideolog ical d ivis ions 
between parties we expect to sta tis tica lly  remove the downward trend in class 
voting. We thus form ulate  the ‘political change hypo thesis ’: (a) Movement to the 
ideological centre by left-wing parties over time or (b) over time de-polarization of 
a party system should explain over time decline in class voting (H5).
3.3 Data and measurement
3.3.1 Comparative Dataset of Cleavage Voting
To test our hypotheses we make use of the Comparative Dataset on Cleavage 
Voting (CDCV). In th is chapter we select all surveys from  CDCV-file in period for 
which Party M anifesto data is available. This results in a selection of surveys 
between 1960-2003 (2004 for the US, 2005 for the UK). We include only those 
respondents w ith  valid in form ation on party choice, social class, age (in years), 
gender (female=1) and education (recoded into years of education and 
standardized by country). U ltimately, our analyses are based on 188 surveys from 
15 countries w ith a to ta l of 238.429 respondents. Table 3.1 show s the period 
covered for each country, the num ber of included surveys and the to ta l num ber of 
respondents.
In order to m easure social class position we use the sam e four c lass-catego- 
ries as in chapter 2: the m anual working class (i.e. skilled and unskilled workers), 
the self-em ployed (i.e. petit bourgeois and farmers), the routine non-m anual 
class, and the service class (i.e. lower and higher service class).
In order to a llow  a cross-nationa l and over tim e com parison of voting behavior 
we use a d ichotom ized m easure of party choice. Therefore, we first standardized 
the responden t’s party choice by applying a fa irly  conventional party fam ily 
categorization (prim ary source: Lane and Ersson 1999). Second, we d ichotom ized 
these party fam ilies on the basis of the ir trad itiona l soc io -econom ic  appeal;
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Table 3.1 Surveys in the C om para tive  D ataset on C leavage Voting between 
1960-2003*
Country Period Number of 
surveys
N of
respondents
% of total N
Australia 1965 -  2001 14 21,529 9.0
Austria 1974 -  2003 7 3,222 1.4
Belgium 1975 -  2003 5 7,355 3.1
Denmark 1971 -  2001 13 18,490 7.8
Finland 1972 -  2003 6 3,333 1.4
France 1967 -  2002 7 14,611 6.1
Germany 1969 -  2002 22 25,680 10.8
Italy 1968 -  2001 8 9,728 4.1
The Netherlands 1970 -  2002 19 18,226 7.6
Norway 1965 -  2001 10 10,974 4.6
Spain 1979 -  2000 7 14,130 5.9
Sweden 1972 -  2002 11 17,792 7.5
Switzerland 1971 -  2003 10 10,600 4.4
United Kingdom 1964 -  2005 17 27,997 11.7
United States 1960 -  2004 32 34,762 14.6
Total 1960 -  2005 188 238,429 100.0
*2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK.
distinguishing between left-w ing parties (socialist, com m unist, left-socialist) 
coded as (0) and right-w ing parties, including relig ious parties (i.e.: liberal, 
conservative, agrarian, Christian dem ocrats, and far right) coded as (1). For 
details consult Appendix A.2. Voters w ho voted for another party are excluded 
from  the analyses6
3.3.2 Comparative Manifesto Data
To determ ine the ideolog ical position of the parties and party b locs we construct 
a scale using data from  the C om parative M anifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; 
K lingem ann et al. 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of 
e lection program s of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity 
and direction of sta tem ents by parties, m easured in (‘q uas i’) sentences in a 
program, are classified in 56 policy categories over seven policy dom ains (i.e. 
external relations, freedom  and democracy, political system, economy, welfare
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and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups). Party positions in each 
country are matched to the individual level data on the basis of the corresponding 
election year or the last preceding election.
First, we construct a R ight-Left party position on ly based on econom ic and 
welfare policy issues. Because these tw o policy dom ains are about c lass-re levant 
issues like social inequality, red istribution, the protection of underprivileged 
groups, welfare state expansion and econom ic principles, they are perhaps more 
c losely associated w ith  the trad itiona l class conflict than the broad le ft-right scale 
by Laver and Budge7 (1992). We use three pre-constructed scales from  the CMP 
data files: The planned economy scale is com posed of the jo in t em phasis on the 
policy categories ‘m arket regulation: pos itive ’, ‘econom ic planning: pos itive ’ and 
‘controlled econom y: positive ’. The welfare scale consists of the policy categories 
‘social justice: pos itive ’ and ‘welfare state expansion: pos itive ’. And the market 
economy scale is constitu ted by the policy categories ‘free enterprise: pos itive ’ 
and ‘econom ic orthodoxy: p os itive ’. We com bine these three scales w ith three 
items on social groups, i.e.: ‘labour groups: pos itive ’, ‘m iddle class and 
professional g roup s’ and ‘ labour groups: negative’. The first item measures 
‘favourable references to labour groups, working class, unemployed; support for 
trade unions; good treatment of manual and other employees’, w hereas the 
second item m easures ‘favourable references to middle class, professional 
groups, such as physicians or lawyers; old and new middle class'. ‘Labour groups: 
negative ’ m easures the ‘Abuse of power by trade un ions ’ and otherw ise the 
reverse of ‘Labour groups: p os itive ’. We create a soc ia l-econom ic  Left-R ight 
position (hereafter: L-R. position) by com bining the scales as ((market econom y 
+ m iddle class groups + negative labour groups) - (planned econom y + welfare 
+ labour groups).
We use th is L-R scale to m easure the Left-Right position of Left-wing parties. 
Because our hypotheses are concerned w ith the position of left-w ing parties as a 
group instead of individual parties we construct a weighted m ean of th is  scale for 
the left-w ing party group in each country-year com bination. The w eight of a party 
w ith in  th is group is determ ined by its vote share in percentages. Because the 
CMP data only includes so-ca lled ‘s ig n ifican t’ parties (parties w ith  coalition 
potential or the ab ility of political blackmail, see CMP coding instructions) not all 
parties in W estern post-war electoral h istory are covered in the CMP dataset. 
Therefore, we are not able to include the position of m inor left-w ing parties in 
calculating the m ean position of the left-w ing party group. In order to m easure 
Party System Polarization we em ploy a m easure suggested by Dalton (2008). Like
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Figure 3.1 LR-positions of Left-wing parties and party polarization in 15 
countries in the period 1960-2005
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other ind icators of party po larization (e.g. S igelm an and Yough 1978) th is index is 
calculated on the basis of the standard deviation from  the average position of 
parties in a party system  weighted by party size.
' ' I
f,
( x . - x )
[1]
<=1
Where, N is the num ber of parties in the party system, f i is the vote share of a 
specific party, x i is the LR-position of a party and X i is the average LR-position 
of all parties in the party system. The m etric of th is  index runs from  0 (all parties 
occupy the sam e position) to 10 (full po larization along the ends of the L-R 
scale).
Table 3.2 Linear Trends (correlations with election year) in LR positions of left- 
wing parties and LR party polarization in 15 countries (1960-2003a).
Country N LR position left-wing parties
LR party system 
polarization
Australia 17 0.41* -0.51**
Austria 13 -0.18 0.01
Belgium 14 -0.33 -0 .82***
Denmark 17 -0.28 -0.21
Finland 12 0.19 -0.19
France 11 0.31 0.20
Germany 12 -0.23 0.42
Italy 11 -0.06 0.26
The Netherlands 13 0.62** -0 .63***
Norway 11 -0.10 -0.36
Spain 8 -0.13 0.41
Sweden 14 0.63** -0.43
Switzerland 11 -0.12 0.38
United Kingdom 11 0.20 -0.23
United States 12 -0.16 -0.15
Total 187 0.11 -0 .22***
a 2004 for the US and 2005 for the UK. Source: Comparative Manifesto Project, Budge et al. 2001, 
Klingemann et al. 2006, own calculations 
* p. < 0.1; * *  p < 0.05; * * *  p < 0.01
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Figure 3.1 show s the position of left-w ing parties on the L-R scale, as well as the 
L-R party system  polarization country by country from  1960 onwards. On the 
y-ax is on the left-hand side, a higher score on the L-R scale m eans a more 
rightward (or centrist) position of left-w ing parties. The second y-ax is on the 
right-hand side portrays the degree of po larization of a party system  based on the 
L-R scale. W hether or not the observed patterns in figure 3.1 fo llow  a linear course 
is tested in tab le 3.2. This tab le show s the corre la tions between e lection year and 
the LR positions of left-w ing parties for 15 countries separate ly as well as the 
corre lation between e lection year and the party system  polarization.
The patterns in figure 3.1 and tab le 3.2 tell us tha t there is no clear sign of a 
universal m ovem ent of left-w ing parties since the 1960s and where such 
m ovem ent is observed it does not fo llow  a linear trend in m ost cases. This was 
also a conclusion of A chterberg ’s (2006) analysis of the overall salience of class 
issues in e lections using the CMP data between 1945 and 1998. The only clear 
signs of de-polarization in tab le 3.2 are observed in Australia, Belgium  and the 
Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Sweden. In these countries there has been 
a rightward sh ift of left-w ing parties since the 1960s and the L-R party system 
polarization decreased over th is period has well.
3.4 Two-Step Hierarchical Estimation
3.4.1 First stage analyses
Two-Step H ierarchical Estim ation m ethod (Achen 2005) involves estim ating a 
separate regression analysis for each survey (188) w ith in  our dataset. G iven the 
categorical nature of our dependent variab le we use binary logit m odels for these 
first-stage estim ations. These m odels provide the m ultivariate effects of social 
class (with the m anual class as the reference category) controlled for age, gender, 
and education on the probability of voting right versus left-w ing. The ‘n e t’ class 
coeffic ients (i.e. w ith  controls) then become the variab les to be explained at the 
second level. We use the natural logarithm  of the odds ratios as the dependent 
variab les in the second stage analyses, because it has the advantage of being 
asym ptotica lly norm ally d istributed (Agresti 2002). The log-odds ratio is a relative 
m easure of cleavage strength and has been used in previous research to study 
class voting (see C hapter 1). In the analysis at the second stage, we take into 
account that the estim ated log-odds ra tio ’s from  the first stage d iffer in reliability, 
due to d ifferences in sam ple size or to d ifferences in the extent of class voting.
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Therefore, we use a case w eight in the analysis w hich gives more w eight to 
log-odds ratios w ith a lower standard error (Sm its and Park 2009). In a second 
series of first-stage analyses we also estim ated the ‘g ross ’ effects of social class, 
i.e.: w ithou t controlling for age, gender, and education. We hypothesized that 
over-tim e d ifferences in the association between class and vote are (partly) 
explained by accounting for changes in the com position  of electorates. We 
therefore present an evaluation of both series of the first stage estim ations. First, 
we present country -by-country graphs of the net log-odd estim ates in figures 
3.2a (routine non-m anual class), 3.2b (service class) and 3.2c (self-em ployed) as 
well as the fitted trend lines. In order to visualize the degree of uncerta in ty 
surrounding the estim ates we also present the corresponding standard error 
intervals. Second, because of the som etim es m odest d ifference between the net 
and gross log-odds ratios we do not present the gross effects in figure 3.2, and 
thus we confine ourselves to the im plied fitted trend lines.
We first d iscuss the gross associa tion between class and vote. Over all 
countries and years in our first stage models, the results confirm  the expectation 
that the working class is generally less right-wing than other classes. As expected 
we find the largest d ifferences in voting between the m anual w orking class and 
the self-em ployed (mean log-odds ratio = 1.39), fo llow ed by the service class 
(mean log-odds ratio = 0.83). The sm allest d ifferences in voting in our m odels 
exist between the m anual working class and the routine non-m anual class (mean 
log-odds ratio = 0.56). In general we see the d ifferences between classes decline 
in the period between 1960s-70s and the 2000s. For the routine non-m anual 
class, the service class and the self-em ployed it holds that the odds of voting for 
a right-wing party generally have decreased over the last four decades, causing 
the political choices of d ifferent classes to convergence over tim e. Despite this 
decline the order of right-wing voting between c lasses for the m ost part persists: 
In 2000-2005 the self-em ployed are m ost d ifferent from  the m anual working class 
(mean log-odds ratio = 1.13); fo llow ed by the service class (mean log-odds ratio 
= 0.34) and the routine non-m anual class (mean log-odds ratio = 0.19). But we 
clearly observe a sharp decline in the political d ifferences between the m anual 
w orking class and the service class.
W ith  regard to c ross-nationa l d ifferences figures 3.2a-3.2c reveal that 
c lass-based voting is the strongest in N orthern Europe (Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland) and the United K ingdom. A lso in N orw ay relatively high log-odds ratios 
are observed, but figure 3.2b also show s a clear decline in th is country in the 
d ifferences between the service class and the m anual working class in the period
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Figure 3.2a Estimated log-odds ratios for routine non-manual class to vote
right-wing relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, 
gender, education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005
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Figure 3.2b Estimated log-odds ratios for service class to vote right-wing
relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, gender, 
education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005
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Figure 3.2c Estimated log-odds ratios for self-employed to vote right-wing 
relative to manual working class (net: controlled for age, gender, 
education) in 15 countries between 1960-2005
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1965-2001. The lowest levels of class voting are found in Italy, France, Sw itzerland 
and the United States. N onetheless, in all countries that we observe the political 
d ifferences relative to the working class are m ost prom inent for the self-em ployed, 
and are the sm allest for the routine non-m anual class. Moreover, in m ost countries 
the general pattern of declining class d ifferences is confirm ed8. The boundaries 
between the routine non-m anual c lass and the working class seem to have 
declined only m odestly in the m ajo rity  of cases, but th is is hardly surprising giving 
the finding that the political d ifferences between these tw o  c lasses were always 
sm aller com pared to the d istance between the working class and other classes. 
In nearly all countries the decline of class voting is m ost apparent w ith respect to 
the w orking class versus service class. But the self-em ployed are also, in a lm ost 
all countries, decreasingly inclined to vote right-w ing relative to the working class. 
The m ost notable exception to the general pattern is the United States. In the US 
d ifferences in voting between working class voters and the self-em ployed 
increased rather than decreased.
Let us now turn to the net log-odds estim ates in figures 3.2a-3.2c. Over all 
countries and years the net estim ates are, as expected som ew hat weaker than 
the gross estim ates, but the d ifferences are rather small. Controlling  for age, 
gender and education on ly m odestly explains the voting d ifferences between the 
routine non-m anual class and working class (mean log-odds ratio decline = 0.04) 
and between the self-em ployed and working class (mean log-odds ratio decline 
= 0.03). Controlling  for age, gender and education has the largest effect on the 
political d ifferences between the service class and the working class (mean log 
odds ratio decline = 0.14, w hich is on average about 20 percent of the association). 
W ith respect to the service class figure 3.2b shows that not on ly the net log-odds 
ratios are on average lower than the gross log-odds ratios but also that in most 
countries the slopes of the fitted trend lines are w eaker in case of the controlled 
association. W ith  regard to the routine non-m anual class and the self-em ployed 
the d ifferences between the controlled and uncontro lled fitted slopes are less 
apparent.
W hat is not shown in the figures is that in general o lder people more often 
(mean b = 0.008) and fem ales less often (mean b= -0.04) vote right-wing, 
although the effects of age and gender are often not significant. In th is sense the 
m ost p rom inent control is education. On average for all the w hole period between 
1960-2005 we find that the more years of education the more likely a person is to 
vote right-w ing (mean b = 0.19), but in m ost countries th is associa tion is weakening 
over time. These find ings to som e extent support the social change hypothesis
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that over-tim e d ifferences in the associa tion between class and vote are explained 
by accounting for individual social characteristics of voters. Our results indicate 
that the changing com position  of the electorate is partly responsib le for the 
decreasing political d ifferences between the service class and the working class, 
but not so much for the d ifferences between the w orking class and the routine 
non-m anual class or self-em ployed.
3.4.2 Second-stage analyses
At the second stage each survey is used as one observation (N =188), and we use 
the net log-odds ratios as the dependent variab les m easuring the levels of class 
voting. Because we investigate three d ifferent c lass contrasts we have three 
dependent variab les at the second stage. Because our observations at th is  stage 
are h ierarchically clustered in countries we em ploy a m ultilevel ana lys is9 analyzing 
188 survey-observa tions nested in 15 countries. We use robust standard errors in 
a m ultilevel linear regression where we add case w eights to control for the 
standard errors of the estim ated log-odds ratios (c.f. Sm its and Park 2009). 
Descriptive sta tis tics of the second-stage variab les are presented in tab le 3.3.
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of second -stage variables
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Log-odds routine non-manual class a 188 0.52 0.33 -1.45 1.40
Log-odds service class a 188 0.69 0.46 -0.22 2.34
Log-odds self-employed a 188 1.36 0.70 -0.01 3.66
LR position of left-wing parties 188 -20.51 8.41 -57.65 1.12
LR party system polarization 188 1.08 0.48 0.10 2.44
Year of survey 188 1985 10.39 1960 2005
a cases weight on the basis of their first-stage standard error estimation
We begin our second-stage tests by exam ining the corre la tions between the 
log-odds ratios m easuring the strength of class voting and the independent 
variables. Table 3.4 show s the zero-order corre lation m atrix of the second-stage 
variables. Naturally, we observe positive corre la tions between the log-odds ratios 
corresponding to d ifferent class contrasts. On the basis of tab le 3.4 we notice the 
d ifferences in w hether these log-odds ratios correlate w ith the independent
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variables. First, the log-odds ratios of the routine non-m anual class do not seem 
to be correlated w ith the LR position of left-w ing parties. But there is a positive 
corre lation (r=0.294) w ith  party system  polarization. The larger the le ft/right 
po larization between parties the more likely routine non-m anual class voters will 
support a right-w ing party instead of a left-w ing party relative to the working class. 
Second, the log-odds ratios of the service class and self-em ployed both show 
significant corre la tions w ith the tw o m anifesto-based scales. Service class and 
self-em ployed voters less often vote right versus left-w ing as left-w ing parties 
adopt more rightist positions (r= -0.227 and r= -0.404) and more often vote 
right-wing as the party system  polarization is greater (r=0.363 and r=0.309).
The corre la tions between the log-odds ratios of class voting and a linear 
m easure of year confirm  our find ings based on the plots in figure 3.2. Year of 
survey is positive ly correlated w ith the log-odds ratios of the routine non-m anual 
class (r= 0 .241 ) and the service class (r=0.330), suggesting declining d ifferences 
in class voting over tim e. W ith regard to the self-em ployed, we however find no 
significant corre lation between the log-odds ratios and year in tab le 3.4. However, 
if we exclude all observations based on U S-surveys and calculate the correlation 
based on the rem aining 156 observation we find a significant and positive 
corre lation between log-odds ratio and year for the self-em ployed (r=0.280). This 
finding confirm s w hat we already noted in figure 3.2c. In spite of a general decline
Table 3.4 Correlation m atrix of second-stage variables
2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Log-odds routine 0 .692*** 
non-manual class (N=188)
0 .309*** -0.100 0.294*** -0.241***
2. Log-odds service class -
(N=188)
0 .544*** -0 .227*** 0.363*** -0 .330***
3. Log-odds self-employed 
(N=188)
- -0.404*** 0 .309*** -0.072
4. LR position of left-wing 
parties (N=187) a
5. LR Party System Polarization 
(N=187) a
6. Year of survey
-0.399*** 0.108
-0.215***
a Correlation based on 187 observations in Comparative Manifesto Dataset (2001, 2006) for all election 
years between 1960 and 2005 for 15 countries 
* p. < 0.1: * *  p < 0.05: * * *  p < 0.01
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of the political d ifferences between the self-em ployed and the working class in 
m ost countries, we observe an increase of these d ifferences in the US.
F inally tab le 3.4 shows a negative corre lation between the LR position of 
left-w ing parties and party system  polarization (r=-0.399). In other words, as 
expected a more right-w ing position of left-w ing parties is associated w ith low 
party system  polarization. However, as we already found in tab le 1, contrary to 
our expectations the LR position of left-w ing parties is not sign ificantly correlated 
w ith year. This finding suggests that there is no sign of a gradual, universal 
m ovem ent of left-w ing parties in the period 1960-2005. Party system  polarization 
on the o ther hand is linearly associated w ith year (r= -0.215). Th is negative 
re lationship suggests a pattern of gradual depolarization, a lthough we have seen 
in tab le 3.2 that th is  is not the case in all countries.
We continue our second-stage test by presenting the results of a series of 
m ultilevel linear regression analyses. Because we investigate three class contrasts 
we show the results of our m odels for three d ifferent log-odds ratios as the 
dependent variable. We start in tab le 3.5 by reporting a null m odel which shows 
the extent to w hich there is w ith in -coun try  and betw een-country variation in the 
levels of class voting. W ith  respect to the routine non-m anual class the null model 
shows that the survey-level variance is 0.070 and the country-level variance is 
0.045. The im plied intra class corre lation ((0.045/(0.045 + 0.070)) = 0.39) indicates 
that not only is there variation in the estim ated log-odds between surveys but also 
considerable varia tion between countries. W ith respect to the service class and 
the self-em ployed the intra class corre lation is even higher, 0.45 and 0.75 
respectively.
Next, we m odel trends in class voting by introducing a linear m easure of year. 
Given the fact that the plots of the first stage estim ated log-odds in figure 3.2 
showed that the decline of class voting is not entire ly a gradual process and that 
trends d iffer from  country to country we tried to m odel these trends in various 
ways (i.e.10-year categories, 5-year categories, linear w ith  a random  intercept, 
linear w ith both random  intercept and slope). G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics and 
likelihood ratio tests (see appendix C) showed that including year of survey linearly 
w ith both a random  intercept and slope in general proved to be the preferred 
model. Only w ith  respect to the routine non-m anual c lass the random  slope model 
is rejected in favor of the random  intercept model. In m odel I we therefore first 
present a random  intercept m odel w ith the effect of year fixed over countries, and 
in m odel II we present a random  coeffic ient m odel w ith  a random  slope of year for 
each country. To interpret the mean intercept of the random  coeffic ient m odel we
108
CLASS VOTiNG AND LEFT-RiGHT PARTY POSiTiONS
centered the linear m easure of year (1985 = 0). Both m odels I and II show  negative 
year-effects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. These estim ates confirm  
that d ifferences in voting between the working class and other classes haves 
declined in recent decades. The m ost clear sign of decline is found w ith regard to 
the service class (mean slope = -0.213). Because the random  slope variance is 
significant w ith respect to the service class and self-em ployed th is confirm s that 
the linear trends in class voting vary between countries. In figure 3.3 we plotted 
the country-specific  trends on the basis of tab le 3.5, m odel II. The association 
between class and vote for right vs. left-w ing parties has indeed declined since 
the 1960s in m ost countries, again w ith the self-em ployed in the US as the most 
notable exception. The linear trends in figure 3.3 show  great resem blance to the 
fitted trend lines in figures 3.2a-3.2c. Despite observed deviations from  the linear 
trend in figure 3.2 we find support for our gradual change hypothesis in tab le 3.5. 
In additional analyses we estim ated m odels I and II on the basis of the gross 
instead of net first-stage log-odds ratios (see appendix C). By com paring the 
‘g ross ’ m ean slopes of year w ith the ‘n e t’ results in table 3.5 we can assess to 
what extent social changes account for the linear decline of class voting. W ith 
respect to the controlled and uncontro lled log-odds ratios of the self-em ployed 
the m ean slope of linear year does hardly differ. In case of the service class and 
the routine non-m anual class, the m ean slope of year respectively is 25% and 
35% weaker regressing the controlled log-odds ratios instead of the uncontrolled 
log odds ratios. These find ings support the social change hypothesis in the sense 
that gradual decline of the associa tion between class and vote is partly accounted 
for by social characteristics of voters.
In m odel III of tab le 3.5, we include the LR position of parties. Critics of the 
Com parative M anifesto Project argue that they are m ost appropriate for 
w ith in -coun try  com parisons but not necessarily for betw een-country com parisons. 
In pre lim inary analyses we therefore included random  slopes of the m anifesto 
scales allow ing these variab les to have a d ifferent effect in each country. However, 
testing the variance of these slopes using likelihood ratio tests (see appendix C) 
we found that allow ing random  slopes did not result in better m odel fits. We 
therefore rejected the random -coeffic ien t m odels in favor of the random -intercept 
m odels and included the LR positions of left-w ing parties w ith a fixed slope over 
countries. We find that, a llow ing country-specific  trends in class voting, positions 
of left-w ing parties do not sign ificantly affect the log-odds ratios for the routine 
non-m anual class, the service class or the self-em ployed. In other words, the 
likelihood of other c lasses voting right-w ing relative to the working class does not
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i  Table 3.5 S e c o n d -s ta g e  p a ra m e te r  e s t im a t io n s  o f m u lt ile v e l lin e a r re g re s s io n  p re d ic tin g  th e  leve l o f c la s s  v o t in g  iO  >
(m easu red  in 'n e t' log -od d s  ra tios  to vote fo r a r ig h t versus a le ft pa rty )  5m33CO
log-odds ratio to vote left versus right 
manual working class = reference group
Routine non-manual class Service class Self-employed and farmers
Null Model
Fixed Effects 
Intercept 
Variance Components 
Level 1 Variance 
Level 2 Variance 
-2 Loglikelihood
b se
0.476*** 0.060
0.070*** 0.011 
0 .045*** 0.017 
65.5
b se
0 .689*** 0.087
0.116*** 0.024 
0 .095*** 0.026 
162.9
b se
1.524*** 0.170
0.132*** 0.021 
0 .390*** 0.121 
205.8
Model I
Fixed Effects 
Intercept
Linear year * 10 (1985=0) 
Variance Components 
Level 1 Variance 
Level 2 Variance 
-2 Loglikelihood
0 .492*** 0.059 
-0.105*** 0.025
0 .060*** 0.008 
0 .044*** 0.016 
36.1
0.728*** 0.091 
-0.199*** 0.035
0.076*** 0.012 
0.104*** 0.024 
90.4
1.538*** 0.175 
-0.146** 0.057
0.109*** 0.017 
0 .405*** 0.124 
172.9
Model II
Fixed Effects 
Intercept
Linear year * 10 (1985=0) 
Variance Components 
Level 1 Variance 
Level 2 Variance 
Random Slope linear year 
-2 Loglikelihood
0.499*** 0.057 
-0.114*** 0.025
0 .058*** 0.007 
0 .042*** 0.015 
0.002 0.002 
34.6
0.737*** 0.089 
-0 .213*** 0.033
0 .068*** 0.012 
0.104*** 0.023 
0.007* 0.004 
82.1
1.555*** 0.170 
-0.189*** 0.041
0 .087*** 0.011 
0 .395*** 0.120 
0.017** 0.009 
144.4
Model III
Fixed Effects
Intercept 0 .420*** 0.088 0.655*** 0.150 1.474*** 0.198
Linear year * 10 (1985=0) -0.111*** 0.026 -0 .209*** 0.034 -0.184*** 0.041
LR position of left-wing parties * 10 -0.036 0.033 -0.037 0.045 -0.037 0.026
Variance Components
Level 1 Variance 0.057*** 0.007 0 .068*** 0.012 0 .086*** 0.010
Level 2 Variance 0.043*** 0.016 0.100*** 0.025 0.381*** 0.117
Random Slope Linear year 0.002 0.002 0.007* 0.004 0.017** 0.009
-2 Loglikelihood 33.1 80.9 143.5
Model IV
Fixed Effects
Intercept 0 .387*** 0.072 0 .602*** 0.084 1.408*** 0.167
Linear year * 10 (1985=0) -0.109*** 0.025 -0.205*** 0.033 -0.183*** 0.040
LR Party System Polarization 0.104** 0.052 0.125*** 0.037 0.137** 0.055
Variance Components
Level 1 Variance 0.056*** 0.007 0 .066*** 0.011 0.084*** 0.011
Level 2 Variance 0.038*** -0.014 0.091*** 0.020 0 .364*** 0.109
Random Slope Linear year 0.002 -0.002 0.009* 0.005 0.017** 0.009
-2 Loglikelihood 29.0 75.4 138.2
* p. < 0.1; **  p < 0.05; * **  p < 0.01; Nsurvays=188. Noountri88=15
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Figure 3.3 Predictions of country-specific trends in class voting(a) with a 
random intercept and slope for year
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Australia Austria
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(a) measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)
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decrease when left-w ing parties are fu rther to the ideolog ical right. Th is finding 
refutes the left-wing party position hypothesis
In m odel IV we add party system  polarization to our models. We find significant 
and positive effects of polarization on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. As 
the ideolog ical po larization in a party system  is greater the first-stage estimated 
log-odds ratios for voting right-wing increase. Th is finding suggests that, allowing 
country-specific  trends in class voting, the routine non-m anual class (0.104), the 
service class (0.125) and the self-em ployed (0.137) are m ore inclined to vote 
right-wing as the d ifferences between political parties are larger. Thus the 
association between social c lass and vote declines as the party system 
polarization decreases, therefore the polarization hypothesis is supported10, 
although the size of th is effect is rather modest. The latter is indicated in figure 3.4 
by the plotted effect of LR party system  polarization on the basis of model IV. 
However, the negative year-e ffects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing are 
not substan tia lly  reduced by including party system  polarization. In both m odel III 
and IV we observe negative year-e ffects on the log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. 
Therefore the political change hypothesis is refuted: neither sh ifts to the center by 
left party fam ilies nor party system  polarization account for the over tim e linear 
decline of class voting.
Figure 3.4 Plotted effect of party polarization on the log-odds ratio to vote 
right-wing relative to the working class (year is fixed at 1985)
routine non-manual class
- service class 
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3.5 Conclusion
Social class is undeniab ly weakening as a basis of party choice. We not only 
observe patterns tow ards sm aller class d ifferences in the m ajo rity  of the countries 
in th is chapter, we also find a general pattern tow ards converging class d ifferences 
in the pooled analyses. The d ifferences between the service class and the working 
class have lost much of the ir strength. The d ifference between the self-em ployed 
and the working class is also, in general, weakening. The m ost apparent exception 
to the general pattern is the United States, where d ifferences in voting between 
the working class and the self-em ployed are increasing rather than decreasing.
A lthough, our results are consistent w ith the erosion of c lass voting in modern 
dem ocracies, they do not signal the end of c lass politics. C lass continues to have 
an im pact on party choice in m ost countries and, despite the decline of the 
m agnitude of d ifferences, the order in w hich classes favor left or right parties for 
the m ost part endures: thus across the 45 year period the self-em ployed are the 
m ost d ifferent from  the m anual working class, fo llow ed by the service class and 
the routine non-m anual class. Moreover, as shown by the plotted country figures 
the process of a class politics breakdown is not always gradual in nature. But 
despite the deviations from  the linear trends in particular countries the general 
pattern based on our c ross-nationa l analyses is one of gradual decline.
We also aim ed to explain variation in the associa tion between class and vote 
by accounting for changes in both the social structure and political structure of 
societies. Our results support the idea of com positiona l changes leading to 
changes in class voting; changes in background characteristics (age, gender, 
and education) are partly responsib le for the decline in political d iv is ions between 
classes. This is prim arily due to changes in the re lationship between education 
and class position. As educational level is generally rising in post-industria l 
societies th is developm ent offers a ‘b o ttom -up ’ explanation for changes in levels 
of class voting - especia lly between the routine non-m anual c lass/service class 
and the w orking class.
As well as exam ining ‘b o ttom -up ’ exp lanations for the levels of class voting we 
tested tw o vers ions of the ‘top -d o w n ’ perspective on class voting. We did not find 
evidence for the idea that le ft-right positions of left-w ing parties alone influence 
the associa tion between class and vote. We do find, however, that when ideological 
d ifferences between political parties are sm aller the associa tion between class 
and vote is weaker (see also Elff 2009). This indicates that the extent of c lass-related 
political choices presented to voters does influence the extent to which they vote
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along class lines. There is therefore evidence of a ‘to p -d o w n ’ d irection of influence. 
In order to detect this, however, it is im portan t to investigate party positions of 
d ifferent parties in relation to each other. The absolute position of left parties on 
the ideolog ical continuum  is not predictive of levels of class voting. Only the 
extent of left-right party system polarization appears to matter. This suggests this 
‘top -d o w n ’ effect relates to instrum ental calcu la tions about the d ifferences 
between parties presented to voters, rather than sim ple vo ter-party proximity.
W hat th is pattern of ‘to p -d o w n ’ influence fails to do, however, is explain the 
over tim e trends in class voting. The reason for th is can be seen from  the lack of 
any consistent corre lation between le ft-party m oves to the centre, or party 
ideolog ical convergence, and tim e itself. In som e countries left parties have 
moved to the centre over tim e and/or there has been ideolog ical convergence, 
but in others these patterns have been absent. A t a country level we m ight expect 
to find party ideolog ical convergence accounting for a decline in class voting 
(Evans, Heath and Payne 1999) but we should not expect to find th is at the more 
general level exam ined here. In the next chapter we w ill investigate w hether class 
voting in the N etherlands is affected by d ifferences and changes in p a rty ’s social- 
econom ic positions and as well as the ir ‘conservative vs. p rogress ive ’ positions. 
The Netherlands are particu larly interesting because it is am ong the few countries 
in th is chapter where we found a clear pattern of depolarization of the party 
system  on the trad itiona l le ft-right d im ension.
C learly th is analysis represents an early stage of system atic research into 
‘to p -d o w n ’ effects, the presence of w hich have previously usually been inferred 
from  narrative accounts of party strategies (i.e. Mair et al. 2004), and the lim itations 
of the study need to be kept in mind. There is undoubted ly m easurem ent error in 
the CMP data and because of the need for c ross-nationa l com parab ility  our 
m easures are of the Left-right position of party fam ily groups rather than individual 
parties. In fu rther w ork it m ight be useful to com pare the effect of party positions 
on class voting using d ifferent m ethods of m easuring party positions, i.e. 
m anifesto data, expert surveys and perceived party positions. W ith in-coun try  
com parisons in single country studies may also be necessary to a llow  more 
detailed m easures of party positions. Currently, however, the C om parative 
M anifesto Data is the only available evidence on party positions across a wide 
range of countries over m any years. The scope of our large-scale com parison did 
also not a llow  the use of more refined m easures of social class and party families. 
In the British case for exam ple our categorization of party choice results in 
m erging the L ibera l-D em ocrats w ith the C onservatives instead of Labour. W ith
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th is recoding we are unable to detect the collapse of class voting in the 1997 
e lections as found by Evans and T illey (2011). Moreover, our pooled data also do 
not a llow  the inclusion of other individual level background characteristics, and 
these other factors may well play a significant role in explaining declining levels of 
class voting. G iven the em phasis on redistribution of resources as a rationale for 
left-w ing voting individual ideology on the econom ic le ft-right d im ension, for 
example, may be such a factor. Neither of these lim ita tions underm ine the 
evidence we have presented show ing party system  polarization im pacts on class 
voting however. So th is chapter provides an im portant step tow ards expanding 
the exam ination of cleavage change beyond ‘b o ttom -up ’ processes to those 
involving the relevance of the choices tha t parties provide for voters: in other 
words, ‘top -d o w n ’ influences.
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3Notes
5 However, socio-demographic change alone is not sufficient to explain party behavior: As Kitschelt (1999: 
344) points out, party strategy depends on political-economic conditions, and the competitive setting 
of elections as well as party organizational features. Kitschelt (1994: 41) calls it ‘naïve' to treat left-wing 
electoral support as a direct function of the proportion of blue-collar workers in the labour force.
6 In our categorization far-right or nationalist parties as treated as right-wing despite their appeal to the 
working class. Excluding far-right parties from the analyses does not substantially change the results. On 
average the estimated class-coefficients at the first stage are somewhat higher, and the trends modeled 
at the second stage are somewhat less steep. But there are no substantial changes in the effect of LR 
positions of left-wing parties or in the effect of party system polarization. The category of left-wing par­
ties does not include Green parties. Including Green parties in the analyses also does not substantially 
change the results. On average the estimated class-coefficients at the first stage are somewhat lower, 
and the trends modeled at the second stage are somewhat steeper. But again there are no substantial 
changes in the effect of LR positions of left-wing parties or in the effect of party system polarization.
7 We also used the Left-Right scale as given by Laver and Budge (1992) which we coded in such a manner 
that it (theoretically) ranges from completely left (-100) to completely right (+100). Because this scale is a 
combination of 26 policy categories (13 left - 13 right) related to all seven policy domains in the CMP data 
it is a measure of the overall Left-Right party position. However, our analyses showed that a scale based 
on more specific class-relevant policy issues is more strongly associated with levels of class voting.
8 With regard to the extent to which the trend lines fit the estimated points country by country (Achen 2005: 
455) we emphasize the relatively poor fit of the trend lines for Switzerland in figure 3.2a and Finland in 
figure 3.2b.
9 Multilevel models in this chapter are estimated using the s ta ta  program g l la m m  (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 
2008).
10 We employed two robustness checks. First, we repeated the analyses while each time excluding one 
the countries. In the case of all three dependent variables, excluding specific countries did not produce 
substantially different results with respect to the parameter estimates of party polarization. In all cases a 
higher level of party system polarization is associated with higher log-odds ratios to vote right-wing. Sec­
ond, we tried another indicator for polarization. We replace party system polarization with the ideological 
range in a party system (measured as the distance on the L-R scale between the most right-wing party 
and the most left-wing party in a party system). No substantially different results were found, and these 
findings confirm our results with respect to party system polarization.
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Part 11
Trends in Cleavage Voting in the Netherlands

Chapter 4
Class Voting, Social Changes and Political 
Changes in the Netherlands 1971-2006*
* A slightly different version of this chapter is accepted for publication in Electoral Studies. Co-authors are 
Nan Dirk de Graaf and Ariana Need.

CLASS VOTiNG, SOCiAL CHANGES AND POLiTiCAL CHANGES iN THE NETHERLANDS 1971-2006
4. 1 Introduction
Like in m any other W estern European countries c lass-based voting has become 
much w eaker in the Netherlands (De Graaf 1996; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2008; 
Need 1997; N ieuw beerta  and De Graaf 1999; Van der Kolk 2000). A lthough there 
is a fa ir am ount of speculation about the causes of th is trend, there is not much 
research tha t system atica lly tries to explain the decline in c lass-based voting. 
Am ong the few studies addressing the decline of trad itiona l social cleavages in 
the Netherlands De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) have explored the interaction 
between the available political op tions and the class position and religious 
a ffilia tion of voters. Theoretically, the ir study contributed to the idea that “in 
understanding the evolving political impact of social divisions it is important to 
recognize that political behavior results from the interplay between social and 
political forces" (2001: 3). De Graaf et al. showed that the decline in relig ious- 
based voting in the N etherlands was affected by the merging of the three main 
denom inationa l parties into the Christian Dem ocratic  Appeal (CDA). W ith respect 
to class voting they did not find that the downward trends were influenced by the 
m erging of four radical left-w ing parties into G reenLeft (‘GroenLinks').
In previous chapters we labeled the d istinction and interaction between social 
changes and political choices as the ‘b o ttom -up ’ and the ‘to p -d o w n ’ perspectives 
on class voting. M ost exp lanations in the literature for the decline in class-based 
voting are of soc io log ica l nature and em phasize factors related to the class 
com position of e lectorates and the relevance of class d ivis ions in society. These 
‘b o ttom -up ’ exp lanations often assum e one or m ore of the fo llow ing processes 
(see also C hapter 1 and 3): The incom e and living standard of w orkers are rising 
and are increasingly sim ilar to those of the m iddle class, partly because there is 
also a growing group of low-paid and low -sta tus white collar em ployees (Dalton
2008); New ‘post-industria l’ and va lue-c leavages have replaced or cross-cut the 
c lass-based conflict; And rising levels of education and ‘cognitive m ob iliza tion ’ 
have enlarged vo te r’s ab ility to make political choices independent from  old 
c lass-based loyalties. The trad itiona l econom ic boundaries between classes 
have, as is often assumed, become blurred. The social and political distinctiveness 
of social c lasses have in consequence declined. Due to processes like de­
industria liza tion and market liberalization the num ber of w ork ing -c lass laborers 
declined. At the same tim e the service class grew rapidly and became increasingly 
heterogeneous, creating new lines for political conflict. What all these explanations 
have in com m on is that they use changes in social structure as the main source
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for changes in political choices, therefore shaping the c lass-vote relationship 
from  the bottom  up.
Political parties are assum ed to adapt to the changing social circum stances. 
As the w orking class is shrinking and the service class is growing, political parties, 
especia lly those on the left, are expected to target m iddle class voters instead of 
w ork ing -c lass laborers (cf. P rzeworski and Sprague 1986). And when the 
econom ic boundaries between classes are w eakening, all parties m ay be 
expected to address new political issues that appeal to voters in non-econom ic 
terms. The significance of new political issues in soc ie ty may also reveal itself in 
the em ergence of new parties w ith  new political agendas. For all these processes, 
the im plication is that the political relevance of class is reduced because parties 
respond to social change. Evans (2000) and De Graaf et al. (2001) have contrasted 
th is ‘soc io log ica l d e te rm in is t’ perspective w ith the alternative view  tha t political 
changes are contributions towards, rather than sim ply reflections of, the evolution 
of political cleavages. They argue tha t an actual voting choice w ill reflect the 
political op tions available to voters as well as the ir social situation. From this 
perspective class voting is cond itioned by the extent to w hich political parties 
em phasize class issues rather than w ith the strength of class d ivis ions in society 
(Oskarson 2005). De Graaf et al. (2001) argue that under d ifferent political 
c ircum stances identical social structures may in theory result in d ifferent patterns 
of voting behavior. These argum ents add a ‘top -d o w n ’ perspective to a ‘b o ttom -up ’ 
perspective: Not s im ply social changes, but also c lass-re levant policy choices 
offered to voters have an additional effect on the class-vote re lationship (Evans, 
Heath and Payne 1999; O skarson 2005; E lff 2009). The Netherlands is particularly 
interesting because not on ly social changes have been prom inent, but, as we 
also observed in the previous chapter there have also been substantia l changes 
in Dutch politics. The question tha t we aim to answer is th is chapter is: To what 
extent can the decline in class voting in the Netherlands be explained by social 
and political changes?
The effects of political factors on the c lass-vote association are rarely directly 
m easured. M ost studies infer a ‘top -d o w n ’ influence by exam ining tim e-specific  
changes in the strength of class voting that coincide w ith  party sh ifts or changes 
in the party system  (Evans, Heath and Payne 1991; Hill and Leighley 1996; De 
Graaf et al. 2001; Andersen and Heath 2003). The m easurem ent of actual party 
positions, as is done in the studies of Evans, Heath and Payne (1999), Oskarson 
(2005) and Elff (2009) is a quite recent innovation to the class voting research. In 
th is chapter we investigate tw o types of changes in political choices in the
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Netherlands. Using more data and more differentiated measures of social class 
and party choice, we reexamine De Graaf et al.’s question whether the emergence 
of GreenLeft led to any class realignment. But additionally, using data of the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006) we 
examine the interaction between party positions and social class. We aim to test 
to what extent class voting in the Netherlands is affected by changes in party’s 
‘old’ social-economic positions and ‘new’ conservative-progressive positions. 
We set out to examine these ‘top-down’ changes after accounting for the 
‘bottom-up’ process of blurring class boundaries. De Graaf et al. (2001) assume 
a process of blurring boundaries by modeling linear class voting trends in the 
Netherlands without accounting for the social distinctiveness of classes. Instead 
of simply inferring societal homogenization we test to what extent trends in class 
voting are interpreted by differences between voters in their economic ideology 
and level of education. Our hypotheses are tested using data from eleven surveys 
of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) 1971-2006 supplemented by 
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project for Dutch political parties.
4.2 Bottom-up: Changes in the class structure of the 
Netherlands
4.2.1 The rise of a ‘new’ social class within the service class
The occupational structure of the Netherlands has changed considerably in the 
past four decades. We observe a contracting working class and an expanding 
service class. The manual class has shrunk from more than 40 % of the working 
electorate in 1970 to less than 30 % in 2004 (Güveli 2006). To understand class 
voting, the simple distinction between blue- and white-collar classes no longer 
suffices (cf. Nieuwbeerta 1995). In a large scale international comparison 
Nieuwbeerta distinguished the unskilled manual class, the skilled manual class, 
the petty bourgeoisie, the routine non-manual class, and the lower-, and upper 
service classes. His findings showed that the distinction between manual and 
non-manual work has become less relevant due to changing class structures. 
Indeed, more recent research shows that due to changes in employment patterns 
and class structure also this more elaborate class distinction is no longer optimal. 
In the Netherlands, the majority of the employed male population works in the 
high and low service classes. These are the high- and low-grade professionals 
and managers, known as classes I and II of the EGP class schema (Ganzeboom
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and Luijkx 2004). When combined these two service classes increased in size 
from 31% in 1970 to more than 50% in 2004 (Güveli 2006). Güveli and De Graaf 
(2007) and Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2007a, 2007b) argue that in post-industri­
al societies, two extra sub-classes should be distinguished within the service 
class: i.e. the socio-cultural specialists (e.g. social workers, teachers, lawyers) 
and the technocrats (e.g. engineers, accountants, and office managers). Construct 
and criterion validation tests (Güveli 2006) support these new class distinctions. 
Even after taking level and field of education into account these distinctions help 
to account for political choices (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). We will 
therefore apply this adjusted class schema in this chapter. Figure 4.1 reports the 
percentage of social and cultural specialists and technocrats in the labor force. It 
confirms that the service class in the Netherlands expanded a great deal (De 
Graaf and Steijn 1997). The increase applies both to the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats. Due to the increase of the population in higher 
class positions the relative size of the manual class has declined considerably.
4.2.2 Compositional changes and the blurring of class boundaries
The aforementioned changes in the size of class categories can be conceived of 
as compositional changes. When the class-vote association is measured in (log) 
odds ratio’s (as in the present case) compositional changes not necessarily affect 
the strength of the association because the odds ratio is invariant to the marginal 
totals. We argue that it is necessary to distinguish compositional changes from 
the blurring of class boundaries. As said, the processes of blurring boundaries 
will result in less distinctive classes. Traditionally, class-based political conflict is 
related to economic divisions is society. The less privileged classes support leftist 
parties that stand for greater socio-economic equality. In opposition to the 
working class members from other classes have less interest in redistributionist 
policies, and are assumed to vote for economic conservative parties on the right. 
The decline of traditional class divisions is often attributed to the decrease of 
economic differences between classes or the increase of economic differences 
within classes. Growing economic homogeneity between classes involves that 
members of different classes increasingly have common living standards or 
income characteristics. The heterogenization of classes, on the other hand, 
resulted in growing economic and cultural differences within particular classes, 
reducing a sense of shared identity and interest. We expect that the blurring of 
class divisions are a continuing and relatively gradual processes which ultimately 
lead to a convergence in their political preferences. We therefore expect that: The
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Figure 4.1 Trends in the percentage of social and cultural specialists and 
technocrats in the Dutch labor force between 1980 and 2004
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Source: Güveli (2006: 52)
association between class and party choice becomes generally weaker. The odds 
ratios between class and vote would therefore be expected to decline. (H1).
The heterogenization of the service class, which led to the rise of a ‘new’ 
social class of social-cultural specialists, may have resulted in more differentiated 
patterns of voting behavior. The socio-cultural specialists and technocrats are 
especially different with respect two to characteristics. First, it is relatively more 
difficult for employers to monitor the work performance, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, of socio-cultural specialists than the work performance of 
technocrats. Second, socio-cultural specialists have specific skills and knowledge 
involving social services and social-cultural issues, and they more often work in a 
public or non-profit field (e.g. health, education) that requires state support. So­
cial-cultural specialists therefore have developed a distinct leftist political 
orientation (Güveli and De Graaf 2007; Güveli, Need and De Graaf 2007a, 2007b). 
Güveli et al. (2007b) found that over the last three decades the low-social cultural 
specialists had become the most leftist class in the Netherlands. We thus 
formulate the following hypothesis about class voting within the service class: 
The decline of the association between class and vote weakened the odds of 
technocrats to vote left vs. right, relative to the manual class, but reversed the
30
0
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odds of social-cultural specialists to vote left vs. right relative to the manual class 
(H1b).
The class cleavage is related to nearly all material concerns of voters in 
modern democracies, e.g. improvement of living standards, maintaining economic 
security, the distribution of economic rewards, income taxation, unemployment 
and inflation (Dalton 2008). We therefore assume that the blurring of class divisions 
should show up in the ideological differences between classes. The relevant 
ideological dimension in this respect is the left-right dimension related to economic 
progressivism/conservatism. We expect that due to rising living standards and 
income levels economic ideology has become less associated with class 
differences. As the ideological differences about redistribution between classes 
decrease, the class basis of voting should diminish. Hence, we formulate: The 
decline of the association between class and party choice becomes less strong 
when we take voters’ economic ideology into account (H2).
Of course, Lipset already suggested that the working class is perhaps 
ideologically on left on the basis of socioeconomic issues but certainly not with 
regard to cultural issues (Lipset 1959). From this perspective, the association 
between class and vote is declining because working class conservatism is 
increasingly relevant to predict party choice (e.g. Van der Waal, Achterberg and 
Houtman 2007). However, in this chapter we cannot test to what extent cultural 
conservative ideology accounts for the decline in class voting because we lack a 
direct comparable measure of individual cultural conservatism in our data. But we 
are able to indirectly test this claim in three ways. First, the use of manifesto data 
enables us to consider the impact of cultural conservatism at the party level. We 
can test if, and to what extent manual workers are less likely to vote for a party 
when it is more culturally progressive. Second, we may expect that when 
non-economic cleavages are increasingly relevant for political interests, the 
influence of peoples’ economic ideology on voting has declined in the past 
decades. Third, a higher education is associated with cultural liberal attitudes 
and values (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004). From a cultural perspective 
the lower educated will vote for right-wing parties cross-cutting traditional 
class-based voting (Van der Waal et al. 2007). We therefore may expect that as 
cultural issues are increasingly important to predict vote choice, the influence of 
education on voting has increased in recent decades. Hence, we formulate: The 
association between voters’ economic ideology and party choice becomes 
generally weaker (H3a), and the association between education and party choice 
becomes generally stronger (H3b).
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4.3 Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands
4.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos
Instead of merely reflecting social changes, parties may contribute to yet more 
blurring of class boundaries. Facing the decline of the working class left-wing 
parties may adopt a more middle class orientated appeal (cf. Przeworski and 
Sprague 1986). By abandoning class-relevant policy programs left-wing parties 
reduce the distinct political voice of the working class, which may decrease their 
distinct class identity, group solidarity and political awareness (De Graaf et al.
2001). In this sense, the political relevance of class is, at least in part, a product of 
the behavior of parties and politicians that choose to politicize it or not (Evans and 
Whitefield 2006). It is assumed that the strength of class voting is conditioned by 
the extent to which parties offer choices that are relevant to economic differences 
between classes. If left-wing parties take more centrist positions (e.g. appeal to the 
middle class, have weaker ties to unions and call for retrenchment of the welfare 
state), thus reducing the socio-economic differences relative to other parties, it may 
weaken working-class allegiance to left-wing parties. In appealing to, the growing 
number of, new middle class voters left-wing parties may also be expected to 
emphasize non-economic issues in their campaigns. Especially the new class of 
social-cultural specialists holds progressives attitudes favoring democratization, 
multiculturalism and environmental protection (Güveli et al. 2007). By appealing to 
the liberal values of this group left-wing parties may give them a distinct political 
voice and strengthen their sense of shared interest and identity. But in doing so, 
left-wing politicians will estrange themselves from their traditional social basis of 
manual workers that hold more cultural conservative attitudes.
Assuming interaction between party positions and class categories we expect 
that members from the working class generally favor parties that are economically 
progressive, and members from other classes generally prefer parties that are 
economically more conservative. With respect to non-economic issues 
(conservative vs. progressive) the opposite may be true. Members from the 
working are more likely to vote for a party that is culturally conservative, whereas 
other classes prefer parties that are culturally more progressive. Keman and 
Pennings (2006) have shown that there is a general tendency in European 
countries for major parties to convergence with respect to economic differences 
and diverge with respect to progressive/conservative issues. We expect that the 
relevance of economic differences between voters will decline as parties become 
less distinct in their economic policies, as happened in the Dutch case (Pennings
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and Keman 2008). The depolarization of political parties with respect to their so­
cial-economic positions may have had an independent impact on the voting 
behavior of classes. Alternatively, polarization on non-economic differences, in 
which the voting preferences of classes are assumed to be reversed (Achterberg 
and Houtman 2006), may be responsible for the decline in class voting. We 
therefore formulate the hypothesis that: The decline of the association between 
class and vote becomes less strong when we take the differences and changes 
into account with respect to the ideological position of parties (H4).
Second, it may be expected that as a result of the economic convergence of 
the political parties, the economic ideology of individuals will lose its power to 
predict party choice. Therefore the influence of economic conservatism on party 
choice should weaken as the differences on economic issues between parties 
become smaller. Hence we hypothesize: The association between economic 
ideology and party choice becomes less strong when we take the differences and 
changes into account with respect to the economic position of parties (H5).
4.3.2 The emergence of GreenLeft
The second test of the ‘top-down’ perspective is related to the restructuring of the 
Dutch party system. If the influence of class on party choice is assumed to be 
declining due to ‘bottom-up’ sociological processes, this decline is assumed to 
be relatively gradual as well as unidirectional. Explanations for more time-specific 
and group-specific changes and possible reversals in the associations between 
class and vote must therefore be attributed to changes in the party system or the 
emergence of new parties, rather than to sociological developments. Like in many 
other European countries a Green party emerged in the Netherlands during the 
1980s (Müller-Rommel 2002). This party, GreenLeft, came into existence after 
1989 when four minor radical parties (CPN, PSP, PPR and EVP) contested the 
election with a joint party list. These four parties had rather diverse and distinct 
histories, the communist CPN dating from 1936, the left-pacifist PSP from 1959, 
the radical PPR from 1971 and the progressive Christian EVP from 1981. Although 
their electoral strength has always been weak De Graaf et al. (2001) argue that 
their merger may be important because:
“By appealing to environmentalists in a way that the old left parties did not, [the 
emergence of GreenLeft] may have well have attracted more middle-class, post­
materialist voters than did left-wing parties in the past. By giving a distinctive voice 
to these postmaterialists it may also have led to a strengthening of their group
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identity and thus have increased the political awareness of this group. Conversely 
by fragmenting left-wing appeals and reducing the emphasis on specifically class 
issues, it may also have tended to undermine class identity yet further" (2001: 3).
De Graaf et al. claim that the emergence of new political options, or the 
disappearance of old options may have an immediate impact on the relationship 
between class and vote. To test this for the Dutch case they therefore look for 
sudden changes in the association between class and vote after the formation of 
the common Green Left party list in 1989. De Graaf et al. do not find evidence for 
an abrupt decline of class voting after 1989. We are however able to conduct a 
more group-specific test of their hypothesis that ‘The odds of middle-class voters 
supporting the old left, relative to working class voters, increases after the formation 
of the GreenLeft (De Graaf et al. 2001: 8). Especially the new class of socio-cultural 
specialists benefits from the material advantages which allow the support for 
parties which hold more postmaterialist stances (e.g. Norton 2003; Inglehart 
1979). The immediate consequences of environmental protection policies are far 
less severe for this new middle class compared to the manual class (Obach 
2002). Socio-cultural specialists may therefore have been likely support to 
GreenLeft once the new party list was established. Consequently, this process 
would be expected to increase the level of class voting. This suggests the 
hypothesis: The odds of the social-cultural specialists supporting new-left parties 
increases after the formation of Green Left (H6).
4.4 Data and variable construction
To test our hypotheses we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 2006. 
We use information on social class based on detailed occupational codings, 
economic ideology, party choice and some social background characteristics 
from 11 elections (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N=1.526], 1977 [N=1.856], 1981 
[N=2.305], 1982 [N = 1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 [N=1.745], 1994 [N=1.812], 
1998 [N =2.101 ], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). We excluded the 
2003-survey because for that survey no data on occupational codings were 
available. In the multivariate analyses we control for age (17=0) and gender 
(male=0), denomination (in categories: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other 
religion, no religion) and church attendance (0-4 interval scale).
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To provide a parsimonious study that allows for an over-time comparison it is 
unavoidable to group relevant Dutch political parties into a limited number of 
party groups. We measure party choice in four categories11 on the basis of the 
De Graaf et al. (2001) classification: the old-left (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), new-left 
(D66 , GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP), liberal right (VVD, BP, NMP) and religious 
parties (CDA, ARP, KVP, CHU, SGP, GPV, RPF, RKPN and CU). Consult appendix 
A.3 for party names. Respondents voting for another party are excluded from the 
analysis. We mainly examine the odds of voting old-left and new-left relative to 
the odds of voting liberal right12. The old-left/liberal right contrast has also been 
used in earlier studies on class voting (De Graaf et al. 2001). The new-left/liberal 
right contrast is used to get more insight in the changing political alignment of the 
new service class (Güveli et al. 2007b).
For social class we want to take into account the evolution of the social classes 
and we therefore use the modified EGP class schema distinguishing the social 
and cultural specialists as a separate class from the technocrats (cf. Güveli, Need 
and De Graaf 2007b) for recoding ISCO-scores into the new classes). We 
distinguish the following classes: 1a. Higher technocrats; 1b. Higher social and 
cultural specialists; 2a. Lower technocrats; 2b. lower social and cultural specialists;
3. Routine non-manuals; 4. Self-employed; 5. Manual class. We collapsed the 
higher manual and lower manual class, since there is hardly any difference in 
their voting patterns, also not over time.
Economic conservatism: In all election surveys there is a question on income 
inequality. This is a question that starts as follows13: “Some people think that the 
difference in incomes in our country should be increased (at number 1). Others 
think that these differences should be decreased (at number 7). Of course, there 
are also people whose opinion is somewhere in between." Then there are 
questions about where the respondent would place the major political parties on 
this line. Finally respondents were asked: “And where would you place yourself?" 
We coded economic ideology such that the metric is running from 0 (‘the 
differences in our country should be decreased’) to 6 (‘the differences in incomes 
in our country should be increased’).
We measure the respondent’ level of education as the number of years it 
normally takes to complete a certain level of education. The educational categories 
in the original files are recoded using the conversion tables of Ganzeboom and 
Treiman (2009). In general this results in a metric running from: 6 year for complete 
primary education (=0) to 17 years for complete university level.
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Party positions: To determine the ideological position of party groups we use 
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et 
al. 2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs 
of political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of 
statements by parties on 56 policy categories are measured as the percentages 
of sentences in a program devoted to these issues. First, we construct a left-right 
party position based on socio-economic issues. We use three policy categories 
from the CMP data files: planned economy (i.e. market regulation economic 
planning), welfare (social justice and welfare state expansion), and market 
economy (free enterprise and economic orthodoxy). Next, we add three policy 
categories on social groups: labour groups (positive mentioning of working class 
and trade unions), middle class and professional groups (positive mentioning) 
and ‘labour groups: negative’ (negative mentioning of working class and unions). 
We create a social-economic Left-Right position by combining the categories as 
((market economy + middle class groups + negative labour groups) - (planned 
economy + welfare + labour groups). Hence, a higher score on this scale (-33.9
- 18.1) corresponds to a more rightist party position. Because our dependent 
variable consists of party groups instead of individual parties we constructed a 
weighted mean of this scale by party group for each election year. The weight of 
a party within this group is determined by its vote share in percentages14.
In similar vein we constructed the policy positions of party groups associated 
with conservative-progressive ideology. For this purpose we employ a scale 
construction procedure used by Keman and Pennings (2006) who use the total of 
five policy categories to measure the emphasis on progressive issues, and five 
categories to measure conservative issues. The progressive issues are: 
anti-growth economy, national way of life: negative (i.e. appeals to patriotism/ 
nationalism), multiculturalism: positive, traditional morality: negative (i.e. opposition 
to traditional moral values) and environmentalism: positive. The conservative 
issues are: social harmony (e.g. need for society to see itself as united), national 
way of life: positive, multiculturalism: negative, traditional morality: positive and 
middle class groups: positive. We create a progressive position (progressive 
issues - conservative issues) which runs from conservative (-1.2) to progressive 
(18.0).
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4.5 Analysis
To test the formulated hypotheses we divided our analyses in four steps. First we 
examine the bivariate association between social class and economic 
conservatism. Second, we model over time changes in class voting by employing 
multinomial logistic (MNL) regression analysis. Using figures we will present the 
odds ratios for voting old-left vs. liberal right and new-left vs. liberal right for all 
class categories (working class is reference). Third, we present the parameter 
estimates of more elaborate MNL models to formally test to what extent trends in 
class voting can be explained by the blurring of class boundaries and/or the 
1989-GreenLeft merger. Finally, we use conditional logistic (CL) regression 
models15 to test whether party positions account for changes in class voting.
Figure 4.2 Economic conservatism regressed on social class (manual class 
is reference group) and year of survey assuming linear trends for 
the effect of social class
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point scale in order to make 2006 as comparable as possible with 1971. (source: DPES 1971-2006)
4.5.1 The blurring of class boundaries
First, we investigate to what extent the ideological boundaries between classes 
are blurring. For this purpose we regressed economic conservatism on social
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class including dummy indicators for the surveys. We assumed linear trends for 
the change of the class effects. In figure 4.2 we report the regression coefficients 
for the reference year 1971 and the calculated class effect for 2006 based on the 
linear trend.
Figure 4.2 shows a decrease in the association between class position and 
economic conservatism for all classes when compared to the manual class. 
However, this linear decrease is only significant at the 5% level for the higher 
technocrats and the lower social cultural specialists. In 2006 the associations 
between ideology and the (higher and lower) social cultural specialists or the 
routine non-manual class are not much different from the association between 
ideology and the manual class. As expected, both the higher and lower technocrats 
and the self-employed are clearly the most economic conservative classes in 
2006, which illustrates the political difference of the technocrats and the social 
cultural specialists. In earlier work Van Wijnen (2000) concluded for the 1971-1998 
surveys that there is no systematic difference over time in the association between 
subjective class orientation and the left-right ideology. Our results are different, 
and this difference in conclusions may be explained by our use of a detailed 
objective class measure, our use of more recent elections or a different measure 
of ideology.
4.5.2 Over-time changes in class voting
To analyze the changing class-vote association we employ MNL regression 
models. We concentrate on the contrasts between old-left vs. liberal right and 
new-left vs. liberal right parties. In this unconstrained model we add dummy 
indicators for each year of survey with 1971 as the reference, as well as interactions 
between year-dummies and the class-groups. In figure 4.3 we first look at the 
odds ratios to vote for old-left vs. liberal right parties over time. Six class categories 
are distinguished: Four in the service class (higher and lower technocrats, higher 
and lower social-cultural specialists) and routine non-manual workers and the 
self-employed. The reference group in the analysis are people in the manual 
class. An odds ratio above 1 (ranging to infinite) indicates that the odds to vote 
old-left vs. liberal right are higher compared to the manual class. Odds ratios 
ranging between 0-1 indicate negative associations. In order to make the scale in 
figure 4.3 comparable for positive and negative association we present negative 
associations as -(1/odds ratio). We start with a comparison of the lower and upper 
service class, routine non-manual class and the self-employed relative to the 
working class. Figure 4.3a shows that the high service class is least likely to vote
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Figure 4.3a Odds ratios for voting Old left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
high service class “ “  “  low service class
routine non-manual “ “  “ self-employed
Figure 4.3b Odds ratios for voting Old left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
“ “  “  high technocrats low technocrats low social/cultural specialists
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Figure 4.4a Odds ratios for voting New left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
high service class 
routine non-manual
low service class 
self-employed
Figure 4.4b Odds ratios for voting New left vs. Liberal Right (manual class as 
reference group)
high technocrats low technocrats low social/cultural specialists
137
CHAPTER 4
old-left followed by the self-employed and low service class/ routine non-manual 
class, and that until 2002 the differences compared to the manual class decline. 
This indicates a process of class dealignment.
To illustrate how important changes in the occupational structure are for 
understanding changes in the class-vote relationship we disentangle the classes 
within the service class. In figure 4.3b we report the odds ratios for the higher 
technocrats, the lower technocrats and the lower cultural specialists vote left wing 
compared to the manual class. Due to a lack of a substantive number of cases for 
each year we do not report the higher social specialists. Figure 3b shows that 
until 1981 there was not much difference between the low technocrats and the 
lower social-cultural specialists relative to the manual class and these difference 
increases over time. After 1994 the lower social and cultural specialists are even 
more likely to vote for left-wing than the manual class, suggesting a process of 
class realignment although the differences with the manual class are very small. 
This shows that it becomes increasingly important to disentangle the service 
class in order to understand the evolution of class voting. With respect to the 
higher technocrats we see that they are far less likely to vote old-left relative to the 
manual class than the other classes in the service class. The differences between 
the lower and higher technocrats seem to have weakened since the 1970s and 
from 1989 onwards there is hardly any difference.
Next, in figure 4.4 we investigate the odds ratios of voting new-left versus 
liberal right. Figure 4.4a shows that in general the self-employed the least likely to 
vote new-left vs. liberal right, followed by the high service class, routine non-manual 
class and low service class. We clearly observe a process of convergence: All 
classes, especially the high service class are increasingly likely to cast a new-left 
vote relative to voting liberal right. From the mid-1990s there is hardly any 
difference between the working class and the low service class/ routine 
non-manual class. In 2006 manual class voters were very unlikely to vote for a 
new-left party, and therefore also the odds for the high service class to vote 
new-left vs. liberal right were higher compared to the manual class.
With respect to the sub-classes within the service class figure 4.4b shows a 
process of class dealigmnent, i.e.: The new-left/liberal-right voting behavior of the 
(higher and lower) technocrats is converging towards the voting behavior of the 
manual class. For the low-grade social and cultural specialists we observe a 
process of realignment. This class initially voted not that different from the manual 
class, but members of this class are increasingly more likely to cast a vote for a 
new-left party relative to casting a liberal-right vote. The odds ratio to vote new-left
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vs. liberal right has reversed between the 1980s and 1990s and this evolution 
shows once again how important it is to distinguish this class within the service 
class.
4.5.3 Interpreting the decline of class voting
Next we formally test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 in table 4.1. We present the MNL 
parameter estimates (b and s.e.) of voting old-left and new-left vs. liberal right. In 
our first model we allow the class effect to change linearly over time. Compared 
to a base model where the class-effects are fixed over years this linear change 
model yields a better model fit (decrease in -2LL of 72 against 18 degrees of 
freedom) and at the same time it is far more parsimonious than the unconstrained 
model shown in figures 4.3 and 4.4.
With respect to voting old-left vs. liberal right model I shows gradual decreases 
in class differences for almost all classes relative to the manual class. The negative 
main-effects of the class-year interactions indicate that in 1971 the odds of voting 
old-left rather that liberal right are lower for other classes compared to the manual 
class. In support of hypothesis 1 the significant positive interactions imply that the 
distinction between the manual class and all other classes for voting old-left 
versus a free market liberal party become less important each year. In 1971 the 
parameter estimate is -3.23 for the higher technocrats and this is -1.13 (-3.23 + 
(35 * .06)) in 2006. These effects indicate that in 1971 the odds for higher 
technocrats to vote old-left were about (1/e-3'23) 25 times lower than the odds for 
the manual class, compared to about 3 times lower in 2006. For low-grade 
technocrats the odds respectively are about 8 (1/e-2 03) and 2 (1/e(-2 03+35*0 04)) 
times lower compared to the manual class in 1971 and 2006. Most remarkable is 
that - based on a linear trend - the odds for low-grade social-cultural specialists 
are 6 times (1/e-177) lower than the odds for the manual classes in 1971, and they 
are about the same (e(-1 77+35* 06) = 1.3) in 2006.
We also observe gradual changes in class differences with respect to voting 
new-left versus liberal right. The differences between manual workers and the 
class of social and cultural specialists were relatively small in 1971. In the reference 
year, we find no significant difference in the odds to vote new-left between the low 
social and cultural specialists and manual class voters. With respect to the odds 
for high-grade social and cultural specialists we find that they were only about 2.5 
times lower than the odds for manual class voters. Over time, social-cultural 
specialists become more likely to vote new-left rather that liberal right. Based on 
a linear trend we find support for hypothesis 1b - the odds for both high and low
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Table 4.1 Multinomial logistic regression for voting old-left, new-left, and religious parties with liberal parties as reference 
in the Netherlands, 1971-2006(a)
C
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4
Model I Model II
Old Left vs. New Left vs. Old Left vs. New Left vs.
Liberal Right Liberal Right Liberal Right Liberal Right
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Constant 2.57*** (0.17) 1.70*** (0.19) 3.45*** (0.20) 1.83*** (0.23)
Year (1971 =ref.)
1972 -0.55*** (0.17) -0.60*** (0.20) -0.60*** (0.17) -0.63*** (0.20)
1977 -0.43*** (0.16) -0.96*** (0.19) -0.59*** (0.17) -1.03*** (0.20)
1981 -0.91*** (0.16) -0.44** (0.18) -1.06*** (0.17) -0.54*** (0.19)
1982 -1.27*** (0.16) -1.57*** (0.19) -1.43*** (0.17) -1.69*** (0.20)
1986 -0.91*** (0.17) -1.23*** (0.21) (0.19) -1.40*** (0.22)
1989 -0.79*** (0.18) -0.64*** (0.21) -1.09*** (0.20) -0.84*** (0.23)
1994 -1.67*** (0.19) -0.83*** (0.22) -2.05*** (0.22) -1.12*** (0.26)
1998 -1.60*** (0.21) -1.21*** (0.24) -2.11*** (0.25) -1.56*** (0.29)
2002 -1.54*** (0.23) -0.89*** (0.27) -2.15*** (0.28) -1.26*** (0.33)
2006 -1.18*** (0.25) -2.12*** (0.31) -1.89*** (0.34) -2.69*** (0.40)
Age 0.01*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) 0.003* (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) 0.17*** (0.06) 0.20*** (0.07) 0.08 (0.06) 0.19*** (0.07)
Social class (manual class =  ref.)
High technocrats -3.23*** (0.21) -2.21*** (0.26) -2.55*** (0.23) -2.08*** (0.27)
High social/cultural specialists -2.16*** (0.46) -0.90* (0.48) -0.91* (0.48) -0.74 (0.50)
Low technocrats -2.03*** (0.19) -1.13*** (0.22) -1.64*** (0.19) -1.05*** (0.23)
Low social/cultural specialists -1.77*** (0.21) -0.37 (0.23) -1.03*** (0.23) -0.23 (0.25)
Routine non-manual -1.60*** (0.16) -0.99*** (0.19) -1.35*** (0.16) -0.93*** (0.19)
Self-employed -2.51*** (0.20) -1.89*** (0.27) -2.45*** (0.20) -1.87*** (0.27)
Trend
Year*high technocrats 0.06*** (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01)
Year*high s/c specialists 0.03* (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
Year*low technocrats 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
Year*low s/c specialists 0.06*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Year*routine non-manual 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Year*self-employed 0.02* (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Bottom-up
Education in years -0.16*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Year*education in years 0.004*** (0.00) 0.002** (0.00)
Df
-2LL
87
25418.4
93
25263.6
(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, church attendance. 
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=11,832
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Table 4.1 Continued
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4Model III Model IV
Old Left vs. 
Liberal Right
New Left vs. 
Liberal Right
Old Left vs. 
Liberal Right
New Left vs. 
Liberal Right
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Constant 3.90*** (0.22) 2.25*** (0.25) 3.91*** (0.22) 2.28*** (0.25)
Year (1971 =ref.)
1972 -0.60*** (0.18) -0.63*** (0.20) -0.60*** (0.18) -0.64*** (0.20)
1977 0.32* (0.18) -0.20 (0.21) 0.31* (0.19) -0.23 (0.22)
1981 -0.04 (0.18) 0.43** (0.20) -0.06 (0.20) 0.36 (0.23)
1982 -0.16 (0.18) -0.54** (0.21) -0.19 (0.21) -0.61** (0.24)
1986 0.03 (0.20) -0.32 (0.24) 0.00 (0.25) -0.43 (0.29)
1989 0.16 (0.22) 0.32 (0.25) 0.19 (0.23) 0.38 (0.26)
1994 -0.41 (0.26) 0.39 (0.28) -0.39 (0.26) 0.41 (0.28)
1998 -0.68** (0.29) -0.25 (0.32) -0.67** (0.29) -0.28 (0.32)
2002 -0.59* (0.32) 0.14 (0.36) -0.61* (0.33) 0.08 (0.37)
2006 -0.45 (0.39) -1.33*** (0.44) -0.50 (0.41) -1.45*** (0.47)
Age 0.00 (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.14* (0.07) -0.02 (0.07) -0.14** (0.07) -0.02 (0.07)
Social class (manual class =  ref.)
High technocrats -2.17*** (0.24) -1.74*** (0.28) -2.20*** (0.25) -1.84*** (0.29)
High social/cultural specialists -0.74 (0.52) -0.58 (0.53) -0.80 (0.53) -0.62 (0.54)
Low technocrats -1 4-]*** (0.20) -0.87*** (0.24) -1.46*** (0.21) -0.87*** (0.25)
Low social/cultural specialists -0.89*** (0.24) -0.11 (0.26) -0.83*** (0.27) -0.12 (0.29)
Routine non-manual -1.27*** (0.17) -0.85*** (0.20) -1.32*** (0.19) -0.90*** (0.22)
Self-employed -2.38*** (0.22) -1.77*** (0.28) -2.33*** (0.23) -1.75*** (0.30)
1
4
3
Trend
Year*high technocrats 0.03*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02)
Year *high s/c specialists -0.01 (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04)
Year*low technocrats 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.04** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Year*low s/c specialists 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
Year*routine non-manual 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.03* (0.02) 0.03* (0.02)
Year*self-employed 0.02* (0.01) 0.03* (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03)
Bottom-up
Education in years -0.17*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.17*** (0.02) -0.04 (0.02)
Year*education in years 0.01*** (0.00) 0.003* (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.002** (0.00)
Economic conservatism -0.44*** (0.03) -0.40*** (0.04) -0.44*** (0.03) -0.41*** (0.04)
Year*economic conservatism -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
GreenLeft merger since 1989
1989*high technocrats -0.05 (0.45) -0.98* (0.50)
1989*high s/c specialists -0.68 (0.80) -0.25 (0.80)
1989*low technocrats -0.47 (0.44) 0.09 (0.51)
1989*low s/c specialists 0.13 (0.44) -0.19 (0.48)
1989*routine non-manual -0.25 (0.34) -0.31 (0.40)
1989*self-employed 0.24 (0.48) 0.10 (0.59)
df
-2LL
99
23646.1
117
23627.2
(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, church attendance. 
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=11,832
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CHAPTER 4
social-cultural specialists to vote new-left increase to about 2.5 times the odds for 
manual workers in 2006. In other words: class differences between social-cultural 
specialists and manual workers have increased in the period 1971-2006. With 
respect to other classes we find that the differences relative to the manual class 
decline over the same period. Based on a linear trend the difference to vote 
new-left versus liberal right for high and low-grade technocrats and the routine 
non-manual nearly disappeared in 2006.
In model II we account for years of education, and allow the effect of education 
to change over time. With respect to voting old-left versus liberal right we find that 
in 1971 more years of education suggested a rightist party choice (-0.16). But 
based on linear change in the education-vote association (0.004) this negative 
effect has nearly disappeared in 2006. With respect to voting new-left versus 
liberal right we find that since 1986 - 15 year after the reference year - more 
education is increasingly associated (-0.03 +15*0.002) with casting a vote on a 
new-left party. The findings supports hypothesis 3b about ‘cultural voting’, a high 
education is decreasingly associated with voting right-wing, and is increasingly 
associated with voting new-left. Controlling for education has the largest impact 
on class-effects with respect to voting old-left versus liberal right. Especially for 
the sub-classes within the service class both the main-effects as well as the linear 
trends are lower when we control for education: In other words: Class voting is 
partially due to educational differences, and the differences in voting between the 
‘new’ service classes and the working class are in part declining because the 
effect of education changed over time.
Model III includes the voters’ economic conservatism. We expected that we 
could interpret class voting trends by accounting for the decline of ideological 
differences between voters. We therefore allow the effect of economic conservatism 
to linearly change over time. The improvement in fit is considerable (-2LL reduction 
of 1617.5 against 6 df). We only find partial evidence for hypothesis 2. With respect 
to voting old-left we find that the main-effects for class voting are somewhat 
weaker compared to model II, but the interaction coefficients are not substantially 
different. This indicates that although economic conservatism accounts for part 
of the class-vote association, it does not explain the linear trend in class voting. 
With respect to voting new-left we find that the interaction coefficients of lower 
social-cultural specialists and technocrats are no longer significant. This suggests 
that the decline in class voting between low-grade technocrats and the manual 
class is accounted for by economic conservatism, and that the former are about 
2.5 (1/e-0'87) times less likely than the latter to vote new-left vs. liberal right
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throughout the whole period. For low-grade social-cultural specialists we initially 
found that the differences with the manual class were increasing over time. But 
controlled for economic conservatism low-grade social cultural specialists and 
manual workers are equally likely to vote new-left versus liberal right over the 
whole period. We thus find modest support with respect to hypothesis 2. 
Interestingly, we notice an increase of the impact of economic conservatism. In 
1971 the effect of economic conservatism on voting old-left is -0.44 and this 
amounts to -0.8 (-0.44 + (35 * -0.01) in 2006: i.e. for each step up on the economic 
conservatism scale one is 1.5 (1/e-0'44) less likely to vote old-left in 1971 and this 
is 2.7 (1/e-0 99) in 2006. Also with respect to voting new-left versus liberal right we 
find that economic conservatism is increasingly relevant to predict party choice. 
Therefore we have to refute hypothesis 3a.
In model IV we test the ‘top-down’ interpretation using the merging of the 
minor left-wing parties into the Green Party in 1989. To test whether the association 
between class and vote for old and new-left versus liberal parties shows an abrupt 
change after the 1989-election when GreenLeft came into existence we include 
interactions between class categories and a dummy that indicates the 
1989-merger. The estimates however reveal that in general this merging has no 
influence on the class effects whatsoever. We only find that from 1989 onwards 
the higher technocrats are less likely to vote for new-left parties compared to the 
working class. Hence, we have to refute hypothesis 6 . We do not find that the 
odds for the social cultural specialists supporting left parties increase after the 
formation of GreenLeft.
4.5.4 Party positions and the decline of class voting
Next we test hypothesis 4 stating that the decline of the association between 
social class and party choice becomes less strong when we take the ideological 
positions of parties into account. First, we look at the changes in the positions of 
parties between 1971 and 2002 with respect to social-economic issues and 
conservative vs. progressive issues. Unfortunately there are no manifesto data 
available for the Dutch 2006-elections. In Figure 4.5 we present the positions 
for the four party groups; old-left, new-left, liberal right and religious parties. 
Figure 4.5a reveals a process of convergence between the major party groups in 
the Netherlands with respect to social-economic issues. In the early 1970s there 
was a clear difference between the liberals and left-wing parties with respect to 
social-economic policy positions. During the 1970s and 1980s the ideological 
gap between party groups has evidently narrowed. The differences between the
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Figure 4.5a Social-economic Left-Right positions of party groups in the 
Netherlands (1971-2002)
—Q— old-left parties (PvdA, DS70, SP)
Figure 4.5b Conservative versus Progressive positions of party groups in the 
Netherlands (1971-2002)
—D— old-left parties (PvdA, DS70, SP)
—û— new-left parties (D66, GL)
Source: Comparative Manifesto Data (2001, 2006), own calculations
old-left and right are especially small in 1994. Figure 4.5b clearly shows that the 
new-left parties are the most progressive in the Dutch party system, and that the 
liberals are the most conservative. The figure suggests ideological convergence 
between parties with respect to conservatism vs. progressivism until 1986, but 
later we observe divergence on conservative versus progressive policy issues.
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To estimate how party choice is affected by the ideological positions of the 
political parties we apply conditional logistic (CL) regression (McFadden 1974). 
Like the MNL model the CL model can simultaneously estimate binary log-odds 
ratios for multiple contrasts among party alternatives. But the CL model also 
allows combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. CL 
models are sometimes used in electoral studies to estimate whether party choice 
is conditional on characteristics of parties that vary across individuals, e.g.: the 
voter-party distance on particular issues (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). But it is also 
possible to examine characteristics of choice options that are constant across 
individuals, like product price in consumer behavior research (Lammers, Pelzer, 
Hendrickx and Eisinga 2007). In our analysis the individual-specific variables are 
the same variables as we used in the MNL models. The choice-specific variables 
are the positions of each party group on social-economic issues and conserva­
tive-progressive issues at each election. This way the CL model enables us to 
examine what happens when parties change their position on two political 
dimensions. We are primarily interested in the extent to which changing party 
positions are responsible for the decline in the class-vote relationship.
In order to fit CL models with choice-specific variables we rearrange the 
structure of our dataset by ‘stacking’ the data matrix into a person-choice file. In 
a person-choice file each respondent has a separate row in the data matrix for 
each category of the dependent variable. In our data that is four rows per 
respondent. Next to dummy variables indicating party groups, we construct 
another binary variable indicating the actual choice made by a respondent. This 
binary variable is used as the dependent variable. The four party groups which 
were the dependent contrasts in the MNL models, are now included as an 
independent variables. As dummy variables these party group indicators 
correspond with the intercept term of the MNL model (Hendrickx 2000). In our 
analysis the liberal-right parties are the reference category. Choice-specific 
variables are included using one parameter for the effect of each variable. The 
effects of individual-specific variables on different choice contrasts are modeled 
as interactions between dummy variables of party groups and the individual-spe­
cific variables (cf. Hendrickx 2000; Long and Freese 2006).
In model I of table 4.2 we report the estimates of a CL model without choice- 
specific variables. Without choice-specific variables the CL model is equivalent to 
the MNL model (Long and Freese 2006). Although individual-specific effects are 
modeled as interactions with dummy indicators for party groups we report them
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Table 4.2 Conditional logistic regression for voting old-left, new-left, and religious parties with liberal parties as reference in 
the Netherlands, 1971-2002(a)
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Model I Model II
Choice-specific variables b s.e. b s.e.
Liberal Right ( =  ref.) - - - -
Old Left 3.71*** (0.20) 414*** (0.23)
New Left 1.88*** (0.22) 2.26*** (0.25)
Religious 0.28 (0.21) 0.58** (0.23)
Social-economic L-R position *10 0.11*** (0.03)
Conservative-Progressive Position * 10 -0.01 (0.06)
Old Left vs. New Left vs. Old Left vs. New Left vs.
Liberal Right Liberal Right Liberal Right Liberal Right
Individual-specific variables b s.e. b s.e b s.e. b s.e
Year (1971 =ref.) 0.008 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Age 0.004* (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) 0.004 (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) 0.15** (0.07) -0.05 (0.08) -0.14** (0.07) -0.04 (0.08)
Social class (manual class =  ref.)
High technocrats -2.39*** (0.26) -1.63*** (0.29) -2.37*** (0.26) -1.59*** (0.29)
High social/cultural specialists 0.60 (0.60) -0.61 (0.61) -0.57 (0.59) -0.62 (0.6)
Low technocrats -1.46*** (0.21) -0.93*** (0.24) -1.45*** (0.21) -0.89*** (0.24)
Low social/cultural specialists 0.84*** (0.25) -0.08 (0.27) -0.82** (0.25) -0.08 (0.27)
Routine non-manual -1.26*** (0.18) -0.87*** (0.21) -1.27*** (0.18) -0.88*** (0.21)
Self-employed -2.54*** (0.23) -1.79*** (0.29) -2.55*** (0.23) -1.81*** (0.29)
Trend
Year*high technocrats 0.05*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.02)
Year*high s/c specialists -0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Year*low technocrats 0.03** (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Year low s/c specialists 0.03** (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Year*routine non-manual 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
Year*self-employed 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03* (0.02) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.03* (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years -0.16*** (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) -0.17*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
Year*education in years 0.004*** (0.00) 0.002* (0.00) 0.005*** (0.00) 0.002* (0.00)
Economic conservatism -0.33*** (0.03) -0.38*** (0.04) -0.32*** (0.03) -0.39*** (0.04)
Year*economic conservatism -0.02*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
df
-2LL
75
21501.0
77
21488.0
(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right / Old Left vs. Religious / New Left vs. Religious not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, 
Protestant, Calvinist, other religion, church attendance.
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=10.669
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Choice-specific variables
Model III Model IV
b s.e. b s.e.
Liberal Right (=ref.) - - - -
Old Left 4.32*** (0.29) 4.3*** (0.23)
New Left 2.41*** (0.29) 2.46*** (0.25)
Religious 0.71*** (0.26) 0.65*** (0.23)
Social-economic L-R position * 10 0.16*** (0.06) 0.12*** (0.03)
L-R*high technocrats 0.09 (0.11)
L-R *high s/c specialists 0.15 (0.26)
L-R *low technocrats -0.04 (0.10)
L-R *low s/c specialists -0.19* (0.11)
L-R *routine non-manual -0.07 (0.09)
L-R *self-employed -0.18 (0.11)
Conservative-Prog position *10 -0.01 (0.06) -0.36*** (0.10)
Con-Prog*high technocrats 0.62*** (0.2)
Con-Prog *high s/c specialists 0.42 (0.38)
Con-Prog *low technocrats 0.46*** (0.18)
Con-Prog *low s/c specialists 0.75*** (0.18)
Con-Prog *routine non-manual 0.38*** (0.15)
Con-Prog *self-employed 0.35* (0.21)
Old Left vs. New Left vs. Old Left vs. New Left vs.
Liberal Right Liberal Right Liberal Right Liberal Right
Individual-specific variables b s.e. b s.e b s.e. b s.e.
Year (1971 =ref.) -0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Age 0.004 (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) 0.003 (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.14** (0.07)
Social class (manual class =  ref.)
High technocrats -2.06*** (0.47)
High social/cultural specialists -0.07 (1.05)
Low technocrats -1.59*** (0.41)
Low social/cultural specialists -1.46*** (0.46)
Routine non-manual -1.52*** (0.35)
Self-employed -3.18*** (0.45)
Trend
Year*high technocrats 0.04** (0.02)
Year*high s/c specialists -0.02 (0.03)
Year*low technocrats 0.03** (0.01)
Year low s/c specialists 0.05*** (0.02)
Year*routine non-manual 0.03** (0.01)
Year*self-employed 0.06*** (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years -0.17*** (0.02)
Year*education in years 0.004*** (0.00)
Economic conservatism -0.32*** (0.03)
Year*economic conservatism -0.02*** (0.00)
df
-2LL
83
21480.5
-0.03 (0.08) -0.14** (0.07) -0.04 (0.08)
-1.34*** (0.43) -2.61*** (0.27) -1.95*** (0.31)
-0.27 (0.87) -0.73 (0.6) -0.85 (0.61)
-1.01*** (0.39) -1.65*** (0.23) -1.18*** (0.27)
-0.58 (0.41) -1.06*** (0.26) -0.46 (0.28)
-1.09*** (0.32) -1 42*** (0.19) -1.11*** (0.22)
-2.31*** (0.42) -2.69*** (0.24) -2.01*** (0.31)
0.04** (0.02) 0.05*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.02)
0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03)
0.02 (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
0.03* (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.00 (0.02)
0.03** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
0.05** (0.02) 0.04** (0.01) 0.03 (0.02)
-0.03 (0.02) -0.17*** (0.02) -0.03 (0.02)
0.002* (0.00) 0.005*** (0.00) 0.002* (0.00)
-0.39*** (0.04) -0.32*** (0.03) -0.39*** (0.04)
-0.01*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
83
21464.9
(a) Estimates for Religious vs. Liberal Right / Old Left vs. Religious / New Left vs. Religious not shown. And additional controls not shown: Catholic, Protestant, 
Calvinist, other religion, church attendance.
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05;***p <0.01; N=10.669
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in similar fashion to standard MNL effects. We include the same individual-specif­
ic variables as in model III of table 4.1. Again we only present the parameter 
estimates for voting old-left versus liberal right and new-left versus liberal right. 
There are however two differences with the MNL models that we presented in 
table 4.1. First, because there are no CMP data available for 2006, we excluded 
this year from the analysis. Second, given that we aim to include choice-specific 
variables that vary between elections we are unable to include year-dummy 
indicators for each election. The linear class voting trends in model I are therefore 
somewhat different from model III in table 4.1: With respect to voting old-left vs. 
liberal right model I shows linear declines in class differences for almost all 
classes relative to the manual class. With respect to voting new-left versus liberal 
right we only find decline for the high-grade technocrats, routine non-manual 
class and self-employed.
In model II we include the choice-specific variables social-economic position 
and conservative-progressive position. The estimate for social-economic position 
is positive (0.11). This indicates that the more economically right-wing the position 
of a party group, the more likely that party group is to be chosen. Interestingly, the 
effect of the conservative-progressive position is not significant. This implies that 
after accounting for all individual-specific variables in the model, the traditional 
L-R position of parties - and not their position on the cultural dimension - has a 
significant impact on vote choice between the four major party groups in the 
Netherlands between 1971 and 2002. The relevance of the L-R party positions is 
supported by the fact that these results are controlled for economic conservatism 
of voters. Even though such a control is lacking for cultural conservatism there is 
no effect of conservative-progressive party position. Accounting for fact that 
people are inclined to vote for parties that are economically more right-wing has 
not reduced the effect of individual economic conservatism on voting old-left/ 
liberal right or new-left/liberal right. Hence, we refute hypothesis 5.
Because party groups became closer towards each over time on social- 
economic issues this could have narrowed the differences between voting old/ 
new-left versus liberal right. To test whether the inclusion of L-R party positions is 
capable of explaining the class voting trends we model interactions between the 
class dummy variables and the social-economic position of party groups. This 
way we test whether the effect of parties’ L-R position varies between social 
classes, with the manual class as the reference. The results are reported in model 
III. We find that compared to the manual class, other classes are not more likely 
to vote for a party as it is economically more right-wing. With one exception we
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find that voters from all social classes - including the manual class - prefer parties 
with a more rightist position. Only low-grade social-cultural specialists are more 
likely to vote for a party group with a more leftist position. By including these 
interactions we expected to explain the decline in class voting. Both old- and 
new-left parties largely moved to the centre of the Dutch party system since the 
1970s. However, we still see strong trend effects for all classes in model III.
Next, we examine whether voters from different classes are more or less likely to 
vote for parties that are more progressive. In model IV we include interactions between 
social class and the conservative-progressive position of party groups. The 
main-effect is negative (-0.36). Keeping in mind that the manual class is the reference 
category, this indicates that a party is less likely to be chosen by manual workers as 
it is more culturally progressive. The positive coefficients for the interaction estimates 
imply that the more progressive the position of a party group the more likely people 
in these classes will vote for that party group compared to the manual class. 
Differences in the effect of conservative-progressive party position are the largest 
between the manual class and the low-grade social cultural specialists. Although this 
clearly implies a top-down effect - i.e. political choice matters, we do not find strong 
evidence that changes in cultural positions of parties are able to account for the 
decline in class voting. As we observed in figure 4.5 especially new-left parties 
became much more culturally progressive after 1986. But, in contrast to hypothesis
4, both the old-left/liberal and new-left/liberal class voting trends and are not explained 
any further by accounting for conservative-progressive party positions.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter discussed changes in the class basis of voting in the Netherlands. It 
would be misleading if one assumes that only political parties change over time 
and that the cleavage structure remains fixed, or vice versa. There are strong 
indications that the class structure is changing in the Netherlands. We find that 
the rise of the ‘new’ class of social-cultural specialists is important in accounting 
for changes in the class-vote relationship. The higher and lower technocrats are 
clearly not only more right-wing, but the higher and lower social cultural specialists 
also have developed strong preferences for new-left parties, suggesting a process 
of realignment. Overall, the distinction between the manual class and other more 
traditional classes becomes less relevant over time for left-wing voting, i.e. a 
process of class dealignment.
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We tried to interpret the decline of class voting by accounting for the blurring of 
the ideological boundaries between classes. We found that the differences 
between classes with respect to their economic ideology weakened over the last 
decades. But holding constant for voters’ economic ideology could only partially 
interpret class voting differences and changes therein. Surprisingly, we find that 
the association between economic conservatism and voting has increased, 
although slightly, over time. This is surprising if one considers that an increasing 
number of non-economic, for example cultural, topics are included in the political 
discussion, and this would make economic ideology less relevant16. On the other 
hand, a low education is decreasingly associated with voting left-wing. Especially 
new-left parties are increasingly chosen by voters with a high education. A cultural 
or cognitive explanation for the decline in class voting seems to apply: Education 
has the largest impact on class-effects with respect to voting old-left versus 
liberal right. Especially for the sub-classes within the service class both the level 
and decline of the class effects are somewhat lower when we control for education. 
But after accounting for changes in the effect of educational differences and the 
blurring of ideological boundaries, the decline of class voting largely persists. We 
however cannot test whether the inclusion of a ‘left-libertarian’ or cultural 
progressive ideology would interpret class differences in voting new-left.
We tested whether, after accounting for social changes, political choices 
offered to voters have an additional effect on the class-vote relationship. Despite 
the fact we covered more elections after 1989 and used a more differentiated 
class schema than De Graaf et al., we reached similar conclusions about the 
‘top-down’ effect of the GreenLeft merger: There is no evidence that the downward 
trends in class voting were influenced by this political merger. Using conditional 
logistic regression we can conclude that after accounting for trends in class 
differences, economic ideology and level of education, the economic L-R position 
of parties - and not their position on the cultural dimension - has a significant 
impact on vote choice between the four major party groups in the Netherlands 
between 1971 and 2002. It is rather surprising that the extent to which voters favor 
parties with economically right-wing policies does not seem to vary between the 
manual class and other classes. Only low-grade social-cultural specialists tend 
to vote for parties that are economically left-wing. This seems to rule out the 
possibility that changing party positions on the economic dimension are 
responsible for the decline in class voting in the Netherlands. Regarding the 
cultural dimension however, we find that manual workers tend to favor conservative 
parties, whereas other classes - again especially the low-grade social-cultural
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specialists - prefer progressive parties. But strong evidence that changes in 
cultural positions of parties are able to account for the decline in class voting is 
however not found. Even though political parties seem to converge on the 
traditional left-right dimension, and diverge on ‘new’ political issues we were not 
able to interpret trends in class voting accounting for these political developments. 
Moreover, considering that changing class composition probably affects party 
strategy, one could raise the question on the causality of influence between social 
and political factors. We have demonstrated that there is a lot to gain by directly 
measuring political factors, and by investigating them simultaneously with 
individual factors. We found significant ‘top-down’ effects of party positions after 
accounting for the heterogenization of the service class and the blurring of 
economic class boundaries. Inquiries on the causal relationship between societal 
developments and party strategy are however beyond this study.
In this chapter we made progress by employing conditional logistic (CL) 
regression analysis. Conditional logistic models accommodate scientific 
improvement in the field of class voting research because the model allows 
combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. The CL model 
therefore has a crucial advantage over the multinomial logistic (MNL) model. In 
our analysis the individual-specific variables were used to test to what extent 
changes in the social background of the electorate were responsible for the 
decline in class voting. Simultaneously, we used information on party positions as 
choice-specific variables. This way we were able to examine what happens when 
parties change their position on various political dimensions. We showed that the 
CL model is suitable to determine which ‘bottom-up’ as well as ‘top-down’ factors 
influence the level of class-based voting. The conditional logistic model therefore 
not enables more stringent tests of ‘top-down’ theories, but it also facilitates the 
solution to an empirical problem in comparative research, i.e.: how to deal with 
the fact that party categories are not fixed over time. In the next chapter we explore 
possibilities of this model yet further in examining to what extent over-time variation 
in religious voting in the Netherlands is explained by both social changes and 
political choices.
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Notes
11 Although we are aware that the LPF attracted 17% of the voters in the 2002 election, we do not include 
the LPF for two reasons. First, it is hard to determine to which of the political groups they belong. A 
separate category of far- and new right parties in order to examine whether the working class has aban­
doned the left to the advantage of the ‘new right' does also not yield to a comparable category suitable 
for over-time analyses. Second, in this chapter we are especially interested in long term trends. Before 
the rise and fall of the LPF new- and far-right voting was a relatively minor phenomenon in Dutch politics; 
the extreme-right Centre Democrats (CD) only gained 0,9% and 2,4% of the votes in the 1989 and 1994 
elections. In 2006 the PVV managed to draw support (5,9%) on an anti-establishment agenda against 
immigration and ‘islamization'. Although the success of the PVV was accompanied by heavy losses for 
the PvdA and of course the idea of cultural voters pops up immediately, it is too early to examine whether 
the emergence of the PVV has a long-standing impact on the relationship between the working class and 
the classical left and in this study the 2006 election is the latest one
12 We do not present the estimates with religious parties as the reference category for reasons of parsimony. 
Results indicate that voters from all social classes are more likely to vote religious versus old-left relative to 
the manual class. But only for the low-social cultural specialists we find that this association is declining. Re­
sults for voting new-left versus religious parties indicate that - except for the self-employed and low-grade 
social-cultural specialists - class differences do not play a significant role in determining party choice.
13 Before 1989 the exact formulation of this question is slightly different. Especially, for the 1971 and 1972 
surveys. In these surveys three answer categories were being used. We tried several recoding procedures 
to make the items comparable and all resulted in similar results. We recoded the 1971 and 1972 version 
into the seven point version by giving the lowest category a score of 0, the middle category a score of 3 and 
the highest category a score of 6.
14 Because the CMP data only includes so-called ‘significant' parties not all parties in Dutch post-war elec­
toral history are covered in the CMP dataset. Therefore, it must be noted that the Dutch Communist Party, 
Pacifist Socialist Party and Evangelical People's Party are not covered in the CMP data thus not included in 
calculating the old-left or new-left mean scores. On the liberal right-wing side this also applies to the Farm­
ers Party and Middle Class Party.
15 We are aware that both MNL and CL models make the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alter­
natives (IIA), i.e.: adding or omitting a category of the dependent variable does not affect the odds of the 
initial or remaining alternatives. The IIA assumption can be relaxed using computationally more complex 
multinomial probit models (MNP) instead of MNL (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998; Long & Freese 2006). We de­
cided not to use MNP models for three reasons. First, the tests commonly used to detect whether the IIA 
assumption is violated - the Hausman Test and the Small-Hsiao Test - both indicated that there is more 
evidence that IIA is not violated in our models than evidence for the opposite (see Appendix D). Second, 
the results of MNP models were are not substantially different from our MNL estimations. We used the 
stata program ASMPROBiT - alternative-specific multinomial probit (ASMP) - as an alternative for the CL 
model (Long & Freese, 2006). The CL models presented in this chapter were however too demanding 
to converge with ASMP estimation. Third, MNL models are often used to study electoral behavior and 
research has shown that for most applications the IIA assumption is neither relevant nor particularly re­
strictive (Dow & Endersby 2004). By applying CL models we follow a recent innovation in cleavage voting 
research (Elff 2009).
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16 This finding might be influenced by differences in the way the question about ‘income differences' that 
we used to measure economic ideology was phrased in the pre-1989-surveys, and in particular in 1971 
and 1972. We have however no reasons to assume these differences are responsible for the increasing 
effect of economic ideology on voting. Also when we investigate shorter time trends (i.e. from 1981 or 1982 
onwards) we find similar results with respect to the over-time effect of economic conservatism. However, 
when we investigate the 5 surveys form 1989 and later, which is only half of the original time period, we 
find no over-time change in the effect of economic conservatism on voting (neither linear nor year-specific 
changes).
157

Chapter 5
Religious Voting, Social Changes and Political 
Changes in the Netherlands 1971-2006*
* A shorter version of chapters 4 and 5 is forthcoming under the title ‘The political evolution of class and 
religion: An interpretation for the Netherlands 1971-2006' in: G. Evans and N.D. De Graaf (Eds.J. Political 
Choice Matters. Explaining the evolution of class and religious bases of party preference in cross-national 
perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Forthcoming). Co-authors are Nan Dirk De Graaf and Ariana 
Need.

RELiGiOUS VOTiNG, SOCiAL CHANGES AND POLiTiCAL CHANGES iN THE NETHERLANDS 1971-2006
5.1 Introduction
Throughout the twentieth century, religion has been one of the most dominant 
political divisions in the Netherlands. Dutch society was more segregated by 
religion than by class. In chapter 2 we established that religion strongly outweighed 
social class as a determinant of voting behavior in the Netherlands. The religious 
cleavage in the Netherlands involves not only the contrast between the religious 
and non-religious population, but predominantly divided Protestants and 
Catholics. Protestants affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church and Protestant 
Church can be distinguished from those who belong to more orthodox Calvinist 
churches (Janse 1985). A well-known outcome of the Dutch religious segmentation 
was the ‘pillarized' political system. From the historical denominational 
fragmentation, the Dutch party system inherited separate political parties linked 
with different denominational groups. Religious-based voting has traditionally 
been high in the Netherlands because denominational parties largely draw 
support from specific religious groups. Consequently, religious people have 
always been more likely to cast a vote for a religious party than those without a 
religion.
Research shows that religious-based voting has declined in the Netherlands 
over the past decades (Eisinga, Felling and Franses 1997; Need 1997; Van der 
Kolk 2000; Irwin and Van Holsteyn 2008; and chapter 2 of this thesis). This process 
matches the alleged ‘conventional wisdom’ (Dalton 2002) that traditional social 
divisions such as religion and social class are increasingly incapable to explain 
voting behavior in modern democracies. However, contrary to the widespread 
decline of the association between class and vote (Clark and Lipset 1991; 
Nieuwbeerta 1995), a universal downward trend in religious voting is empirically 
less obvious. Comparative studies have demonstrated evidence for relatively 
stable associations between religious divisions and party choice in Western 
European countries (Knutsen 2004; Elff 2007) or recently even reported a slight 
increase of the effect of religion on voting in European Parliament elections (Van 
der Brug, Hobolt and De Vreese 2009). These findings may raise questions about 
recent changes in the course of the trend in religious voting in the Netherlands, 
they especially raise questions about the causes of this trend. The question that 
we aim to answer is this chapter is: To what extent can changes in religious voting 
in the Netherlands be explained by social and political changes?
If the influence of religion on political behavior of individuals is assumed to be 
declining due to sociological processes such as secularization and the growth of
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individualism, this decline is assumed to be relatively gradual and unidirectional. 
Explanations for time-specific changes or potential (temporary) reversals in the 
associations between religion and vote must therefore be attributed to changes 
other than sociological developments. De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) have 
examined the interaction between the available political options and the religious 
affiliation of voters. They demonstrated that the there was an abrupt decline in 
religious-based voting in the Netherlands after the merging of the three main 
denominational parties into the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA). This finding 
supports the idea that political changes affect the religion-vote association. To 
understand over time variation in religious voting in the Netherlands we therefore 
derive explanations from two theoretical approaches borrowed from the class 
voting literature. In the introductory chapter of this thesis and in chapters 3 and 4, 
we have grouped perspectives on explanations in variations in class voting into 
two categories: Approaches that emphasize sociological factors related to the 
composition of classes and the relevance of class divisions in society, and 
approaches that mainly use political factors related to the extent to which parties 
appeal to voters on the basis of class differences (Evans 2000; Evans and 
Whitefield 2006).
The former, so-called ‘bottom-up’ approach uses social changes as a source 
of changes in political choices. Hypotheses about secularization often lay at the 
core of arguments predicting a decline of the religion-vote relationship (Broughton 
and ten Napel 2000; De Graaf et al. 2001; Knutsen 2004). Secularization, Manza 
and Wright (2003) argue, involves that the importance of religion in the lives of 
individuals is declining, that the social and political influence of religious 
organizations is declining and/or that the engagement in political life by religious 
organizations is declining (2003; 300-301). On the one hand, secularization theory 
suggest a decline in the religion-vote relationship as a result of rising levels of 
education and affluence causing voters to become less reliant on ‘simple religious 
heuristics to govern all aspects of their lives, including how they vote' (Manza and 
Wright 2003: 301). On the other hand, declining levels of church attendance are 
assumed to weaken the capacity of churches to influence the voting behavior of 
their members. The traditional boundaries between different denominations and 
between those who are religious and those who are not have, is often assumed, 
become blurred. Consequently, not only the cultural, but also the political distinc­
tiveness of religious groups has in declined.
The implication of the secularization process is that changes in the social 
structure of societies produce changes in political choices, therefore shaping the
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religion-vote relationship ‘bottom-up’. Parties are considered to respond to 
changes in societal circumstances. In class voting research it is commonly held 
that due to the shrinking size of the working class politicians, socialists in 
particular, are more likely to seek support from the middle class, which in turn 
leads them to alienate themselves from the working class (Przeworski and 
Sprague 1986). In this view, the outcomes of party behavior are contributions to, 
and not mere reflections of, the evolution of political cleavages. From this 
‘top-down’ perspective, Evans Heath and Payne (1999) for example explained 
that class voting in Britain declined between 1964 and 1997 as a result of the 
Labour Party’s move to the centre of the party system. Kalyvas (1996) has 
translated this ‘Dilemma of Electoral Socialism’ to the consequences of the 
electoral strategy of confessional parties in the nineteenth century. Historically, 
confessional parties gave emphasis to religious issues. But their religious nature 
hindered Christian Democrats in successfully mobilizing non-religious voters. In 
order to maximize the numbers of votes Christian parties had to deemphasize 
religion without destroying the confessional character of the party. This 
‘Confessional Dilemma’ induced Christian parties to redefine the position of 
religion in politics. In the late nineteenth century Christian Democrats broke their 
organizational dependence on the Church, and they reinterpreted their religious 
identity by replacing specific and detailed religious doctrines by general and 
abstract moral values (Kalyvas 1996: 242-244). Therefore, Kalyvas states that 
“Confessional parties (...) contributed making religion less relevant for politics" 
(Kalyvas 1996: 245). This contests a simple ‘bottom-up’ process. Paradoxically, 
Kalyvas remarks that by eroding their members’ link to the church religious parties
- once formed to bring religion back in society and politics - instead reinforced 
general secularization (1996: 256). A similar argument for the Dutch case is made 
by De Graaf et al. (2001) who argue that the merging of the major Catholic, 
Protestant and Calvinist parties in 1977 into a into a single Christian Democratic 
party has ‘replaced specific linkages between denomination and party with a 
more diffuse relation' (2001: 3). Rather than simply reflecting social changes, a 
‘top-down’ perspective on cleavage voting suggests that changes in political 
choices may reinforce the blurring of religious boundaries.
In this chapter we simultaneously investigate two types of changes in political 
choices in the Netherlands. First, we re-address De Graaf et al.’s question about 
the extent to which the formation of the CDA led to sudden religious dealignment. 
Because we investigate a longer time trend we are also able to investigate the 
consequences of a more recent political merger in 2002 ; that of two minor
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Protestant parties into the ChristianUnion. In doing so, we examine time-specific 
changes in the strength of religious voting that coincide with the changes in the 
party system (De Graaf et al. 2001; Andersen and Heath 2003; Hill and Leighley 
1996). Second, following recent innovations in cleavage voting research (Oskarson 
2005; Elff 2009), we include direct measures of party positions. We account for 
parties’ moral traditionalism using the Comparative Manifesto Data (Budge et al. 
2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). In doing so, we examine the interaction between 
denominational membership/church attendance and differences and changes in 
party positions.
We examine the effect of two forms of political change on the religious voting 
after accounting for the ‘bottom-up’ process of blurring religious boundaries. De 
Graaf et al. (2001) simply assume a process of blurring boundaries. In this 
research, instead of inferring societal homogenization between religious and 
irreligious voters based on gradual decline of religious voting, we formally tests to 
what extent trends in religious voting are interpreted by weakening church 
attendance and growing effects of education. Our hypotheses are tested using 
the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) between 1971 and 2006.
5.2 Bottom-up: Changes in the religious structure of the 
Netherlands
The considerable change in the Dutch religious structure in the past decades has 
already been mentioned. Figure 5.1 shows that the proportion of church members 
has fallen noticeably. It also reveals a more or less linear downward trend of both 
church attendance and church membership over a 35-year period. Total church 
membership dropped from 70% to 45% and regular church attendance (i.e. at 
least once a month) dropped from 39% to 18%. Using different data De Graaf and 
Te Grotenhuis (2008) showed that religious belief and belief in the supernatural 
declined as well. Figure 5.1 also shows that the decline in church membership 
runs more or less parallel for Catholics and Protestants, dropping from 37% and 
23% in 1971 to 24% and 12% in 2006. The total membership of Calvinist groups 
constituted about 10% over the whole period.
Yet, the observed changes in the religious structures and secularization 
processes do not necessarily produce a decline religion-vote relationship. Manza 
and Wright (2003; 313) note that while church membership or church attendance 
may decline, levels of religious voting can remain stable among those who remain
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Figure 5.1 Trend in church membership, church attendance and denomination 
in percentages between 1971 and 2006
Source: DPES 1971-2006
in church. The changes in the sizes of the different religious categories can be 
defined as compositional changes. We therefore need to distinguish compositional 
changes from the blurring of religious boundaries. Knutsen (2004: 99) writes that: 
“Although religious issues are not very prominent on the political agenda, religious 
values are related to a wide range of social and political beliefs: work ethics, 
achievement aspirations, lifestyle norms, parent-child relations, morality, social 
relations, attitudes toward authority, and acceptance of the state" Or, in other words, 
the ideology that connects religion and vote is cultural conservatism (Middendorp 
1991). As said, the process of blurring boundaries will result in less distinctive 
denominational groups, culturally and socially. The decline of religious divisions is 
often attributed to the decrease of religious values and religious integration. Growing 
homogeneity between those who are religious and those who are not may have 
reduced a sense of shared identity and interest among members of religious 
denominations. We expect that the process of blurring religious divisions is 
unidirectional and relatively gradual leading to converging political behavior. We 
therefore expect that: The association between denomination and vote for religious 
versus non-religious parties becomes generally weaker (H1).
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Secularization involves that religious identity, beliefs and values may be 
reduced because church attendance is declining. Church attendance is important 
because, as integration theory (Durkheim 1879 [1967]) suggests, during religious 
rituals the norms of religious groups are not only transmitted but also confirmed. 
The more often people attend church the more their social, cultural and political 
values reflect the religious norms that are transmitted during religious services. 
Therefore, people who attend church frequently hold a more conservative ideology 
than infrequent attendees (Felling and Peters 1986; Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis 
and Bosch 1999). We may expect that conservative religious values cause church 
attendees to vote for parties that stand for traditional moral values, which in the 
Netherlands are usually the confessional parties. But the cultural and normative 
boundaries between religious and irreligious voters may blur as the level of church 
attendance declines. Moreover, compared to earlier decades clergymen today 
may not only be less successful in enforcing religious norms but may also put 
emphasis on different values during religious services. A decline in the religion-vote 
relationship should therefore also show up in weaker religious integration, as 
indicated by less church attendance. We therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis: The association between church attendance and religious party 
choice becomes generally weaker (H2).
A decline in the impact of church attendance on voting could explain why the 
association between denomination and religious party choice is weakening. We 
would assume that church members are attending church less frequently over 
time. Next to religious attendance we would also expect that conservative religious 
values, which are confirmed and transmitted during religious services, are of 
decreasing relevance for party choice. Aarts and Thomassen (2008), for example, 
have shown that value orientations over euthanasia was strongly associated with 
voting for the CDA in 1989, but that this association virtually disappeared in 2006. 
Questions on euthanasia and abortion are, unfortunately, not consistently 
available in the DPES surveys for the whole 1971-2006 period. We therefore 
cannot test to what extent changes in the impact of religious beliefs interpret the 
decline of the denomination-vote relationship. Hence, we only formulate a 
hypothesis about the extent to which changes in the impact of religious behavior 
affect the denomination-vote relationship: The decline of the association between 
denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties becomes less 
strong when we take church attendance into account (H3)
Another implication of the secularization process is associated with the rising 
levels of education in post-industrial societies. Because higher educated people
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generally adhere to more individualistic and liberal norms than less educated 
they are less often religiously affiliated and more often leave their church (Need 
and De Graaf 1996). Higher educated church members are expected to have a 
less traditional world view than church members with a lower education. An 
increasing level of education may therefore blur the cultural boundaries between 
religious and irreligious voters. Our expectation is: The decline of the association 
between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties becomes 
less strong when we take education into account (H4).
5.3 Top-down changes: Political change in the Netherlands
5.3.1 Differences and changes in party manifestos
From the political perspective the religion-vote association is dependent on the 
nature of political appeals to the electorate (Evans and Whitefield 2006). In 
appealing to the growing number of secular voters, confessional parties may 
have deemphasized religious issues in their campaigns. By calling less attention 
to morality policies religious parties decrease the distinct political voice of 
particular religious groups. Studying election surveys from Britain, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Norway Oskarson (2005) demonstrates that the levels of religious 
voting correlate with polarization regarding traditional values at the party level. 
She argues that: “the impact of social cleavages on party choice will not only 
depend on how pronounced or widely spread the cleavages are, but also on how 
the parties relate to the cleavages present in the electorate" (2005: 103). Other 
research on Western Europe (Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands) shows that regular church attendees favor parties with 
relative traditionalist positions, whereas non-churchgoers prefer parties with 
relative modern positions (Elff 2009). Assuming interactions between religious 
categories and the extent to which political parties are culturally conservative, we 
formulate: Church members are more likely to vote for a party relative to non-church 
members as a party holds a more traditional moral position (H5a). And: The more 
individuals attend church the more likely they vote for a party as it holds a more 
traditional moral position (H5b).
Following this line of reasoning, over time changes in the ideological position 
of parties may result in a decline or increase in the association between religion 
and vote. We expect that religious parties in the Netherlands will become less 
traditionalist over time. Keman and Pennings (2006) showed that political choices
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with respect to economic dimension converge. This is due to many Social 
Democratic as well as Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, including 
those in the Netherlands, who have moved to the centre of party systems during 
the 1990s. Analogous to the move of Labor parties towards the centre due to the 
shrinking size of the manual class, we expect that religious parties have become 
less traditionalist because of the decline of church members. Discussing the 
position of Christian Democratic parties Keman and Pennings (2006: 110) write 
that: ''[I]n trying to keep the median voter they apparently felt compelled in view of 
secularization and economic constraints to moderate their moral views and 
traditional values". We thus expect that: The decline of the association between 
denomination and vote becomes less strong when we take the differences and 
changes into account with respect the positions of parties regarding traditional 
moral values (H6).
5.3.2 Religious parties in the Netherlands.
After World War II there were three major religious parties in Dutch politics. The 
oldest one, the ARP (Anti-Revolutionary Party) was founded in 1879. The ARP 
received strong support from Calvinists and other orthodox Protestants. A second 
political party for Protestants was founded in 1908 when the CHU (Christian 
Historical Union) split from the ARP. The CHU was orientated toward the Dutch 
Reformed Church and primarily received support from liberal Protestants (Van 
Holsteyn, Galen and Irwin 2000). The dominant religious party in the post-war 
period was the KVP (Catholic People’s Party) usually attracting around 30 percent 
of the votes. The KVP drew nearly all its support from Catholics. In the 1960s the 
votes for religious parties began to decline, and especially the CHU and KVP lost 
much support. Eventually, the KVP, CHU and ARP participated with a common list 
in the 1977 election and officially merged in a single party (CDA, Christian 
Democratic Appeal) in 1980 (cf. Ten Napel 1990; Pijnenburg 1994).
After the formation of the CDA other confessional parties, mainly appealing to 
orthodox Protestants, remained to exist in the Dutch party system. Although these 
minor ‘Re-reformed’ (Gereformeerde) parties (SGP, GPV, RPF) did not join the 
CDA, two of these parties (GPV and RPF) merged into the ChristianUnion in 2002. 
Both the SGP and ChristianUnion draw much less support than the CDA and 
especially with respect to cultural issues these parties are much more conservative. 
On economic issues the ChristianUnion takes a more leftist position than the 
CDA, and the label ‘minor right’ (klein rechts) that was used to summarize the 
CU-predecessors suffices no longer (Pellikaan 2002).
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Our hypothesis about the effect of political restructuring takes a different form 
than does the ‘bottom-up’ hypothesis of general and gradual class and religious 
dealignment. We expect to find that, if political options have had any autonomous 
effect, the changes in the relationship between religion and vote will be more 
time-specific and more group-specific. First, following the study by De Graaf et al. 
(2001) we look for changes in the association between religion and vote after the 
formation of the common Christian Democrat party list in 1977. We assume that 
the links between specific denominations and the new CDA are less strong than 
the links with individual parties had been before. At the same time, we postulate 
that the CDA would be more successful in attracting non-religious people than 
before since it was less strongly associated with specific denominational 
connotations. As a result we expect the association between religion and vote to 
go down. Second, we look for changes in the religion-vote association after the 
formation of the ChristianUnion. Although we have less clear expectations about 
the merger of the two minor Protestant parties, we may expect that the new CU 
would appeal less to some orthodox Protestants partly because the party name 
no longer contains an explicit reference to either Protestantism or the Reformation. 
A denomination-neutral name and more left-leaning profile may also have made 
the party more attractive to non-Calvinists. Although the vote share of the CU and 
its predecessors has always been small we expect the association between 
denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties to go down as a 
result of the party merger. Our hypothesis is: The association between 
denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious parties shows an abrupt 
decline after the 1977 election when the CDA came into existence (H7a) and after 
the 2002 election when the CU came into existence (H7b).
5.4 Data and measurements
To test our hypotheses we use survey data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election 
Studies (DPES) covering the Dutch national elections between 1971 and 2006. 
We use information on church membership, church attendance, party choice and 
some social background characteristics from the same 11 election surveys 
exploited in the previous chapter: (1971 [N=2.495], 1972 [N =1.526], 1977 
[N=1.856], 1981 [N=2.305], 1982 {N=1.541], 1986 [N=1.630], 1989 [N=1.745], 
1994 (N=1.812], 1998 [N=2.101], 2002 [N=1.574] and 2006 [N=2.623]). The 
combined dataset, after selection on valid information on the relevant variables,
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contains respondents 16.129 respondents. Below we discuss the operationaliza­
tion of our dependent and independent variables.
Party choice: In all election surveys respondents were asked “Did you vote in 
the parliamentary elections on [date]?”. Provided that the respondent answered 
‘yes’ the subsequent question was asked “Which party did you vote for?”. In the 
larger part of the analysis we use a dichotomous dependent variable to estimate 
binary logistic regression of voting for a religious party (CDA, KVP, ARP, CHU, 
RKNP, RPF, GVP, CU, SGP) versus all other parties (1/0). In the final part of the 
analysis we employ conditional logistic regression, here we distinguish between 
four major party groups in the Netherlands on the basis of the De Graaf et al. 
(2001) classification. Next to a category for religious parties we combine parties 
of the old-left (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), new-left (D66, GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP) 
and liberal right (VVD, BP, NMP). Consult appendix A.3 for party names. The 
rearrangement of the data, required to fit the conditional logistic model, together 
with the model specification and estimation procedure, are discussed later.
Religion: Religious denomination of the respondent is measured using a 
question whether respondents consider themselves a member of a particular 
church or religious community: We distinguish between respondents without a 
religious affiliation, Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists and those with another 
religion. In our analyses the ‘non-members’, those without a religious affiliation, 
are the reference category.
Education: We measure the educational level of the respondent as the number 
of years it normally takes to complete a certain level of education. The educational 
categories in the original files are recoded using the conversion tables of 
Ganzeboom and Treiman (2009). In general this results in a metric running from: 
6 year for complete primary education (=0) to 17 years for complete university 
education.
Church attendance: Respondents were asked how often they attended 
religious services: (1) at least once a week; (2) 2 or 3 times a month; (3) once a 
month; (4) several times a year; (5) Never. We coded church attendance such that 
a high score refers to more attendance (0-4).
Party positions: To determine the position of religious parties we use data 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al 
2006). The CMP datasets are based on content analyses of election programs of 
political parties contesting in national elections. The quantity and direction of 
statements by parties, measured in (‘quasi-’) sentences in a program, are 
classified in 56 policy categories. With regard to the position of parties regarding
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cultural conservatism we use the emphasis in the manifesto placed on positive 
statements about ‘traditional morality’. This item was measured as the number of 
‘quasi-sentences’ as a percentage of the total manifesto text dedicated to 
‘favourable mention of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and 
suppression of immorality and unseemly behavior; maintenance and stability of 
family, and religion’. Because our dependent variable consists of party groups 
instead of individual parties we constructed a weighted mean of this scale by 
party group for each election year. The weight of a party within this group is 
determined by its vote share in percentages. Because the CMP data only includes 
‘significant’ parties not all parties in Dutch post-war history are covered. Therefore, 
the positions of minor religious parties (RPF, GVP, SGP)17 are not included in 
calculating the position of the religious party group on the traditional morality 
scale.
5.5 Analysis
To test the formulated hypotheses we divided our analyses in four steps. First we 
examine the association between denominational membership and church 
attendance. Second, we show the over time results of the denomination-vote 
relationship. For this purpose we employ logistic regression with a binary 
dependent variable contrasting religious parties versus other parties. The results 
of this model will be presented in figures as odds ratios for religious groups to 
cast a religious vote relative to the unaffiliated. Third, we present the parameter 
estimates of multivariate logistic regression models to formally test to what extent 
declining trends in religious voting are accounted for by ‘bottom-up’ changes 
(declining effect of church attendance, increasing effect of education) and/or 
‘top-down’ changes in the party structure (CDA merger in 1977, CU merger in
2002). Finally, we use conditional logistic regression models to test to what extent 
changes in traditionalist party positions account for changes in religious voting.
5.5.1 Denomination and church attendance
First, we investigate part of the ‘bottom-up’ explanation for the decline of religious 
voting which assumes that the association between denomination and church 
attendance has declined. In table 5.1 we present the mean levels of church 
attendance broken down by denomination for 1971 and 2006. Table 5.1 suggests 
a clear pattern of convergence between the non-members and other denominations
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in the mean level of church attendance. For all denominations church attendance 
is lower in 2006 compared to 1971. For Catholics the average church attendance 
even becomes about half the size, dropping from 3.1 in 1971 to 1.5 in 2006. Also 
the mean attendance of Protestants, Calvinists and those with another religion is 
significantly lower in 2006 compared to 1971. The differences between religious 
groups decrease as well: as indicated by the F-statistics (between-group variance 
/ within group variance) differences between religious groups are lower in 2006 
compared to 1971. In general the association between church attendance and 
denomination becomes weaker. This supports the idea that the association 
between church membership and the church attendance declines.
Table 5.1 M ean church attendance (0-4) by religious group in 1971 and 2006
Religious
group
1971 
N (%) Mean s.d.
2006  
N (%) Mean s.d.
1971 vs. 2006  
Compare means(a)
Non-members 743 (29.8) 0.00 0.00 1424 (54.3) 0.00 0.00 n/a
Catholic 886 (35.5) 3.14 1.16 629 (24.0) 1.51 1.14 -1.63***
Protestant 528 (21.2) 2.36 1.27 316 (12.1) 1.90 1.70 -0.46***
Calvinist 226 (9.1) 3.51 1.03 100 (3.8) 2.55 1.88 -0.96***
Other religion 112 (4.5) 2.55 1.27 153 (5.8) 2.22 1.83 -0.33*
Total 2495 (100) 2.05 1.70 2622 (100) 0.82 1.41 -0.64***
F-test (all religious groups) 1193 *** 557 ***
F-test (excl. non--religious) 71.1 *** 18 ***
Source: DPES 1971 and 2006 ; *p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01 
(a) T-test for equality of means
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5.5.2 Denominational groups, church attendance and voting confessional
Next we show the overtime results of the denomination-vote relationship. We 
present the results of logistic regression analyses regressing religious voting on 
dummy-variables for Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, and those having another 
religion. The reference group in the analysis consists of those without a 
denomination. To allow over time changes we add dummy indicators for each 
year of survey with 1971 as the reference, as well as interactions between 
year-dummies and the religious groups. In figure 5.2a we present for each 
denomination for each year the odds ratio of voting for a religious party versus 
any other party as opposed to the non-members.
It is clear that the odds of casting a religious vote are highest for Calvinists 
followed by Catholics, Protestants and those with another religion. In 1972, the 
odds of Calvinists voting for a religious party versus any other party were 172 
times the odds of the non-members voting for a religious. For Catholics and 
Protestant and those with another religion the 1972-odds of voting religious were 
respectively 30, 15 and 11 times higher compared to the non-members. There 
has been a strong decline of the denomination-vote relationship after the 1970s. 
The odds that Calvinists will vote for a religious party, although peaking again in 
1998, eventually dropped to 30 times higher as opposed the odds of non-members 
in 2006. The odds of Catholics and Protestants casting a religious vote relative to 
the non-members dropped from respectively 30 and 15 in 1972 to 8 in 1986. From 
1986 onwards there is hardly any difference left relative to the non-members 
between Protestants and Catholics. Together with the other religious people their 
odds to cast a religious vote are about 4 to 10 times higher compared to the 
non-members throughout the 1986-2006 period.
Figure 5.2b shows that almost the whole trend can be interpreted by taking 
church attendance into account (note that we reduced the y-axis by a factor 5). 
Since the association of church attendance with religious voting declined over 
time (see table 5.2) we allowed church attendance to change linearly over time. 
The results indicate that, accounting for a declining effect of church attendance, 
the odds of Catholics to vote for a religious party are about the same in 1971 and 
2006 (about 2 times higher compared to the non-members). The odds of 
Protestants are even about two times higher in 2006 than in 1971. In 1972 the 
odds of Calvinists to cast a religious vote are about 16 times higher compared to 
the non-members. In 1986 this odds ratio drops to about 3, but again rises to 25 
in 1998 and 12 times in 2006. We conclude that the decline of church attendance 
and therefore religious disintegration among church members is almost fully
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responsible for the decline in and for the convergence of religious-based voting. 
However, religious disintegration is not able to interpret the alleged increase in 
religious voting between 1986 and 1998.
To get more insight in the changes and to test our hypotheses formally we 
present several logistic regression models. In our first model in table 5.2 we 
tested for over time changes in the association between denomination and party 
choice. To get a parsimonious model we allow each denomination parameter to 
vary linearly over time. With 1971 as a baseline all religious groups are significantly 
and substantially more likely to cast a confessional vote than those without a 
denomination. The odds to vote for a confessional party in contrast to the 
non-members are (e328) 26 times higher for Catholics, 9 times higher for 
Protestants, 97 times higher for Calvinists and 5 times higher for other religious 
groups. However, there are clearly time-interaction effects for all denominations, 
with the strongest linear decline for the Catholics and the Calvinists. Between 
1971 and 2006 the odds that Catholics will vote for religious parties relative to the 
non-members fell from 26 to about 5 (e328 - (35 *05)). There is an even stronger 
decline for Calvinists. In 1971 the odds for Calvinists to vote for a confessional 
party were 97 times higher than for unaffiliated voters, but this becomes (e458 - (35 
*04)) 24 times in 2006. These results support hypothesis 1. Compared to earlier 
research of De Graaf et al. (2001), that covered fewer elections and did not find 
any linear trend for Protestants, we now find a linear decline in religious voting for 
all major denominational groups.
In model II we add the ‘bottom-up’ changes to the model. We expected that 
social changes would be able to interpret the decline of the association between 
denomination and vote. We include variables for education in years and church 
attendance, and allow these effects to vary linearly over time. With respect to 
church attendance model II demonstrates two things: First, the effect of church 
attendance gradually declines (-0.01), supporting hypothesis 2. Second, the 
decline of the church attendance-vote association largely interprets the decline of 
the denomination-vote association, which supports hypothesis 3. Accounting for 
church attendance model II shows that the odds for all religious groups to cast a 
vote on a religious party relative to unaffiliated voters have fallen. With 1971 as a 
baseline the odds for Catholics fall to 2 (e072), for Protestants to nearly 1, and for 
Calvinists to 5.5. Voters having another religion are even less likely to vote for a 
confessional party. Moreover, the decline for the effects of being Catholic and 
being Calvinist, relative to the non-members are also not significant anymore. 
Interestingly, when controlling for the effect of church attendance we find that, for
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Table 5.2 Logistic regression for voting religious parties versus all other parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2006
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
 
5Model I 
Linear trends
Model II 
Linear trends and 
bottom-up changes
Model III 
Linear trends and top- 
down changes
Model IV 
Linear trends, bottom- 
up and top-down
b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
Constant -3.29*** (0.12) -2.86*** (0.15) -3.45*** (0.16) -2.98*** (0.18)
Year (1971 =ref.) - - - - - -
1972 -0.18** (0.09) -0.05 (0.10) -0.22** (0.09) -0.09 (0.11)
1977 0.03 (0.10) 0.10 (0.11) 0.43** (0.19) 0.45** (0.20)
1981 0.15 (0.10) 0.23** (0.11) 0.45** (0.18) 0.48** (0.19)
1982 -0.11 (0.10) -0.05 (0.12) 0.16 (0.18) 0.18 (0.19)
1986 0.52*** (0.11) 0.56*** (0.13) 0.70*** (0.17) 0.68*** (0.19)
1989 0.65*** (0.12) 0.76*** (0.14) 0.78*** (0.17) 0.83*** (0.19)
1994 -0.01 (0.13) -0.17 (0.16) 0.02 (0.19) -0.23 (0.21)
1998 0.04 (0.14) -0.21 (0.17) -0.01 (0.20) -0.36 (0.22)
2002 0.73*** (0.15) 0.52*** (0.18) 0.96*** (0.18) 0.72*** (0.21)
2006 1.12*** (0.15) 1.01*** (0.21) 1.30*** (0.18) 1.13*** (0.23)
Age 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) 0.06 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04)
Denomination (non-members=ref.)
Catholic 3.28*** (0.11) 0.72*** (0.15) 3.42*** (0.17) 0.73*** (0.21)
Protestant 2.24*** (0.12) 0.18 (0.15) 2.44*** (0.18) 0.34* (0.21)
Calvinist 4.58*** (0.16) 1.72*** (0.20) 5.02*** (0.23) 2.19*** (0.27)
Other religion 1.70*** (0.20) -0.60** (0.24) 1 74*** (0.20) -0.61** (0.24)
1
7
7
Trend
Year*Catholic -0.05*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Year*Protestant -0.01* (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.07*** (0.01)
Year*Calvinist -0.04*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.06*** (0.02)
Year*Other religion -0.01 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01)
Bottom-up
Education in years -0.07*** (0.01) -0.07*** (0.01)
Year*education in years 0.00*** (0.00) 0.00*** (0.00)
Church attendance 0.84*** (0.03) 0.85*** (0.03)
Year*church attendance -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
CDA merger since 1977
1977*Catholic -0.46** (0.23) -0.35 (0.24)
1977* Protestant -0.73*** (0.25) -0.80*** (0.27)
1977*Calvinist -1.11*** (0.33) -1.42*** (0.35)
CU merger since 2002
2002*Catholic -0.43** (0.21) -0.54** (0.22)
2002*Protestant -0.67*** (0.24) -0.80*** (0.26)
2002*Calvinist -0.32 (0.32) -0.62** (0.34)
Df 20 24 26 30
-2LL 15699.2 14159.4 15680.8 14131.6
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=16,129
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Protestants, their denomination becomes now increasingly important, i.e.: up to 
an odds ratio of (e018 + (35 *0 03)) about 3.5 in 2006. Model II therefore suggests 
that the extent to which church members attend religious services is of decreasing 
importance for voting confessional. This largely interprets the decline in religious 
voting for Catholics, Protestants and Calvinists. Being a Protestant relative to 
having no religious affiliation becomes more important for casting a vote on a 
religious party between 1971 and 2006.
The negative main-effect of education indicates that the odds that one votes 
for a religious party in 1971 are about 7 percent (1/(e-0 07)) lower after each year of 
education. The positive year*education interaction suggests that the effect of 
education becomes less strong over time. The positive main-effect of church 
attendance shows that in 1971 the odds of voting for a religious party are higher 
as one attends church more often. The negative year*church attendance-interac- 
tion implies that the effect of church attendance is declining over time. Although 
both the effects of education and church attendance are significant it is largely 
church attendance that accounts for the decline in religious voting. When we 
estimate model II without church attendance the effects of the year*denomination 
interactions are the same as in model I. Hypothesis 4, stating that the decline of 
the association between denomination and party choice becomes less strong 
when we take education into account, is refuted.
In model III we test the political change hypotheses 7a and 7b. To test whether 
the association between denomination and vote for religious versus non-religious 
parties shows an abrupt decline after the 1977-election when the CDA came into 
existence we include an interaction between denomination and a dummy that 
indicates the 1977-merger of the three main religious parties. This way we test 
whether there was an abrupt decline in confessional voting which coincides with 
formation of the CDA (cf. De Graaf et al. 2001). We also included an interaction 
between denomination and a dummy indicating the 2002-election when the 
ChristianUnion was formed of out the merger of two minor Protestant parties. In 
support of hypothesis 7a the estimates indeed show that compared to 
non-members the 1977 CDA-merger seems to be responsible for a decline in 
confessional voting for the Catholics (e-0464), Protestants (e-0732) and Calvinists 
(e-1108). That is, after the CDA-merger the odds for Catholics voting for a religious 
party fell to sixty percent of their pre-1977 level, whereas the odds for Protestants 
fell to about a half and the odds for Calvinists to a third of their original level. The 
2002-interactions suggest that there was also an abrupt decline in religious voting 
for Catholics and Protestants after the 2002-election. Also after 2002 the odds to
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vote for a religious party fell to about sixty percent (e-0432) of their level before 
2002 for Catholics, and to about a half for Protestants (e-0674). The 2002-elections 
did not affect the odds of voting confessional for Calvinists.
In model IV we include the ‘bottom-up’ changes (i.e. education, church 
attendance) and ‘top-down’ changes (i.e. party mergers) simultaneously. The 
results indicate that accounting for both types of changes the gradual decline of 
the association between denomination and vote is accounted for, but abrupt 
decreases associated with political changes remain. We find that the odds to vote 
confessional for all major denominations even gradually increase in the period 
1971-2006, but show sudden decreases after 1977 (for Protestants and Calvinists) 
and 2002 (for all denominations). It is however unlikely that the full decline of 
religious voting in 2002 can be attributed to the CU-merger. Votes for the 
ChristianUnion (and its predecessors) only cover a small share of the total votes 
for religious parties. And given the Protestant identity of the party we would not 
expect that the merger affected the odds of casting a religious vote for Catholics. 
Moreover, the 2002-elections were heavily influenced by the parliamentary 
entrance of another newcomer, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). But although the rise 
of the LPF caused massive shifts among the electorate, it is also unlikely to be 
primarily responsible for the abrupt decline in religious voting in 2002. There is no 
obvious relationship between specific denominations and voting LPF18. Moreover, 
research on the Dutch 2002 elections has shown that people who frequently 
attend church were even less likely to vote for the LPF than those never attend 
church (Van der Brug 2003; Lubbers 2007). It is therefore not plausible that the 
decline in the religion-vote association was caused by religious voters that moved 
away from confessional parties to the LPF. This model supports the idea that after 
accounting for social changes and party mergers, there may be other political 
factors that affect religious voting despite the weakening of religious integration 
and the ‘depillarization’ of the party system. In other words: Accounting for church 
attendance perhaps interprets much of the decline in religious voting, and party 
mergers may explain sudden decreases in religious voting. But these factors 
leave unexplained why the odds to vote for a religious party for all denominational 
groups now increase over time.
5.5.3 Religious voting and party positions
Next, we test another version of the ‘top-down’ approach by including the changes 
and differences in positions of political parties. First we look at the changes in the 
emphasis on traditional values in the manifestos of political parties between 1971
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Figure 5.3a Emphasis on traditional morality issues in party manifestos by 
political party groups in the Netherlands
—o— Religious parties —*— free market liberals (VVD)
—B— old-left parties (PvdA, DS70, SP) —A— new-left parties (D66, PPR, GL)
Figure 5.3b Controlled odds ratios for voting religious (non-members as
reference group) and the emphasis on traditional morality issues 
in party manifestos of religious parties
" Other religion
Morality Issues (religious parties)
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (2001, 2006)
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and 2002. Unfortunately there are no manifesto data available for the Dutch 2006- 
elections. In Figure 5.3a we not only present the positions regarding traditional 
morality for religious parties, but we also show the positions of the Dutch liberals, 
left-wing parties, and new-left parties. Figure 5.3a shows that religious parties 
decreasingly mention issues on traditional morality in their manifestos since the 
1970s, but only until 1982. There is hardly any variation among the other political 
parties over time19. After 1982 the traditional values become more salient again in 
the party programs of religious parties. The common perception that the Christian 
Democrats in the Netherlands adjusted their party program to the changing 
religious structure of society by de-emphasizing traditionalist issues is therefore 
not supported by the pattern in figure 5.3. It seems that the traditionalist position 
of the religious party group in 2002 is at about the same level as in 1972.
In figure 5.3b we overlay the manifesto-pattern for religious parties with the 
patterns in religious-based voting as reported in figure 5.2b (viz., controlled for 
the linearly declining effect of church attendance). We clearly observe that for 
Calvinists variation in the odds ratios to vote for a religious party relative to 
unaffiliated voters follows a very similar pattern as the emphasis on traditional 
values in the manifestos of religious parties. Also the increase of religious voting 
from 1986 onwards for Catholics, Protestants and those with another religion 
seems to coincide with an increase of the salience of traditionalist issues in 
religious party programs. Because we are analyzing the odds to cast a religious 
vote relative to the non-members this figure suggests that the manifesto positions 
may especially influence those without a denomination. The more religious parties 
emphasize issues related to traditional moral values the less non-members may 
be inclined to vote for these parties relative to votes with a religious affiliation, 
causing the odds ratios to increase. These results seem to confirm the 
‘Confessional Dilemma’ of Christian Democratic parties.
To formally test hypotheses 5(a and b) and 6 about the differences and 
changes in party positions regarding traditional values we apply conditional 
logistic (CL) regression (McFadden 1974). In order to employ CL estimation it is 
required to use a multi category dependent variable, similar to multinomial logistic 
(MNL) regression. Next to religious parties we therefore distinguish between three 
other major party groups in the Netherlands on the basis of the De Graaf et al. 
(2001) classification: the old-left (PvdA, DS70, CPN, SP), new-left (D66 , 
GroenLinks, PPR, PSP, EVP) and liberal right (VVD, BP, NMP). Respondents voting 
for another party are now excluded from the analysis (N=13.569). Like a MNL 
model the CL model can simultaneously estimate binary log-odds ratios for
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Table 5.3 Conditional logistic regression for voting religious vs. old left 
left and liberal right parties in the Netherlands, 1971-2002
, new
Model I
Party-specific variables b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Old Left ref. 2.26*** (0.15) 2.51*** (0.14)
New Left -2.26*** (0.15) ref. 0.25 (0.17)
Liberal -2.51*** (0.14) -0.25 (0.17) ref.
Religious -2.97*** (0.16) -0.71*** (0.18) -0.46*** (0.17)
Emphasis on traditional morality
Individual-specific variables Religious vs.
Old-Left New Left Liberal
Year (1971 =ref.) 0.04*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01)
Age 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.02 (0.05) -0.21*** (0.06) 0.04 (0.06)
Denomination (non -members= ref.)
Catholic 0.78*** (0.19) -0.05 (0.23) 0.00 (0.21)
Protestant 0.16 (0.18) 0.28 (0.24) -0.50** (0.21)
Calvinist 2.49*** (0.33) 1.15*** (0.34) 1.65*** (0.39)
Other religion -0.63** (0.28) -0.76*** (0.34) -1.48*** (0.30)
Trend
Year*Catholic 0.01 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
Year*Protestant 0.03*** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01)
Year*Calvinist 0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
Year*Other religion 0.03** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years 0.07*** (0.02) -0.13*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02)
Year*education in years -0.003*** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.002*** (0.00)
Church attendance 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05)
Year*church attendance -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
CDA merger since 1977
1977*Catholic 0.01 (0.14) 0.87*** (0.18) 0.08 (0.17)
1977*Protestant 0.08 (0.18) 0.07 (0.27) -0.09 (0.20)
1977*Calvinist -0.62 (0.43) -0.58 (0.41) -0.85* (0.47)
df 57
-2LL 29456.4
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=13.659
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Model II
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
ref. 2.25*** (0.15) 2.49*** (0.14)
-2.25*** (0.15) ref. 0.24 (0.17)
-2.49*** (0.14) -0.24 (0.17) ref.
-2.84*** (0.16) -0.59*** (0.19) -0.34* (0.18)
-0.08*** (0.02) -0.08*** (0.02) -0.08*** (0.02)
Old-Left
Religious vs. 
New-Left Liberal
0.04*** (0.01) -0.02** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
-0.02 (0.05) -0.20*** (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
0.89*** (0.19) 0.08 (0.23) -0.11 (0.22)
h 0.29 (0.19) 0.41 (0.25) -0.37* (0.21)
2.61*** (0.33) 1.26*** (0.35) 1.78*** (0.40)
-0.63** (0.28) -0.77** (0.34) -1.48*** (0.30)
0.02* (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01)
0.03*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
0.03** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.02)
-0.002*** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.002*** (0.00)
0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05)
-0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
-0.23 (0.16) 0.61*** (0.20) -0.16 (0.18)
-0.16 (0.19) -0.19 (0.27) -0.33 (0.22)
-0.87** (0.43) -0.3** (0.41) -1.11** (0.47)
58
29438.7
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Table 5.3 Continued
Model III
Party-specific variables b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
Old Left - 2.24*** (0.15) 2.47*** (0.14)
New Left -2.24*** (0.15) - 0.23 (0.17)
Liberal -2.47*** (0.14) -0.23 (0.17) -
Religious -2.72*** (0.17) -0.48** (0.19) -0.25 (0.18)
Emphasis on traditional morality -0.19*** (0.04) -0.19*** (0.04) -0.19*** (0.04)
Traditional morality*Catholic 0.11*** (0.05) 0.11*** (0.05) 0.11*** (0.05)
Traditional morality *Protestant 0.19** (0.06) 0.19** (0.06) 0.19** (0.06)
Traditional morality *Calvinist 0.18*** (0.08) 0.18*** (0.08) 0.18*** (0.08)
Traditional morality *Other 0.19*** (0.08) 0.19*** (0.08) 0.19*** (0.08)
Traditional morality *Church att.
Individual-specific variables Religious vs.
Old-Left New Left Liberal
Year (1971 =ref.) 0.05*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Age 0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Gender (male=ref.) -0.02 (0.05) -0.21*** (0.06) 0.04 (0.06)
Denomination (non -members= ref.)
Catholic 0.81*** (0.21) 0.00 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23)
Protestant -0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.28) -0.68*** (0.24)
Calvinist 2.30*** (0.39) 0.99** (0.41) 1.51*** (0.44)
Other religion 0.81*** (0.21) -0.95*** (0.35) -1.65*** (0.32)
Trend
Year*Catholic 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
Year*Protestant 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03** (0.01)
Year*Calvinist 0.01 (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Year*Other religion 0.02 (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 0.05*** (0.02)
Bottom-up
Education in years 0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.02)
Year*education in years -0.003*** (0.00) 0.001* (0.00) 0.003*** (0.00)
Church attendance 0.90*** (0.04) 0.77*** (0.05) 0.83*** (0.05)
Year*church attendance -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
Top-down
CDA merger since 1977
1977*Catholic -0.25 (0.17) 0.60*** (0.21) -0.18 (0.19)
1977*Protestant 0.09 (0.22) 0.07 (0.3) -0.08 (0.24)
1977*Calvinist -0.65 (0.48) -0.61 (0.47) -0.89* (0.52)
df 62
-2LL 29424.3
*p < 0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p <0.01; N=13.659
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Model IV
b (s.e.) b (s.e.) b (s.e.)
- 2.25*** (0.15) 2.49*** (0.14)
-2.25*** (0.15) - 0.24 (0.17)
-2.49*** (0.14) -0.24 (0.17) -
-2.81*** (0.16) -0.56*** (0.19) -0.32* (0.18)
-0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.03) -0.10*** (0.03)
0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Religious vs.
Old-Left New-Left Liberal
0.04*** (0.01) -0.02* (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
0.01*** (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
-0.02 (0.05) -0.20*** (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
0.90*** (0.19) 0.08 (0.23) 0.12 (0.22)
0.29 (0.19) 0.42* (0.25) -0.36* (0.21)
2.61*** (0.33) 1.29*** (0.35) 1.78*** (0.4)
-0.62** (0.28) -0.75** (0.34) -1.47*** (0.30)
0.02*) (0.01 0.02** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)
0.03*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.05*** (0.01)
0.03 (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 0.04** (0.02)
0.03** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02)
0.07*** (0.02) -0.14*** (0.02) -0.15*** (0.02)
-0.003*** (0.00) 0.001* (0.00) 0.03*** (0.00)
0.88*** (0.05) 0.75*** (0.06) 0.81*** (0.05)
-0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00)
-0.21 (0.15) 0.63*** (0.19) -0.15 (0.18)
-0.15 (0.19) -0.18 (0.27) -0.32 (0.21)
-0.84* (0.43) -0.80* (0.41) -1.07* (0.47)
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multiple contrasts among party alternatives. But the CL model also allows 
combining case-specific variables with choice-specific variables. In our analysis 
the individual-specific variables are the same variables that we used in the 
binomial logistic models. The choice-specific variable is the emphasis of each 
party group on traditional moral issues at each election. This way the CL model 
enables us to examine what happens as parties take a more traditionalist position. 
We are primarily interested in whether changing party positions are responsible 
for changes in the religion-vote relationship.
In order to fit CL models with choice-specific variables we rearrange the 
structure of our dataset by ‘stacking’ the data matrix into a person-choice file. In 
a person-choice file each respondent has a separate row in the data matrix for 
each category of the dependent variable. In our data that is four rows per 
respondent. Next to dummy variables indicating party groups, we construct 
another binary variable indicating the actual choice made by a respondent. This 
binary variable is used as the dependent variable in the CL model. The 
four-category party group variable, usually the dependent variable in the MNL 
models, is now included as an independent variable (Hendrickx 2000). As dummy 
variables these party group indicators correspond with the intercept term of the 
MNL model. The emphasis on traditional morality is included using one parameter. 
The effects of individual-specific variables on different choice contrasts are 
modeled as interactions between dummy variables of party groups and the indi­
vidual-specific variables (Hendrickx 2000; Long and Freese 2006).
In model I of table 5.3 we report the estimates of a CL model without choice- 
specific variables. Without choice-specific variables the CL model is equivalent to 
a MNL model (Long and Freese 2006). Although individual-specific effects are 
modeled as interactions with dummy indicators for party groups we report them 
in similar fashion to standard MNL effects. In model I we present the individual- 
specific estimates for voting for a religious party using different reference 
categories for party choice. We include the same individual-specific variables as 
in model IV of table 5.2, with two exceptions: First, because there are no CMP 
data available for 2006, the election of 2002 is the latest one in this analysis. We 
therefore cannot include the 2002 CU-merger in this model. Second, given that 
we aim to include choice-specific variables that vary between elections we are 
unable to include year-dummy indicators for each election. With respect to voting 
religious versus old-left we find an increase in the effect of being a Protestant, but 
no overtime change for Catholics or Calvinists. With respect to voting religious 
versus new-left model I shows linear increases in denomination effects for almost
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all re lig ious groups relative to the unaffiliated. W ith respect to voting religious 
versus liberal right we find that the d ifferences relative to the non-re lig ious become 
larger for C atho lics and Calvin ists. We find that in the reference year, holding 
constant for education and church attendance, Protestants were even slightly 
more likely to vote for a liberal party than for a relig ious party (1/e-050). Based on 
a linear trend we find that in 2002 Protestants were about (1/e -050+31*0 04) 2 tim es 
more likely to vote for a relig ious party relative to a liberal party.
In model II we include the choice-specific  variab le ‘em phasis on trad itional 
m ora lity ’. The estim ate of th is effect is negative (-0.08). This im plies that after 
accounting for all individual-specific variables in the model, a party group is less 
likely to be chosen when it has a m ore trad itiona lis t position. To test w hether the 
inclusion trad itiona lis t party positions is capable of explaining the linear trends in 
denom ination-e ffec ts we m odel in teractions between denom inationa l groups and 
the em phasis on trad itiona l m orality  in party m anifestos. This way we test whether 
the effect of pa rties ’ trad itiona lis t position varies between relig ious groups, with 
the non-re lig ious as the reference. The results are reported in m odel III. The 
m ain-effect is negative (-0.19). Keeping in m ind tha t the non-m em bers are the 
reference category, th is  indicates that a party is less likely to be chosen by secular 
voters as it is m orally more trad itiona lis t. And supporting  hypothesis 5a, the 
positive coeffic ients for the interaction estim ates im ply that the m ore trad itional 
the position of a party group the more likely people of th is  relig ious category will 
vote for that party group com pared to the non-re lig ious. For m ost denom inations 
the in teraction-effect largely com pensates the negative m ain-effect, which 
indicates that parties w ith  more trad itiona l m oral positions deter secular voters 
rather than attract re lig ious voters. On the whole, m odel III show s w eaker linear 
trends in relig ious voting than m odel II. W ith respect to voting relig ious versus 
o ld -le ft the initial linear trends are fu lly accounted for. We also find no linear trends 
in the voting behavior of P rotestants and C atho lics w ith respect to the religious 
versus new-left party contrast. Only for the relig ious versus liberal right party 
contrast we could not interpret the linear trends by accounting for denom inationa l 
d ifferences in the effect of trad itiona l party positions. By and large, we find support 
for hypothesis 6, a lthough we interpreted linear increase rather than linear 
decrease.
In m odel IV we test hypothesis 5b by investigating w hether the trad itional 
position of parties affects the association between church attendance and vote. 
The interaction effect between the m anifesto scale and church attendance is 
however not significant. Th is indicates that there is no evidence tha t the effect of
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church attendance is influenced by the em phasis on trad itiona l va lues in 
m anifestos of political parties. Moreover, in m odel IV we notice no substantia l 
change in the trend of church attendance. We do find no support for hypothesis 
5b.
5.6 Conclusions
There is clearly a decline in the associa tion between church m em bership  and 
vote in the period 1971-2006. For the m ost part th is  decline seem s to have taken 
place before 1986. Especially for C atholics and C alvin ists we observe convergence 
in voting behavior com pared to non-affilia ted voters. The decline of the political 
boundaries between relig ious groups is largely explained by declining church 
attendance. Declining church attendance, as an indicator of religious 
disintegration, suggests tha t church m em bers are less adhered to the conservative 
relig ious norm s and values preached in churches. The d ifference in voting 
between liberal Protestants and the non-m em bers was already relatively small in 
the 1970s. Therefore, the initial decline of the associa tion between being a 
Protestant and voting confessional is only weak. However, accounting for religious 
d isintegration even produces an increase of re lig ious voting for Protestants and 
people w ith ‘o th e r’ re lig ious affiliations.
We find that in addition to the linear trends the merging of relig ious parties into 
the CDA reduced the level of relig ious voting (see also De Graaf et al. 2001). The 
CDA-m erger seem s to be particularly responsib le for a decline in confessional 
voting am ong the C alvin ists and the Protestants. Covering more e lections than 
De Graaf et al. we also found tha t the level of relig ious voting dropped after the 
2002-elections, coinciding w ith the political m erger of tw o  m inor Protestant 
parties into the C hristianU nion. Interestingly, the party m ergers not only had 
effects in reducing the re lig ion-vote association, we also find tha t the mergers 
m attered even after the linear trend is fu lly accounted for by the changing church 
attendance-vote relationship. We conclude that apart from  social changes the 
political in terruptions are im portant in the processes of relig ious dealignment, 
supporting the political choice argument.
We have shown that trad itiona lis t party positions increase relig ious voting 
despite the weakening of relig ious integration and the restructuring of the party 
system. We found interactions between relig ious categories and the ideological 
positions of parties. Especially non-affilia ted voters are generally less likely to
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vote for parties that hold trad itiona l m oral positions. In th is sense we may conclude 
that parties w ith more trad itiona l m oral positions deter secular voters rather than 
attract relig ious voters. We aim ed to investigate w hether the trad itiona lis t positions 
of parties could interpret the decline in re lig ious-based voting after accounting for 
social changes that reduce relig ious boundaries. But because the decline of 
church attendance is a lm ost fu lly responsib le for the decline in re lig ious-based 
voting, party positions do not contribute to explaining linear downward trends. 
A fter accounting for a declining effect of church attendance a U-curve for religious 
voting remained, that strong ly resem bles the over-tim e em phasis of religious 
parties on trad itiona l m oral issues. M odeled as a linear increase in relig ious- 
based voting th is trend is to som e extent explained by the trad itiona l moral 
positions of parties.
For future research it may be useful to include a variab le m easuring individual 
conservative ideology. Now we use church attendance as an ind icator of religious 
integration to derive expectations about the transm iss ion  of relig ious beliefs. 
A lthough we know that frequency of church attendance is correlated w ith ideology, 
a direct over tim e com parable m easure of cultural conservatism , would a llow  a 
more sophisticated interpretation of re lig ious voting by linking the effect of party 
ideology directly to individual ideology.
Deciding w hether the ‘b o ttom -up ’ or ‘to p -d o w n ’ approach is m ore successful 
in explaining the re lig ion-vote associa tion is difficult. Both are relevant and they 
are of course related. In th is chapter we find that the ‘b o ttom -up ’ explanation is 
successful since accounting for relig ious integration resulted in a powerful 
in terpretation of the decline in re lig ious-based voting. Social changes are not only 
likely to affect the relig ion-vote associa tion but also strategy of political parties. 
On the o ther hand, it would be m isleading if one assum es that only political 
parties change over tim e and that the cleavage structure rem ains fixed. This can 
be illustrated by the CDA-merger. The m erger itself was a reaction to secularization 
and the waning electoral power of the m ajor denom inationa l parties. It shows that 
the ‘bo ttom -up ’ approach can be seen apart from  the ‘to p -d ow n ’ approach, but 
not the other way around. Social changes may be gradual in nature, but can 
provoke sudden political changes, leading to abrupt changes in political 
alignment.
We showed that political parties may draw som e support from  relig ious voters 
by stressing trad itiona lis t issues. But we also showed that the relig ious structure 
of the N etherlands has changed considerab ly in the past four decades. The 
proportion of church m em bers am ong the electorate has become smaller. If a
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relig ious party w ants to m axim ize its vote share in secularized Dutch socie ty it 
should deem phasize trad itiona l m oral values. In th is sense the nineteenth century 
‘C onfessional D ilem m a’ Kalyvas (1996) referred to still exists. The im plications of 
th is trad e-o ff between m orals and votes may be problem atic to the CDA because 
the m eaning of the “C ” already gave rise to debates about the Christian identity 
of the party. Our results suggest that also a “C onservative D em ocratic A p p ea l” 
may be prone to the effects of secularization. Moreover, the C hristianU nion may 
challenge the CDA more strong ly in the future. In the long run the CU may be 
more successfu l to attract CDA-voters, including C atho lics and non-affilia ted 
voters. The period studied here may therefore be too  short to assess the full 
extent of the C hristianU nion m erger a fter 2002 for long-term  changes in the 
re lig ion-vote re lationship in the Netherlands.
Notes
17 For the 2002-elections the ChristianUnion is included in calculating the mean value of the religious party 
group. The CU only modestly affects the weighted value of the combined scores, because it attracted 
2.54% of the votes compared to 27.93% that went to the CDA.
18 A logistic regression of voting LPF in 2002 controlled for age, gender, education and church attendance 
(N = 1556) shows no significant (p<0.1) differences between denominations. With the non-religious as the 
reference group the parameter estimates (b, se) are: Catholics (0.25, 0.23), Protestants (-0.22, 0.33) Calvin­
ists (-0.37, 0.48), other religion (0.05, 0.46). Church attendance has a significant negative effect (-0.345, 
0.08). People who attend church more often were less likely to cast a vote for the LPF in 2002.
19 When we use the emphasis in the manifesto placed on negative statements about ‘traditional morality’ 
there is only a slight variation among the other political party groups, and only in the first elections. The 
overall variation among all party groups is much less pronounced than reported in Figure 4a.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Discussion

CONCLUSiON AND DiSCUSSiON
6.1 Introduction
The aim of th is thes is  was to describe and explain cross-nationa l and over-time 
variation in class and relig ious voting in W estern dem ocracies. We have tested 
hypotheses based on the assum ption that political factors may have an additional 
influence on the levels of cleavage-based voting next to the effect of social 
changes. To test our hypotheses we relied on d ifferent strategies of data collection 
and analysis. In the first part of th is  book we used 196 surveys from  the Comparative 
Dataset on Cleavage Voting (CDCV) to present large-scale com parative 
investigations of cleavage voting in up to 15 W estern dem ocracies. In the second 
part of the book we focused on trends in cleavage voting in the Netherlands using 
eleven surveys of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies. In th is final chapter we 
answer our research questions by sum m arizing the find ings of the four empirical 
chapters. Next, we reflect on our research strategy and analyses. Finally, we 
discuss the theoretical contributions of th is thesis and the im plications for future 
research.
6.2 Summary: Research questions and findings
6.2.1 Chapter 2: The Relative Influence of Class and Religion on Party 
Choice in comparative perspective
In chapter 2 we investigated the level of and change  in class and relig ious voting 
in 13 countries in the period 1960-2008. We made use of 125 surveys in the 
CDCV-file which include suffic ient in form ation on both class and religion The first 
central research problem  of th is thesis is answered in th is chapter by investigating 
to w hat extent there are c ross-nationa l and over-tim e d ifferences in the influence 
of social c lass and religion on voting. We divided th is research problem  into two 
sub-questions about to the strength of the class cleavage relative to that of the 
relig ious cleavage, and the changes therein: (a) To w hat extent is a strong 
class-vote re lationship in a country accom panied by a w eak relig ion-vote 
re lationship? (b) To w hat extent are the d ifferences between the strength of the 
relig ion-vote re lationship and the class-vote re lationship in countries declining, 
increasing or stable?
W ith  respect to the first question our results indicate positive correlations 
between a country ’s degree o f class voting and degree o f religious voting. These 
findings contest L ijpha rt’s claim that class may have a strong influence on voting
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only if there the influence of religion on voting is weak. Nevertheless, in five 
countries we find that social class is generally m ore im portant than religion, i.e.: 
Australia, Austria, Norway, Sweden and the United K ingdom. In six countries, 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sw itzerland, the relig ious basis 
of voting is stronger than the class basis. W ith  respect to G erm any and the US our 
results are less conclusive.
The second question in chapter 2 exam ined over tim e changes in the relative 
influence of social c lass and religion on party choice. We found that in most 
countries the association between party  choice and both class and denomination 
and/or church attendance is weakening. Despite the decline of the magnitude of 
cleavage voting in m ost countries, the hierarchy between class and religion as 
socia l bases of voting for the m ost pa rt endures. Religion nowadays is more 
im portant than socia l class in the largely same countries as in the 1970s. However, 
we find that the relative effect o f religion over class is waning in Belgium and Italy 
and is even reversing in Germany and the US. In the other countries, the dominance  
of religion over class generally persists. Class continues to be more influential 
relative to religion in Australia and Austria. In Sweden and the UK the relative effect 
of class over religion decreased considerably. In the last decade under study 
(1997-2007) we find the strongest relative effect of social class in Sweden: In 
Sweden the kappa-index of class voting and the contributed proportion of 
explained variance is found to be tw ice as strong when com pared to the effect of 
religion. In the sam e period we find the strongest relative effect of religion in the 
Netherlands, where the effect of re lig ious voting com pared to that of social class 
is about tw o tim es stronger, and nearly 15 tim es in term s of explained variance.
6.2.2 Chapter 3: The effect of Left-Right party positions on class voting 
in comparative perspective
A fter tha t we established the trends in class and re lig ious-based voting in Western 
dem ocracies in chapter 2, the rem aining chapters sought to explain varia tion in 
cleavage-based voting. The central problem was: To w hat extent are social and 
political changes able to explain (a) the levels of and changes in class voting in 
W estern dem ocracies and (b) trends in class and relig ious voting in the 
N etherlands?
In chapter 3 we address the first, c ross-nationa l part of th is research problem 
by answering the question: To w hat extent are the levels of and changes in class 
voting in W estern dem ocracies explained by social changes and the positions of 
political parties? To answer th is question we estim ated the im pact of the Left-R ight
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positions of parties on the c lass-vote associa tion through a Tw o-Step H ierarchical 
analysis of integrated data from  15 countries (1960-2005) in our Comparative 
Dataset on Cleavage Voting supplem ented w ith data from  the C om parative 
M anifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; K lingem ann et al. 2006).
We tested three ‘to p -d o w n ’ hypotheses: (1) the levels of class voting are 
w eaker as the Left-R ight position of left-w ing parties is more centrist. And (2) the 
levels of class voting are w eaker in less polarized party systems. A final expectation 
was tha t (3) m ovem ent to the ideolog ical centre by left-w ing parties or de-po lar­
ization of a party system  would explain decline in class voting. Before testing 
these political hypotheses we assessed to w hat extent ‘b o ttom -up ’ social changes 
account for the decline in class voting. Our results support the idea that 
com positional changes lead to changes in class voting because changes in 
background characteristics (age, gender, and education) are partly  responsible  
for the decline in po litica l divisions between classes. Especially the changes in the 
relationship between education and vote seem to account for the decline in class 
voting. As educational levels are generally rising in post-industria l societies this 
developm ent o ffers a ‘b o ttom -up ’ explanation for changes in levels of class 
voting. C lass voting is declining as the effect of education on vote changes. On 
average for all the w hole 1960-2005 period we find that the more years of 
education the more likely a person is to vote right-wing, but in m ost countries this 
association is weakening over tim e. The higher educated service class, or more 
likely parts of it, transform ed from  being right-w ing to left-w ing. The Dutch analyses 
in chapter 4 give reason to assum e tha t th is  holds for the soc ia l-cu ltura l specialists 
in particular.
In the third chapter we did not find evidence that le ft-right positions of left-w ing 
parties alone influence the c lass-vote relationship. We did find, however, that 
w hen ideolog ical d ifferences between political parties are sm aller the association 
between class and vote is weaker. We can therefore conclude that the levels of 
class voting are influenced by the extent o f class-related po litica l choices  
presented to voters. But in order to detect this ‘top-dow n’ direction o f influence it 
is im portant to investigate party polarization rather than the absolute position of 
left parties on the ideolog ica l continuum. W hat varia tion in both party polarization 
and left-w ing party positions fail to do, however, is to explain the over tim e trends 
in class voting. The reason for th is  can be seen from  the lack of consistent 
corre lations between le ft-party  m oves to the centre, or party ideological 
convergence, and tim e itself.
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6.2.3 Chapter 4: The effect of social changes and politica l changes on 
class voting in the Netherlands
In the second part of th is book we exam ined trends in cleavage voting in the 
Netherlands. Using more detailed m easures and m ore sophisticated analyses 
techniques than in the cross-nationa l part of th is book we fu rther investigate 
w hether changes in cleavage voting can be explained by ‘b o ttom -up ’ and 
‘to p -d o w n ’ changes. In chapter 4 we exam ined trends in class voting in the 
Netherlands using 11 surveys from  the Dutch Parliam entary Election Studies in 
the period 1971-2006. The m ain question in th is chapter was to w hat extent the 
decline of class voting can be explained by social and political changes. W ith 
respect to ‘b o ttom -up ’ social changes we form ulated hypotheses about the het­
erogenization of the service class, the blurring of ideolog ical boundaries between 
classes and the effect of education. From a ‘to p -d ow n ’ perspective we form ulated 
hypotheses about the restructuring of the Dutch party system  after the form ation 
of the G reenLeft party, and the changes in p a rty ’s soc ia l-econom ic  positions and 
conservative-p rogressive positions.
Using a series of m ultinom ia l logistic regression m odels we found that the rise 
of the ‘new ’ class o f socia l-cu ltura l specia lists is im portant in accounting for 
changes in the class-vote relationship. The higher and lower technocrats are 
clearly not only more right-wing, bu t the higher and lower socia l cultural specialists 
also have developed strong preferences for new-left parties. Overall, the distinction 
between the m anual class and other classes becom es less relevant over tim e for 
left-w ing voting. We also found that the differences between classes with respect 
to their econom ic ideology weakened over the last decades. But holding constant 
for voters’ econom ic ideology cou ld  only partia lly interpret class voting differences 
and changes therein. Moreover, we found that the association between econom ic  
conservatism and voting has increased, although slightly, over time. W ith respect 
to education we found that a low education is decreasing ly associated w ith voting 
left-w ing. Moreover, new-left parties are increasingly chosen by voters w ith a high 
education. Especially for the sub-c lasses w ith in  the service class both the level 
and decline  of the class effects are partia lly explained by education. With respect 
to ‘top -dow n’ changes we found no evidence that the downward trend in class 
voting was influenced by the po litica l m erger o f four m inor left-w ing parties into 
GreenLeft. Using cond itional logistic regression we tested w hether the party 
positions affect the c lass-vote relationship. We conclude that after accounting  
‘bo ttom -up ’ socia l changes, the econom ic L-R position of parties -  and not their 
position on the cultural dimension - has a s ignificant im pact on vote choice
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between the four major party  groups in the Netherlands between 1971 and 2002. 
However, the extent to which voters favor parties with econom ica lly right-w ing  
policies generally does not vary between the manual class and other classes. Yet, 
there is a top-down effect: With respect to the cultural dimension, we found that 
manual workers tend to favor parties with conservative positions, whereas other 
classes -  again especially the low-grade socia l-cu ltura l specia lists -  prefer parties  
that are more progressive. But, although there seems to be a clear relation between 
party positions and the strength class-vote relationship, the party positions hardly 
explain the decline in c lass-based voting.
6.2.4 Chapter 5: The effect of social changes and politica l changes on 
religious voting in the Netherlands
Chapter 5 aimed to answer the question to w hat extent changes in relig ious voting 
can be explained by social factors and political changes. S im ilar to chapter 4 this 
chapter first tested a set of ‘b o ttom -up ’ exp lanations for over-tim e varia tion in re­
lig ious-based voting before testing tw o types of changes in political choices. We 
found clear evidence for the decline in the associa tion between church 
m em bership and vote in the period 1971-2006. For the m ost part th is decline 
seem s to have taken place before 1986. Especially for C atholics and Calvin ists 
we observe convergence in voting behavior com pared to non-affilia ted voters. 
The decline of the po litica l boundaries between religious groups is largely 
explained by declin ing church attendance, as an indicator o f religious disintegration. 
The decline of the associa tion between being a Protestant and voting confessional 
is only weak. This is understandable given the fact tha t the d ifference in voting 
between liberal Protestants and the non-m em bers was already sm all in the 1970s. 
However, we found that accounting for re lig ious d isintegration even produced an 
increase of re lig ious voting for Protestants.
In chapter 5 we tested tw o ‘top -d o w n ’ hypotheses. First, we found tha t the 
C DA-m erger in 1977 was responsib le for a decline in relig ious voting. We also 
showed that the level of relig ious voting dropped after the 2002-elections, 
coinciding w ith the political m erger of tw o m inor P rotestant parties into the 
C hristianU nion. These party m ergers not only had effects in reducing the 
relig ion-vote association, we also found that the m ergers m attered after the linear 
trend is fu lly accounted for by relig ious disintegration. We therefore conclude that 
apart from socia l changes the po litica l interruptions are im portant contributions in 
the processes o f religious dealignm ent in the Netherlands. Finally, we have shown 
that trad itiona lis t party positions increase relig ious voting. Especially non-affilia ted
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voters are generally less likely to vote for parties that hold trad itiona l moral 
positions. We therefore conclude that parties with more traditional m oral positions 
deter secular voters rather than attract religious voters. But because the decline of 
church attendance is alm ost fully responsible for the decline in re lig ious-based  
voting, party  positions do not contribute to explaining linear downward trends. 
A fter accounting for a declining effect of church attendance a U -curve for religious 
voting rem ained, that strong ly resem bles the over-tim e em phasis of religious 
parties on trad itiona l m oral issues. Modeled as a linear increase in relig ious- 
based voting th is trend is only to a very m odest extent explained by the trad itional 
m oral positions of parties.
6.3 Reflections on research strategy and analyses
In th is thesis we com bined large-scale cross-nationa l research w ith the 
exam ination of trends in the Netherlands. There are both advantages and 
d isadvantages to th is research strategy. One of the m erits is that the tw o  parts in 
th is book are com plem entary. The com parative studies in part I a llow  general 
conclusions about the levels of cleavage voting between and w ith in  countries. In 
th is part we were able to test exp lanatory hypotheses about the effect of party 
positions on class voting based on large-scale cross-nationa l analyses. 
Drawbacks of these pooled analyses were the low level of detail in measuring 
cleavages and cleavage strength, and the lack of testing for a lternative 
exp lanations for varia tion in cleavage voting. In part II therefore, the na tion-spec if­
ic analysis of cleavage voting in the N etherlands not on ly enabled us to m easure 
cleavages and party choice w ith a greater level of detail, but also allowed us to 
more exhaustive ly test exp lanations for the trends in cleavage voting. In turn, the 
cross-nationa l analyses a llow  us to see to w hat extent trends in the Netherlands 
are part of larger societal developm ents, and to w hat extent exp lanations for 
these trends are m ain ly Dutch particu larities or are universal in nature. 
Nevertheless, both the cross-nationa l analyses in the first part of th is book and 
the Dutch analyses in the second part face som e lim itations. Below  we reflect on 
the measures, m ethods and m odels used in th is book.
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6.3.1 Measurement
Voting behavior: E lectoral research gained considerab ly by the in troduction of 
surveys in the 1960s because it furthered the shift from  macro to m icro data. An 
alleged drawback however, also faced here, is that instead of m easuring the 
actual voting behavior of voters at the ba llo t-box we have to rely on self-reported 
party choice in surveys. In the CDCV-file (used in chapters 2 and 3) we use 
d ifferent variab les to m easure party choice. In m ost surveys respondents were 
asked to name to the party they voted for in the m ost recent e lection or vote 
intention for the upcom ing election. W hen available, one of these variab les is 
used. In other, non-election, surveys, political party choice is m easured as voting 
intention “w hat would you vote if e lection were today/ next S un d ay?” or party 
identification. We recognize tha t such d ifferences between pre-, post- and 
non-e lection surveys may have im plications for the reported party choice of 
respondents. But we are not interested in the univariate frequency d istribution of 
single parties. In th is book we study the re lationship between cleavage groups 
and political choices. N ieuw beerta  (1995) has argued tha t the relationship 
between class and political preference is not fundam enta lly  d ifferent from  that 
between class and voting behavior, and that when analyzing only surveys 
containing ‘voting behavio r’ does not result in d ifferent outcom es than analyzing 
only surveys conta in ing ‘party preference’. Moreover, we use classified variables 
of party choice into tw o or three categories. By grouping political parties, 
d ifferences in reported party choice due to type of survey will be reduced.
A second point of consideration is concerned w ith the c lassification of party 
choice. In all chapters we grouped political parties into a lim ited num ber (2, 3 or 
4) of categories. In C hapter 3 we used a tw o-categ o ry  (left vs. right) categorization 
of respondents ’ party choice to exam ine variation in class voting. C ross-nationa l 
com parisons unavoidably com e at the cost of nation-specific  details, and this 
d ichotom ous c lassification is no exception. In the British case for exam ple we 
lumped together the Liberal Dem ocrats w ith the C onservative party in opposition 
to the Labour Party. A lthough th is log ically fo llow s from  collapsing non-le ft party 
categories, in th is case ‘ libera l’ and ‘conserva tive ’, it m ay affect the patterns of 
class voting. Merging the Liberal Dem ocrats w ith Labour instead w ould reveal 
that the level of class voting in Britain dropped in the 1997-elections (Evans and 
Tilley 2011). W ith our c lassification, unfortunately, we were unable to detect such 
change. Another lim ita tion is that our d ichotom ous categorization d isregards the 
m ultid im ensiona lity  of party space: In chapter 3 parties are only classified with 
respect to trad itiona l le ft-right d ivis ions in politics. M any parties tha t are classified
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as ‘righ t-w ing ’ are in fact Christian D em ocratic parties that adopt a centre or 
centre-right position in the party system. The electoral appeal of Christian parties 
is not prim arily targeted at particular soc ia l-econom ic  groups in society. In 
Chapter 2, where we also exam ined cross-nationa l variation in relig ious voting, 
Christian parties are therefore d istinguished from  other right-wing parties, and 
chapter 5 is fu lly dedicated to voting for a relig ious party in the Netherlands.
In som e party system s the existence of a ‘second ’ d im ension (e.g. new-left 
and new-right) has led to the realignm ent of social groups. S tud ies on Nordic 
countries for example have often d ifferentiated between soc ia l-dem ocra tic  parties 
and the new or more radical le ftist and rightist parties that challenge them  (e.g. 
Andersen and B jorklund 1990). In chapter 4 we explored the d ifferences in class 
voting between the ‘o ld - le ft’ and ‘new -le ft’ in the Netherlands by applying a more 
detailed c lassification of parties. But also in th is chapter we were forced to group 
relevant parties. In line w ith the ‘New Politics Th e s is ’ (see C hapter 1) we merged 
the parties on the m ateria lis t ‘o ld - le ft’ (PvdA, CPN, SP), as opposed to p ost-m a­
teria lis t ‘new -le ft’ parties (D66 and GreenLeft). Th is c lassification of course 
disregards the intergroup d ifferences between parties in each group. And also 
new-right parties are not investigated in th is chapter. To provide a more complete 
picture of class d ifferences in vote choices future research may benefit from  a 
separate category of ‘new rig h t’ parties in order to exam ine w hether the working 
class has abandoned the left to the advantage of the ‘new rig h t’. The period under 
study in chapter 4 does also not a llow  a com parable category for the ‘new righ t’ 
suitab le for over-tim e analyses. Before the rise and fall of the LPF new- and 
far-right voting was a relatively m inor phenom enon in Dutch politics; the 
extrem e-right Centre Dem ocrats (CD) on ly gained 0.9% and 2.4% of the votes in 
the 1989 and 1994 elections. In 2006 the PVV (Party for Freedom) m anaged to 
draw support (5.9%) on an an ti-estab lishm ent agenda against im m igration and 
‘is lam iza tion ’. The success of the PVV was accom panied by losses for the PvdA 
and a lthough the idea of cultural voters seem s very plausible, it is too early to 
exam ine w hether the em ergence of the PVV has a long-stand ing im pact on the 
re lationship between the working class and the classical left. The large electoral 
gains of the PVV in the more recent e lections in 2010, drawing 15.5% of the votes, 
also raise questions about the re lig ion-vote relationship. During the 2010-elections 
the vote share of the CDA w as v irtua lly  halved. And while  the Liberal VVD won the 
general e lections for the first tim e in history, CDA losses were the heaviest in the 
trad itiona lly  C atholic  South of the N etherlands where the electoral success of the 
Freedom  Party (PVV) was the largest. And a lthough it may not have been Catholics
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that voted for the PVV, it raises new questions about d ifferences in the political 
re-a lignm ent between fo rm er C atholics and fo rm er Protestants.
Social Class: In the cross-nationa l part of th is  book we used a four-category 
c lassification of social class. In explaining over-tim e varia tion in class voting, this 
c lassification is sub-op tim al because it is unable to account for all relevant 
com positiona l changes in the class structure of societies. In all countries, the 
service class grew rapidly in size and became increasingly heterogeneous. Our 
four-category c lassification d istinguishes sub-c lasses w ith in  the ‘non-m anual 
c lass ’ (service class, routine non-m anual and self-em ployed), but neglects further 
d ifferentia tions w ith in  the service class. The decline in class voting tha t we found 
in chapter 3 between the m anual c lass and the service class may partia lly be 
attributed to the heterogenization of the service class. In the second part of this 
book, exam ining class voting in the Netherlands, we therefore d istinguished w ithin 
the service class between h igh-grade and low-grade technocrats and social- 
cultural specialists. The advantage of using a four-ca tegory c lassification in the 
cross-nationa l part of th is book is that we were able to integrate much more 
surveys into our com parative dataset com pared to previous studies. Because all 
countries in our file have at least five included surveys and cover at least a 
tw enty-year period we could detect long-term  changes in class voting for 15 
modern dem ocracies. In ten countries our class voting trend covers th irty  years 
or more, and in tw o countries even fo rty  years or more. We therefore not on ly can 
detect long-term  decline in class voting, but also confidently generalize this 
finding to all countries in our study.
Religion: The degree of d ifferentia tion is not only an issue in m easuring social 
class. G iven the d iversity of re lig ious structures across countries the most 
appropriate c lassification of church m em bership  m ay vary between countries. In 
chapter 2 we aimed to com pare the influence of relig ion on voting cross-nationa l- 
ly by applying a uniform  categorization of church m em bership  across 13 countries. 
There are however som e im plications to our m easure of denom inationa l 
d ifferences. First, in our survey data for Italy, Spain, Norway and Sweden 
inform ation on denom inationa l m em bership  was not available. Despite the fact 
that also in these countries som e people may not feel affiliated to the dom inant 
Catholic Church or Protestant state churches survey data did not reveal such 
denom inationa l d ifferences. A second drawback is that som e surveys included in 
the CDCV-file do not make suffic ient d istinction between ‘o ther re lig ion ’ and ‘no
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re lig ion ’. As a result we merged the tw o categories in chapter 2 for all countries in 
order to enable a cross-nationa l com parison. Because th is com bined group 
functioned as the reference category we m ay have underestim ated the strength 
of the relig ious cleavage som ew hat in chapter 2. Given the conclusion of this 
chapter - in the m ajority  of the countries religion is more im portan t than social 
class - th is does not seem to be a fundam enta l problem. A better estim ation of 
the effect of religion would on ly have reinforced our conclusion that religion 
outw eighs social c lass in determ ining party choice. As m entioned, in chapter 2 
we may have underestim ated the associa tion between relig ion and party choice 
in the US, and over-estim ated the decline in th is associa tion by m erging all 
Protestant denom inations into a single category.
Party Positions: In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we used the ‘to p -d o w n ’ perspective to 
derive hypotheses about the effect of party positions on cleavage voting. A lthough 
there are d ifferent approaches to m easuring policy positions of parties we use 
data from  the Com parative M anifesto Project (CMP). The CMP datasets are the 
m ost conventional content analysis of election program s available. The most 
im portant alternative approaches in estim ating positions of parties are expert 
surveys and com puter-assisted content analysis of e lection program s. There is 
an extensive body of literature d iscussing and com paring the m easurem ent 
quality, va lid ity  and re liab ility of the three approaches, see the overv iew  by Volkens 
(2007). We do not repeat all a rgum ents in favor of and against each approach 
because there is one sim ple but com pelling reason to use the CMP data: At this 
m om ent the CMP data provides the only readily available source of party positions 
over a long tim e period in a large num ber of countries that can be com pared to 
other com parative data. In th is respect expert surveys have tw o m ajor drawbacks. 
Expert surveys are conducted at fixed and lim ited num bers of m om ents in tim e 
(e.g. Castles and Mair 1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006), 
and are often am biguous about the tim e period for w hich the estim ates are valid. 
Volkens concludes that “Experts (...) judge m ost parties to stick to the same 
positions over long periods o f time. /As com pared to quickly changing program matic 
positions, expert surveys seem to provide generalizations of pa rty  positions over 
time" (2007: 109). C om puter-assisted content analysis of e lection program s relies 
on com puterized w ord -counts of the sam e election docum ents as the CMP data. 
This new technique seem s prom ising but has not yet been able to create a tim e 
series dataset that can com pete to the richness of the C om parative Manifesto 
Project (Budge and Pennings 2007).
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The CMP data is not only rich, it also conta ins direct reflections of w hat parties 
state as the ir position at each election, and the re liab ility and va lid ity  of pre-con- 
structed scales in the dataset are w idely exam ined (Budge and Pennings 2007). 
But despite its strengths there are several shortcom ings to the CMP dataset that 
should be m entioned here (cf. Benoit and Laver 2007). First, there is no indication 
of the uncerta in ty associated w ith the CMP estim ates. Therefore, Benoint and 
Laver argue that “we do not know, for any two adjacent po ints in a time series, 
whether the difference between them is due to measurement error or movement in 
the underlying variable" (2007: 94). Second, because CMP m easures consist of 
pre-defined and fixed scale com ponents, they are unable to reflect local or 
tem poral d ifferences in the m eaning of certain policy d im ensions. O ther drawbacks 
of the CMP data are that not every party publishes an e lection program, not all 
policy areas are m entioned in all of the program s, and som e m inor parties are not 
included in the data. A final drawback in th is book is that we did not calculate the 
position of individual parties, but rather positions of party groups. This is a result 
of the way in which we coded the dependent variab le th roughout the chapters. 
The lim ita tions of CMP data could in part be responsib le for the fact tha t the 
erratic patterns of party po larization that we found in chapter 3 generally did not 
correlate w ith a linear m easure of time. The more detected fluctuations in party 
positions are caused by m easurem ent error, the less likely it is that such 
‘m ovem ents ’ are associated w ith  changes in class voting. Yet, we found that 
although our m easure of party po larization could not explain trends in class 
voting, it was associated w ith the level of class voting in our pooled analysis. 
Moreover, in part II, we showed that there is a re lationship between cleavage 
voting and C M P-based party positions in the Netherlands. Future studies, 
investigating shorte r or fixed tim e periods, could explore w hether using d ifferent 
approaches in estim ating party positions leads to d ifferent conclusions about the 
im pact of party positions on cleavage voting.
6.3.2 Analyses
Models and methods: In chapter 1 we elaborated on the evolution of c lass voting 
research: From using cross-tabula tions and the A lford -index in the 1960s to using 
m ultinom ia l logistic regression from  the 1990s onwards. We build on th is evolution 
by em ploying b inary and m ultinom ia l logistic regression analyses. In most 
chapters we m easured cleavage strength on the basis on odds ratios and 
log-odds ratios. Only in chapter 2 we sum m arized class and relig ious voting 
effects using the kappa-index. By em ploying a sum m ary m easure, we could have
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used more refined m easures of party choice, such as party fam ilies or even all 
parties as separate categories (see Knutsen 2007). We decided not to do so 
because w ith many, often sm all party categories, the lim ita tions of the kappa-index 
(see C hapter 1) have greater im plications. Not on ly all classes, but also all parties 
contribute equally in calculating the average class voting effect, regardless of 
the ir size. S trong class voting effects am ong m ajor parties may therefore not be 
detected due to w eak class voting effects am ong m inor parties. It may therefore 
be w orthw h ile  if future stud ies seek to construct cleavage voting m easures that 
are not only a function of aggregate g roup-party associations, but also of group 
sizes, party popularity and group tu rn -ou t rates, see for exam ple the w ork of 
Lachat (2006) and Best (2007).
We made m ethodolog ica l progress in chapters 4 and 5 by employing 
conditional logistic (CL) regression analysis. We argued that cond itional logistic 
m odels accom m odate scientific im provem ent in the field of cleavage voting 
research because the m odel allows com bining case-specific  variab les with 
choice-specific  variab les. The CL m odel therefore has a crucial advantage over 
the m ultinom ia l log istic  (MNL) model. In our analysis the ind ividual-specific  
variab les were used to test w hether changes in the social background of the 
electorate were responsib le for the decline in cleavage voting. S im ultaneously, we 
used inform ation on party positions as choice-specific  variables. This way we 
were able to exam ine w hat happens w hen parties change the ir position on various 
political d im ensions. In chapters 4 and 5 we showed that the CL m odel is suitable 
to determ ine which ‘b o ttom -up ’ as well as ‘to p -d o w n ’ factors influence the level of 
c leavage-based voting. The conditiona l logistic m odel therefore not enables more 
stringent tests of ‘top -d o w n ’ theories, but it also facilita tes the so lution to an 
em pirical problem  in com parative research, i.e.: how  to deal w ith the fact that 
party categories are not fixed over tim e and space. The CL m odel is not a new 
analysis technique (cf. M cFadden 1974). But, as A lvarez and Nagler (1998) have 
argued, the d ifference between the CL and the MNL m odel are not w idely 
recognized in political science. The same, we could add, holds for political 
sociology. Only very recently the CL m odel was first adopted in cleavage voting 
research (Elff 2009). As far as we know chapters 4 and 5 are the first tim e that 
cond itional logit m odels are em ployed to exam ine cleavage voting in a single 
country over time. We encourage other researchers to explore possib ilities of this 
m odel yet further, to explain variation in cleavage voting both w ith in  and between 
countries.
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Despite its merits, the CL m odel has certain w eaknesses. The m ost im portant, 
and m ost frequently debated drawback, is that both CL m odels and standard 
MNL m odels make the assum ption of the Independence of Irrelevant A lternatives 
(IIA). Th is assum ption holds tha t adding or om itting  a category of the dependent 
variab le does not affect the odds of the initial or rem aining alternatives. In term s 
of e lections IIA im plies that when a right-w ing party is in com petition w ith a 
left-w ing party, the partic ipation of a second left-w ing party will not affect the 
odds tha t an individual voter chooses between the initial tw o  parties. This 
assum ption is likely to be vio lated as the tw o left-w ing parties take sim ilar positions 
on particu lar issues. In spite of IIA, the odds that a voter chooses the initial 
left-w ing party may go down because he or she considers the tw o left-w ing 
parties to be substitu tes (cf. A lvarez and Nagler 1998). The v io la tion  of IIA may 
therefore be especia lly relevant in studies focusing on the entry of new political 
options, or the disappearance of old ones. One can test for v io la tion  of IIA by 
com paring the estim ates from  the full m odel to those of restricted m odels that 
exclude at least one of the a lternatives (Long and Freese 2006). W ith respect to 
our analyses, the tests com m only used to detect w hether the IIA assum ption is 
violated -  the H ausm an Test and the S m all-H s iao  Test -  both indicated tha t there 
is m ore evidence tha t IIA is not vio lated in our m odels than evidence for the 
opposite (see appendix D).
If necessary, the IIA assum ption can be relaxed using com puta tiona lly  more 
com plex m ultinom ia l probit m odels (MNP) instead of M NL (Alvarez and Nagler 
1998; Long and Freese 2006). We decided not to use MNP m odels because the 
results of MNP m odels were are not substan tia lly  d ifferent from  our MNL 
estim ations. We used the stata  program a s m p r o b it  - a lternative-specific  m ultinom ial 
probit (ASMP) -  as an alternative for the CL m odel (Long and Freese 2006). The 
CL m odels presented in th is book were however too  dem anding to converge with 
ASM P estim ation.
Modeling changes : A large part of th is  study is aimed at explaining over-time 
variation in the effects of social cleavages on voting. We assum ed linear changes 
because of the relatively gradual, slow ly changing character of m ost social 
changes a fter the 1960s. Any observed changes consistent w ith ‘b o ttom -up ’ 
processes are expected to take the form  of a gradual decline. In m ost chapters 
changes in cleavage voting are therefore prim arily m odeled as linear changes. In 
chapter 2 we investigated the patterns of changes, but only in three form s, that is: 
stability, fu lly linear or com plete ly unconstrained. A lthough th is chapter showed
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that linear changes often fit the data better than stab ility  or trend less fluctuations, 
there are m any d ifferent fo rm s of non-linear changes tha t are unconsidered here 
but may be fit the data better.
In chapter 3 we adopted a Two-Step estim ation procedure to model class 
voting trends. We first presented over-tim e and country -by-country graphs of the 
class-vote association in log-odd ratios. Next, we estim ated a series of multilevel 
linear regression m odels w ith  the value of the log-odds ratios as the dependent 
variable. To account for the fact that trends d iffer from  country to country we 
m odeled linear trends w ith both a random  intercept and slope for each country. 
The advantage of using log it-coeffic ients instead of ind ividuals as unit of analysis 
is that we can directly explain the associa tion between social class and vote, 
estim ate nation-specific  class voting trends, and sim ply include additional macro 
level dependent variables. The problem  that rem ains w ith our Tw o-Step approach 
is that it is possible to find significant linear trends even when there is on ly one 
sudden point of change in the range of observations. A nother problem  involves 
the degree of uncerta in ty associated w ith the dependent variab les at the second 
stage of the Two-step Estim ation. Recognizing these lim ita tions we like to point 
out tha t in chapter 3 readers are able to judge for them se lves the degree of 
uncerta in ty surrounding the estim ates (see figure 2), and to w hat extent our 
estim ated trends lines match the plotted log-odds ratios (see figure 2 and 3).
In the Dutch chapters we paid more attention to non-linear changes. Both chapters 
4 and 5 first show  the ‘unconstra ined ’ odds ratios of cleavage voting over time. 
And in both chapters we investigated discrete d iscontinuities in the linear trends 
based on the assum ption tha t ‘jum p s ’ or ‘d rops’ in over tim e patterns of cleavage 
voting are associated w ith political changes. Especially w ith respect to religious 
voting chapter 5 showed the im portance of non-gradual changes additional to 
linear decline. We found a reversal in the trend between denom ination and party 
choice after 1986, and sudden drops of relig ious voting after 1977 and 2002. We 
leave it to future research to more exhaustive ly investigate the country-specific  
scenarios of non-linear changes in cleavage voting for other countries.
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6.4 Theoretical contributions
6.4.1 Social change explanations
We have shown that both social and political changes may contribute in explaining 
the level of c leavage-based voting. In chapter 1 we sum m arized m ost com m on 
hypotheses in the literature. Let us first d iscuss the theoretical im plications of this 
book w ith respect to social change explanations. In the em pirical chapters, both 
c ross-nationa lly  and over-tim e in the Netherlands, we did not test all specific 
hypotheses about social changes. In chapter 3 we tested a ‘b o ttom -up ’ hypothesis 
pertaining to the rise of new social d ivis ions and the changes in the effect of 
education. We expected that the decline in class voting is partia lly accounted for 
by changes in effects of gender and education on voting. The scope of analysis 
in chapter 3 surpasses all previous studies on class voting. We found that in 
particular changes in the effect of education partia lly accounted for the decline of 
class voting. Our results im ply that the d ifferences between the working class and 
the other c lasses are to som e extent waning because of new conflic ts between 
those w ho received a high education and those w ho have not. A high education 
is decreasingly associated w ith  voting right-wing. This is in line w ith the idea of 
new cultural d ivis ions between the higher educated holding more liberal views 
than the lower educated. In chapter 4 on the Netherlands we found that a high 
education is decreasing ly associated w ith  a rightist party preference, and is 
increasingly associated w ith voting new-left. Our results should however be 
considered w ith som e caution. In chapter 3 we lacked consistent m icro data 
across all 188 included surveys to test alternative ‘b o ttom -up ’ hypotheses, see 
the overview  in chapter 1: e.g. growing mobility, rising affluence, and changing 
soc io-econom ic  and cultural values. Nevertheless, the analyses in chapter 3 are 
am ong the few com parative studies tha t aim to explain changes in class voting 
over-time, especia lly w ith respect to both m icro level exp lanations and political 
explanations.
In the second part of th is book we fu rther exam ined the influence of social 
changes for the patterns of cleavage voting in the Netherlands. In chapter 4 we 
looked at the rise of the ‘new ’ class of social cultural specialists. In doing so, we 
improved on previous research on the trends in class voting in the Netherlands. 
Critics of ‘new c lass ’ theories have argued tha t the political o rien ta tions of the 
new m iddle class predom inantly reflects the m ore left-w ing views am ong upwardly 
m obile voters due to the ir c lasses of origin (Goldthorpe 1982). But in spite of such 
accounts Güveli (2006, chapter 3 and 4) has show n tha t technocrats recruit more
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from  lower social c lasses than the social and cultural specialists, and tha t both 
inter and in tragenerational m ob ility is greater for technocrats than for social 
cultural specialists. Güveli also showed that the political d ifferences between the 
social and cultural specialis ts and technocrats persist when controlled for 
educational level, gender and em ploym ent sector. We are therefore confident that 
the adjusted class schem a revealed a process of heterogenization of the service 
class in the Netherlands, w hich proved to be essentia l in understanding changes 
in the c lass-vote relationship. We therefore encourage other researcher to apply 
th is schem a in studying class voting.
In chapter 4 we also tested w hether trends in class voting are interpreted by 
d ifferences between voters in the ir econom ic ideology and level of education. In 
doing so we improved on De Graaf et al. (2001) w ho tested hypotheses on social 
changes by only inferring a process of blurring boundaries between classes. We 
actually accounted for the social d istinctiveness of classes by looking at their 
econom ic ideology. We expected that due to rising living standards and income 
levels attitudes on incom e red istribution had become less associated w ith  class 
differences. This is an indirect m icro level hypothesis based the notion of ‘growing 
a ffluence ’. C ontrary to our expectation we found that the associa tion between 
econom ic ideology and voting has increased, a lthough slightly, over time. This is 
unexpected: Assum ing that class conflict increasingly has to com pete w ith 
non-econom ic  cleavages, the influence of peop les’ econom ic ideology on voting 
was certa in ly not expected to increase. A reason for th is  rather surprising finding 
may be tha t the econom ic progressive views of social cultural specialists 
crystallized over the last decades. In th is sense class-based voting am ong the 
new service class became stronger because the econom ic orien ta tions of social 
and cultural specialis ts became more hom ogeneous over time.
W ith respect to relig ious voting, the ‘b o ttom -up ’ hypotheses in chapter 5 are 
largely based on secularization theory. Our hypotheses suggested a decline in 
the re lig ion-vote re lationship as a result of rising levels of education and declining 
church attendance. We expected tha t the cultural and norm ative boundaries 
between relig ious and irrelig ious voters are blurring as the level of church 
attendance declines. In form ulating th is expectation we need the assum ption that 
people w ho attend church hold m ore cultural conservative views than infrequent 
attendees. This assum ption about relig ious beliefs or social cultural va lues is not 
tested in chapter 5. Unfortunately, no direct com parable m easures of cultural 
conservatism  over tim e are available in the full range of the DPES surveys. But 
additional analyses on data from  the “Social and Cultural D evelopm ents in the
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N etherlands” (SO C O N 20) surveys of 1979, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005, 
which include a good set of item s for constructing a scale for ‘cultural conserva tism ’, 
shows a corre lation of 0.44 w ith church attendance. This suggests that church 
attendance is not an optim al but at best a reasonable proxy for cultural 
conservatism . Future research should therefore fu rther d isentangle changes in 
the effect of church attendance on voting from  that of re lig ious belief or social 
cultural values.
6.4.2 Political choice explanations
In th is book we made an im portant step tow ards expanding the exam ination of 
cleavage change beyond ‘b o ttom -up ’ processes to those involving the relevance 
of the choices that parties provide for voters. O ur results suggest tha t ‘to p -d ow n ’ 
effects in class voting relate to d ifferences between parties presented to voters, 
rather than to econom ic appeals of left-w ing parties alone. Based on large-scale 
data analyses in chapter 3, we found that when ideolog ical d ifferences between 
political parties are sm aller the associa tion between class and vote is weaker. 
According to the ‘Electoral D ilem m a’ (Przeworski and Sprague 1986) class voting 
would decline because left-w ing parties extend the ir appeal beyond the ir core 
constituency of working class voters. But we did not find tha t class voting is 
weaker as left-w ing parties adopt more centrist positions. The em phasis is thus 
on the d ifference between the main party choices that voters face, and not 
necessarily w ith respect to econom ic d ifferences only. For the N etherlands we 
could not find that party d ifferences on the econom ic issues are responsib le for 
the decline in class voting. The position of the social and cultural specialis ts is 
exceptional. More than any other class, low-grade socia l-cu ltura l specialis ts tend 
to favor parties tha t are econom ica lly  left-w ing.
This show s that ‘top -d ow n ’ effects of party choices m ay interact with 
‘b o ttom -up ’ processes such as the heterogenization of the service class. We 
found substantia l class d ifferences w ith respect to the conservative/progressive 
position of political parties. Manual workers tend to favor conservative parties, 
w hereas other classes -  again especia lly the low-grade soc ia l-cu ltura l specialists 
-  prefer progressive parties. In th is sense, party po larization does seem  to m atter 
because parties in the Netherlands have diverged on ‘new ’ political issues.
W hat the com parative chapter on class voting and the Dutch chapter have in 
com m on is tha t we were not able to interpret trends in class voting accounting for 
changes in political d ifferences between parties. The fa ls ification of the ‘to p -d ow n ’ 
hypotheses predicting that class voting trends would be explained by accounting
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for party positions, does not necessitate the ir im m ediate rejection. The fact that 
party changes could not explain linear trends, do not m ean that they are incapable 
of explaining more tim e-spec ific  changes and possib le reversals in cleavage 
voting. For the Dutch case we found tha t the CDA and CU party m ergers mattered 
after the downward trend in relig ious voting is fu lly accounted for by religious 
disintegration. This finding is im portan t because the C DA-m erger itself was a 
reaction to secularization and the waning electoral power of the m ajor 
denom inationa l parties. It show s that the ‘b o ttom -up ’ approach can be seen 
apart from  the ‘to p -d o w n ’ approach, but not the other way around. Social changes 
may be gradual in nature, but can provoke sudden political changes, leading to 
abrupt changes in political a lignm ent. By im plication, future research could 
consider to w hat extent program m atic changes can explain tim e-specific  ‘ju m p s ’ 
or ‘d rop s ’ in cleavage voting. This may be prom ising because after controlling for 
‘bo ttom -up ’ changes we found a U -curve for re lig ious voting in the Netherlands 
that strong ly resem bles the over-tim e em phasis of re lig ious parties on trad itional 
m oral issues.
By m easuring party positions on the basis of sta tem ents in e lection manifestos, 
we assum e that voters make prospective calcu la tions about w hat they may w in or 
lose by voting for a particular party. But next to relying on the prom ises of 
politic ians, voters will re trospective ly judge w hat parties, especia lly the incumbent, 
have done for them  during the last governm ent term. Both policy positions and 
policy outcom es are related to the substantive representation  of groups in society. 
Cutting welfare expanses, for example, m ay hit the working class m ore than the 
prosperous m iddle class. C lass voting may drop as m anual c lass voters punish 
incum bent left-w ing parties for cutting welfare expenses. Investigating the impact 
of welfare state characteristics on electoral d iv is ions in eleven countries in the 
early-1970s Henjak (2009, Chapter 5) finds tha t in countries where soc ia l-d em o­
cratic parties im plem ented welfare state policies, the support for these parties 
am ong the w orking class increased. Future research could investigate to what 
extent such policy decisions by parties contribute to explain cross-nationa l and 
over-tim e varia tion in cleavage voting over a longer period of tim e and in more 
countries.
Next to substantive representation  we recom m end future research to 
investigate cleavage voting through the lens of descriptive representation. 
Descriptive representation involves the social com position  of parliam ent or 
parties. A m em ber of parliam ent represents som eone by matching him or her on 
relevant characteristics, such as gender, ethnic origin, religion or class. A lthough
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research on descriptive representation has in recent years strong ly focused on 
socia lly d isadvantaged groups, the underrepresentation of the working class 
rem ains underexposed in the literature (W auters 2010). Research on the 
parliam entary behavior of fem ale and black representatives has shown that they 
are more likely to give priority to issues and polic ies tha t are im portant for wom en 
or b lack people respectively (Celis 2006; Owens 2005). Interestingly, politic ians 
of Christian D em ocratic parties are often re lig iously affiliated. But politic ians of 
labor parties are rarely of working class origin. Such d ifferences in descriptive 
representation may offer an explanation for w hy religion is often more im portant 
in determ ining voting behavior than social class. This w ould be a ‘bo ttom -up ’ 
explanation if the com position  of parliam ents would only be shaped by reflecting 
the structures of society. The under- or overrepresentation of particular social 
groups in parliam ent is however a consequence of electoral laws and of the 
political recruitm ent procedures and candidate selection w ith in  parties. A sh ift to 
the question ‘w ho represents w h o m ’ would therefore m ean a fu rther investigation 
of the re lationship between ‘b o ttom -up ’ and ‘top -d o w n ’ changes.
This having said, we w ould w elcom e studies tha t aim to determ ine under what 
cond itions religion ou tw eighs social class, and vice versa. In chapter 2 we 
addressed questions on the relative influence of social cleavages on party choice. 
In line w ith a growing num ber of scholars, the results presented in the other 
chapters of th is  book suggest that it is im portant to consider the role of both 
social and political cond itions of cleavage voting (Bartolin i and Mair 1990; Mair 
1999; Evans 2000; De Graaf et al. 2001; Evans and W hitefie ld  2006; E lff 2009). 
The hierarchy between cleavages may change as the social c ircum stances force 
parties to adopt new strategies. Przeworski and Sprague have argued that the 
relative influence of class may w eaken as the electoral strategy of left-w ing parties 
is less w orker-orientated: “/As socialists appeal to voters in supra-class terms, they 
weaken the salience o f class and (...) leave room open for com peting particularis­
tic appeals o f religion, ethnic or linguistic groups, regions, etc." (1986: 46). Heath 
et al. (1997) put forward tha t social cleavages need political vehic les to exert 
substantia l influence on party choice. They attribute the relative un im portance of 
religion in British politics not to the absence of the social basis for a religious 
cleavage but to the fact that the cleavage has not been politicized. These 
argum ents make clear tha t the politic ization of cleavages may take d ifferent form s 
but that next to social factors political factors may be crucial to understand why 
the relative influence of social cleavages d iffers by electoral context.
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Notes
20 For details about the SOCON surveys we refer to Eisinga, Felling, Peters, and Scheepers (1992); Eis­
inga, Felling, Peters, and Scheepers (1999); Eisinga, Coenders, Felling, Te Grotenhuis, Oomens, and 
Scheepers (2002); Eisinga, De Graaf, Levels, Need, and Scheepers (2008).
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Summary in Dutch (Samenvatting)

SUMMARY iN DUTCH (sAMENVATTiNG)
Inleiding: sociale scheidslijnen en politieke tegenstellingen
Dit proefschrift richt zich op politieke tegenste llingen die voortkom en uit sociaal- 
structure le verschillen in de sam enleving, de zogenoem de ‘sociale sche ids lijnen ’ 
waarlangs zich verschillen voordoen in politieke gedragingen en houdingen. In 
dem ocratische sam enlevingen functioneren verkiezingen als voornaam ste 
m echanism e voor de collectieve uitdrukking van tegenste llingen en overeen­
komsten. De sam en hang tussen de sociale positie van m ensen en hun stem gedrag 
is daarom  een van de belangrijkste onderzoeksgebieden van de politiek 
socio logie. In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik tw ee trad itione le  socia le scheidslijnen 
tussen kiezers in w esterse dem ocratieën; sociale klasse en godsdienst.
Tijdens de eerste helft van de tw intigste eeuw gingen wetenschappers er veelal 
vanuit dat er een sterke samenhang bestond tussen de sociale groep waar mensen 
bij horen en de politieke partij waarop zij stemmen. Politieke partijen werden gezien 
als de vertegenwoordigers van specifieke sociale belangengroepen, en leden van 
dergelijke groepen werden verondersteld op een bepaalde partij te stemmen vanuit 
groepsbelang en partijloyaliteit. Linkse partijen golden daarbij als de vertegen­
woordigers van de arbeidende klasse. Vanuit het oogpunt van de klassenstrijd 
tussen arbeiders en kapitaalbezitters over de productiemiddelen in de samenleving, 
stemde de arbeidende klasse op partijen die herverdeling en opbouw van sociale 
zekerheden voorstonden, terwijl de burgerij, de zelfstandigen en de bezitters van het 
kapitaal op partijen stemden die overheidsbemoeienis in de vrije markt verwierpen. 
‘Klassengebonden stem gedrag’ in traditionele zin gaat er dan ook vanuit dat 
arbeiders op linkse partijen stemmen en niet-arbeiders op rechtse partijen.
In vergelijking met sociale klasse is het verband tussen religieuze groepen en 
politieke partijen m inder eenduidig. De grote d iversiteit aan religieuze denom inaties 
en aan partijen die hen vertegenw oord igen, zowel binnen als tussen landen, ligt 
hieraan ten grondslag. In het a lgem een geldt echter dat w anneer w etenschappers 
de invloed van religie op stem gedrag onderzoeken, zij er vanu it gaan dat het 
electorale gedrag van relig ieuze kiezers a fw ijk t van het gedrag van seculiere 
kiezers. H istorisch gezien stem m en religieuzen voor partijen die hun religieuze 
vrijheden verdedigden in conflicten over de afschaffing van staatskerken en de 
positie van godsdienst in het onderw ijs. Later werden de tegenste llingen tussen 
relig ieuze en seculiere kiezers ook belangrijk met betrekking to t andere 
n iet-m aterië le belangen. In tegenste lling to t seculiere kiezers stem m en religieuzen 
op partijen die liberale politieke opvattingen over abortus, euthanasie  en rechten 
voor hom oseksuelen verwerpen.
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Het doel van dit onderzoek is om verschillen tussen en binnen landen te 
beschrijven en te verklaren in de mate waarin sociale klasse en godsdienst 
sam enhangen met de keuze voor een politieke partij. Ik richt me op daarb ij in het 
b ijzonder op tw ee vragen: (1) In hoeverre bestaan er in w esterse dem ocratieën 
verschillen tussen landen en door de tijd heen in de relatieve invloed van sociale 
klasse op stem gedrag ten opzichte van de invloed van godsd ienst? En (2) In 
hoeverre bieden sociale en politieke veranderingen verklaringen voor (a) het 
niveau van en veranderingen in klassengebonden stem gedrag in westerse 
dem ocratieën en (b) trends in klassengebonden en godsdienstgebonden 
stem gedrag in N ederland?
Hoofdstuk 1: Sociale klasse, godsdienst en stemgedrag in de literatuur
In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik aan de hand van een literatuuroverzicht zien dat er sprake is 
van evolutie in de onderzoekslitera tuur naar klassengebonden stem gedrag. Ik 
doe dit aan de hand van veranderingen in een vierta l dom einen die eerder door 
N ieuw beerta  (1995) zijn gebru ikt om het onderzoek naar klassengebonden 
stem gedrag in drie generaties op te delen, te weten: de (1) form ulering  van de 
onderzoeksvragen, (2) de belangrijkste hypothesen, (3) m eetprocedures en (4) 
de gehanteerde analyse technieken. In hoofdstuk 1 laat ik echter zien dat na de 
studie van N ieuw beerta  dergelijke veranderingen hebben doorgezet, en dat er in 
toenem ende mate sprake is van een vierde generatie in het onderzoek naar klas- 
sengebonden stem gedrag. De onderzoeksvragen van deze vierde generatie 
richten zich op de vraag waarom  de invloed van sociale klasse op stem gedrag 
afneem t. De verk laringen die in de belangrijkste hypothesen worden aangedragen 
hebben in toenem ende name betrekking op politieke veranderingen. Naast de 
gebruikelijke gestandaard iseerde maten om sociale klassen te categoriseren, 
zoals het EG P-schem a van Erikson, G old thorpe and Portocarrero (1979), worden 
er aangepaste ‘postindustrië le ’ schem a ’s gebruikt. En ook de ontw ikkelingen in 
de gehanteerde onderzoeksm ethoden laten een toenam e zien in steeds 
geavanceerdere analysetechnieken.
Aan de hand van dezelfde criteria bespreek ik eveneens de onderzoekslite ra­
tuur naar godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag. Hoewel er overlap bestaat tussen 
het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stem gedrag en godsdienstgebonden 
stem gedrag, zijn beide onderzoekslijnen geworteld in verschillende trad ities. De 
ontw ikkelingen in het onderzoek naar klassengebonden stem gedrag zijn sterk 
beïnvloed door het vergelijkende stra tifica tieonderzoek (Ultee 1989; Ganzeboom ,
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Treiman and Ultee 1991). O nderzoek naar godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag is 
niet in deze trad itie  geworteld. De evolutie van onderzoeksvragen, hypothesen, 
m eetprocedures, en analyse technieken is daarom  m inder du idelijk als bij het 
k lassengebonden stem gedragonderzoek. Verschillende generaties laten zich 
m oeilijker onderscheiden.
Vervo lgens ga ik in hoofdstuk 1 dieper in op de hypothesen die in de literatuur 
worden aangedragen om variatie  tussen en binnen landen in godsd ienst-/ k las­
sengebonden stem gedrag te verklaren. Ik laat daarbij zien dat er veelal dezelfde 
rederneringen w orden gebruikt om verk laringen te form uleren voor de afnam e 
van godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag als voor de afnam e van klassengebonden 
stem gedrag. In navolging van Evans (2000) groepeer ik de verklaringen in twee 
brede categorieën. 1) Verklaringen die er vanuit gaan dat de afnam e in klassen/ 
godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag het gevolg is van sociale veranderingen, de 
zogenaam de ‘b o ttom -up ’ (van-onder-naar-boven) benadering. 2) Verklaringen 
die politieke veranderingen als belangrijkste bron van verandering in klassen/ 
godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag gebruiken, de zogenaam de ‘top -dow n (van- 
boven-naar-onder) benadering.
In de vier volgende em pirische hoofdstukken richt ik me op specifieke vragen 
over trends en landenverschillen in klasse- en re lig iegebonden stem gedrag. Dit 
boek kent daarbij tw ee delen. Het eerste deel bestaat uit grootschalige 
vergelijkende studies naar de invloed van k lasse/godsd ienst op stem gedrag 13 
(hoofdstuk 2) en 15 (hoofdstuk 3) m oderne dem ocratieën in W est-Europa, de 
Verenigde Staten en Austra lië  in de periode 1960 to t 2008. Voor dit doel heb ik 
een n ieuw  grootschalig  databestand sam engesteld, de Comparative Dataset on 
Cleavage Voting (CDCV). In dit bestand zijn de gegevens geïntegreerd van 196 
afzonderlijke survey-onderzoeken in Australië, België, Denem arken, Duitsland, 
Engeland, Finland, Frankrijk, Italië, Nederland, Noorwegen, O ostenrijk, de 
Verenigde Staten, Spanje, Zweden en Zw itserland tussen 1960 en 2008. Dit 
databestand biedt daarm ee de grootste verzam eling aan gekoppelde (kiezers) 
onderzoeken met betrekking to t godsd ienst- en klassengebonden stem gedrag 
voor W esterse landen na de Tweede W ere ldoorlog . Het grootschalige karakter 
van het eerste deel van dit proefschrift heeft als belangrijkste nadeel dat er alleen 
vergelijkingen in grove categorieën m ogelijk  zijn, en dat het aantal vergelijkbare 
variabelen per survey beperkt is. In het tw eede deel van dit boek richt ik me 
daarom  op trends in klasse- en godsd ienstgebonden stem gedrag in één land, te 
weten: Nederland. Voor dit doel gebruik ik data van de N ationale K iezersonder­
zoeken (NKO) tussen 1971 en 2006.
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Deel 1 : sociale scheidslijnen en stemgedrag in vergelijkend 
perspectief
Hoofdstuk 2: Sociale klasse versus godsdienst als determ inant van 
stemgedrag
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik de mate van en de verandering klassen-/godsd ienst- 
gebonden stem gedrag in 13 w esterse landen in de periode 1960 to t 2008. Voor 
dit hoofdstuk m aak ik gebruik van de 125 surveys in het CDCV-bestand die 
vo ldoende inform atie bevatten over zowel de sociale klasse van m ensen als hun 
godsdienstige achtergrond. In dit hoofdstuk beantwoord ik de eerste centrale 
vraag van dit proefschrift over c rossnationa le  verschillen en trends in de relatieve 
invloed  van sociale klasse op stem gedrag ten opzichte van de invloed van 
godsdienst. Twee deelvragen staan centraal: (a) In hoeverre hangt een sterk 
verband tussen sociale klasse en stem gedrag sam en m et een zw ak verband 
tussen godsdienst en stem gedrag? (b) In hoeverre zijn de verschillen tussen de 
mate van klassengebonden stem gedrag en de mate van godsd ienstgebonden 
stem gedrag in landen afgenom en, toegenom en of stabiel?
Ik begin hoofdstuk 2 m et een uitgebreide bespreking van de literatuur om trent 
de relatieve invloed van sociale klasse en godsdienst op stem gedrag. Ik laat 
daarbij zien dat het m oeilijk is om resultaten van verschillende onderzoeken met 
elkaar te vergelijken. Er bestaan nam elijk grote verschillen in de m anier waarop 
sociale scheidslijnen gemeten worden, en hoe hun invloed op stem gedrag wordt 
geanalyseerd. Scheidslijnen op basis van sociale klasse en godsd ienst worden 
veelal gem eten op basis van verschillende contrasten, c lassificaties en indicatoren. 
De afhankelijke variabelen zijn vaak te landenspecifiek om in ternationaal te 
kunnen vergelijken. En er bestaat een grote d iversite it aan criteria die worden 
gehanteerd om de sterkte van een scheidslijn  te kunnen bepalen. In tegenstelling 
to t veel voorgaand onderzoek gebruik ik in dit hoofdstuk uniform e m etingen van 
scheidslijnen in alle landen, gebaseerd op m ulticategorale typo log ieën van zowel 
scheidslijnen als politieke partijen. Vooruitgang w ordt ook gem aakt door de 
analyses te richten op de relatieve invloed van godsdienst versus sociale klasse, 
en door veranderingen in de effecten van sociale klasse en godsdienst s im ultaan 
te m odelleren. Om de invloed van scheidslijnen te beoordelen hanteer ik twee 
criteria; de kappa-index en de toegevoegde verk laarde variantie.
Met betrekking to t de eerste deelvraag laten mijn analyses zien dat er een 
positieve sam enhang bestaat tussen de mate van klassengebonden stem gedrag
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in een land en de mate van godsd ienstgebonden stem gedrag. Deze bevindingen 
weerspreken de bewering van L ijphart (1979) dat klasse alleen een sterkte invloed 
kan hebben w anneer de invloed van godsdienst zw ak is. Ik vind dat sociale klasse 
over het a lgem een belangrijker is voor stem gedrag dan godsd ienst in v ijf landen, 
te weten: Australië, Engeland, Noorwegen, O ostenrijk  en Zweden. In zes landen 
vind ik dat godsd ienst een sterkere basis voor stem gedrag vorm t dan sociale 
klasse. Deze landen zijn België, Frankrijk, Italië, Nederland, Spanje en Zwitserland. 
Met betrekking to t Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten bieden m ijn resultaten een 
m inder duidelijke conclusie.
De tw eede vraag in hoofdstuk 2 richtte zich op veranderingen in de relatieve 
invloed van sociale k lasse/godsd ienst op stem gedrag. Ik vind dat in de meeste 
landen de sam enhang tussen partijkeuze en zowel sociale klasse als godsdienst 
afneem t. Ondanks de afnam e in de sterkte van deze effecten blijft de hiërarchie 
tussen socia le klasse en godsd ienst als voorspelle r van stem gedrag in de meeste 
landen ongewijz igd. Tegenwoordig is godsdienst is belangrijker dan sociale 
klasse in globaal dezelfde landen als in de jaren zeventig. Het relatieve belang 
van godsdienst ten opzichte van sociale klasse neemt echter af in België en Italië, 
en keert zelfs om in Duitsland en de Verenigde Staten. In Austra lië  en O ostenrijk 
was, en blijft, sociale klasse een belangrijkere determ inant van stem gedrag dan 
godsdienst. In Zweden en Engeland heeft het relatieve effect van sociale klasse 
ten opzichte van godsdienst flink aan kracht ingeboet. Tegenwoordig vinden we 
de sterkste relatieve effecten van sociale klasse versus godsdienst in Zweden, 
w aar zowel de toegevoegde proportie  verklaarde variantie  als de kappa-index 
van sociale klasse tw ee maal zo groot zijn dan die van godsdienst. Religie is 
tegenw oord ig  het m eest dom inant ten opzichte van sociale klasse in Nederland. 
Het effect van godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag gem eten in kappa-index is 
ongeveer tw eem aal groter dan dat van klassengebonden stem gedrag. In term en 
van toegevoegde verk laarde variantie  is dit zelfs v ijftien  keer.
Hoofdstuk 3: Klassengebonden stemgedrag en links-rechts posities van 
politieke partijen
Na het vastste llen van de trends in godsd ienst-/ en klassengebonden stem gedrag 
in hoofdstuk 2, zijn de resterende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift erop gericht 
dergelijke veranderingen te verklaren. In hoofdstuk 3 richt ik mij op de vraag in 
hoeverre het de mate van klassengebonden stem gedrag, en veranderingen 
daarin, verklaard kunnen w orden door socia le veranderingen en de posities van
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politieke partijen. Ik beantwoord deze vraag door het effect te schatten van 
links-rechts posities van partijen op de mate van klassengebonden stem gedrag 
door middel van een h iërarchische tw ee-staps analyse. Ik m aak in dit hoofdstuk 
gebruik van gegevens uit 15 landen in het C DCV-bestand aangevuld met 
in form atie van het C om parative M anifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; K lingem ann 
et al. 2006).
In dit hoofdstuk toe ts ik drie ‘to p -d ow n ’ hypothesen; (1) De mate van k lassen­
gebonden stem gedrag is lager naarm ate de links-rechts posities van linkse 
partijen m eer centristisch zijn. En (2) De mate van klassengebonden stem gedrag 
is lager in m inder links-rechts gepolariseerde partij systemen. En (3) bewegingen 
naar het ideolog ische m idden door linkse partijen of de-polarisatie  van het partij 
system  verklaren de afnam e in klassengebonden stem gedrag. De voorgaande 
hypothesen w orden getoetst nadat vastgesteld is in welke mate ‘bo ttom -up ’ 
veranderingen de daling in k lassengebonden stem gedrag beïnvloeden. Mijn 
analyses laten zien dat com positione le  veranderingen leiden to t veranderingen in 
klassengebonden stem gedrag om dat controle voor achtergrondkenm erken 
(leeftijd, geslacht en opleiding), deels ve ran tw oorde lijk  zijn voor de afnam e van 
e lectorale verschillen tussen socia le klassen. Met name verandering in de 
sam enhang tussen opleid ing en stem gedrag lijkt een relevante verklaring voor de 
afnam e van klassengebonden stemgedrag.
In dit derde hoofdstuk vind ik geen aanw ijz ingen voor de stelling dat de 
links-rechts positie van enkel linkse partijen de sam enhang tussen sociale klasse 
en partijkeuze beïnvloed. Wel vind ik dat w anneer de ideolog ische verschillen 
tussen partijen kle iner zijn, dat dan de sam enhang tussen socia le klasse en 
stem gedrag zw akker is. Ik concludeer daarom  dat de mate van k lassengebon­
den stem gedrag beïnvloed wordt door de mate van politieke keuzes die het 
electoraat gepresenteerd krijgt. Om dit ‘to p -d ow n ’ effect te vinden is het echter 
belangrijk om naar de polarisatie  van partijen te kijken, in p laats van naar de 
absolute positie van linkse partijen. Verschillen in partij po larisatie  noch in posities 
van linkse partijen kunnen echter trends in klassen gebonden stem gedrag 
verklaren. De reden h iervoor is w ellicht gelegen is het gebrek aan stelselm atige 
sam enhang tussen verschuivingen van linkse partijen, of ideolog ische 
convergentie van partijen, en tijd.
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Deel 2: Trends in de samenhang tussen sociale scheids­
lijnen en stemgedrag in Nederland
Hoofdstuk 4: Klassengebonden in Nederland tussen 1971 en 2006
In het tw eede deel van dit proefschrift onderzoek ik trends in godsdienst en k las­
sengebonden stem gedrag in Nederland. Door gebruik te maken van g edeta il­
leerdere maten en geavanceerdere analyse technieken ten opzichte van het lan­
denvergelijkende deel, kan ik me in dit deel van het proefschrift uitgebreider 
richten op de vraag in welke mate ‘b o ttom -up ’ en ‘to p -d o w n ’ veranderingen ver­
an tw oorde lijk  zijn voor veranderingen in godsdienst en klassengebonden 
stem gedrag. In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik trends in klassengebonden stem gedrag 
in Nederland aan de hand van surveydata afkom stig  van 11 N ationale K iezerson­
derzoeken in de periode 1971 to t 2006. De belangrijkste vraag in dit hoofdstuk is 
in hoeverre sociale en politieke veranderingen verk laringen bieden voor 
veranderingen in klassengebonden stem gedrag in N ederland? Met betrekking tot 
de socia le veranderingen fo rm uleer ik hypothesen over de heterogenisering van 
de d ienstenklasse, de vervaging van ideolog ische scheidslijnen tussen klassen, 
en de invloed van opleiding. Hypothesen over politieke veranderingen hebben 
betrekking op de herstructurering van het Nederlandse partijsysteem  na de 
form atie van GroenLinks, en veranderingen in de posities van partijen op de 
sociaaleconom ische links-rechts d imensie en conservatie f-progressief dimensie.
D oor middel van een reeks m ultinom ia le  log istische regressie analyses vind 
ik dat de opkom st van de ‘n ieuw e’ klasse van sociaa l-cu lturee l specialisten een 
belangrijke verklaring is voor de veranderende sam enhang tussen socia le klasse 
en stem gedrag. Over het a lgem een vinden we dat het verschil tussen de 
arbeidende klasse en andere sociale klassen kle iner w ordt over de tijd, m aar bij 
de soc iaa l-cu lturee l specialisten lijk t er ook sprake te zijn van hergroepering. 
Hogere en lagere technocraten zijn niet alleen rechtser in hun stem gedrag, m aar 
de soc iaa l-cu lturee l specialisten hebben in het b ijzonder en sterke voorkeur 
ontw ikkeld  voor n ieuw -linkse partijen zoals D66 en GroenLinks. Verder vind ik in 
dit hoofdstuk dat de ideolog ische verschillen tussen socia le klasse wat betreft 
econom ische herverdeling de laatste decennia zijn afgenom en. M aar wanneer 
constant gehouden w ordt voor de econom ische ideolog ie van kiezers biedt dit 
slechts een gedeelte lijke verklaring voor verandering in het verband tussen 
sociale klasse en partijkeuze. Sterker nog, ik vind dat de sam enhang tussen 
econom isch conservatism e en stem gedrag zelfs licht is toegenom en over de tijd.
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Met betrekking to t opleid ing vind ik dat een lage opleid ing steeds m inder 
sam enhangt m et stem m en op een linkse partij. Voornam elijk  n ieuw -linkse partijen 
w orden in toenem ende mate gekozen door m ensen m et een hoge opleiding. Met 
name voor de subklassen van de d ienstenklasse geldt dat op le id ingsniveau een 
verklaring biedt voor zowel de sterkte als de afnam e van de klasseneffecten op 
stemgedrag.
Met betrekking to t de zogenaam de ‘to p -d o w n ’-hypothesen over politieke 
veranderingen vind ik geen ondersteuning voor de verw achting dat de neerwaartse 
trend in klassengebonden stem gedrag beïnvloed zou zijn door de fusie van de 
PPR, PSP, CPN en EVP in G roenLinks. Of, en in welke mate partijposities de mate 
van klassengebonden stem gedrag beïnvloeden heb ik in dit hoofdstuk getoetst 
door gebruik te maken van cond itione le  log istische regressie m odellen. Ik 
concludeer dat na rekening te houden m et de bovenbeschreven sociale 
verklaringen, het vooral de econom ische links-rechts positie van partijen is, en 
niet hun conservatie f-p rogressie f positie, wat een significant effect heeft op de 
keuze tussen de vier grote partijgroepen in Nederland tussen 1971 en 2002. 
Echter, de mate waarin kiezers partijen stem m en met econom ische rechtse be­
le idsstandpunten verschilt niet tussen de arbeidende klasse en andere sociale 
klassen. Met betrekking to t de culturele posities van partijen vind ik dat arbeiders 
eerder op partijen stem m en naarm ate deze conservatiever zijn, terw ijl andere 
sociale klassen, en met name de sociaa l-cu lturee l specialisten, vaker op partijen 
stem m en naarm ate deze progressiever zijn. Maar hoewel ik in dit hoofdstuk laat 
zien dat er een duidelijke relatie bestaat tussen partijpositie  en de mate van k las­
sengebonden stem gedrag, kunnen de veranderende partijposities niet verklaren 
waarom  klassengebonden stem gedrag afneemt.
Hoofdstuk 5: Godsdienstgebonden stemgedrag in Nederland tussen 
1971 en 2006
In hoofdstuk 5 beantwoord ik de vraag in hoeverre veranderingen in godsd ienst­
gebonden stem gedrag in Nederland verklaard kunnen worden door sociale en 
politieke veranderingen. Net als in het vorige hoofdstuk toe ts  ik in dit hoofdstuk 
eerst een reeks ‘b o ttom -up ’-hypothesen over sociale veranderingen alvorens 
tw ee typen ‘to p -d o w n ’ hypothesen te toetsen over politieke veranderingen. Ik 
vind in dit hoofdstuk dat het verband tussen kerklidm aatschap en partijkeuze in 
Nederland sterk is afgenom en. Deze afnam e heeft voor het grootste deel 
p laatsgevonden voor 1986. Ik observeer dat met name de verschillen tussen
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katholieken en gereform eerden enerzijds en niet-kerkleden anderzijds kleiner zijn 
geworden. De afnam e van godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag w ordt hoofdzakelijk 
verklaard door de terug loop  in kerkgang, wat een indicatie is voor religieuze 
disintegratie. De sam enhang tussen lid zijn van een protestantse kerk (Nederlands 
Hervorm d of P rotestantse Kerk Nederland) en het stem m en op een religieuze 
partij is slechts licht afgenom en. De verschillen in stem gedrag tussen protestanten 
en niet-kerkleden waren echter al klein in de jaren zeventig. Ik vind echter dat 
w anneer er rekening w ordt gehouden met de d isintegratie van kerkleden, aan de 
hand van een veranderende invloed van kerkgang, protestanten zelfs steeds 
vaker op een religieuze partij stem m en ten opzichte van niet-kerkleden.
In hoofdstuk 5 toe ts ik tw ee hypothesen over politieke veranderingen. Ten 
eerste, vind ik dat de fusie van de KVP, ARP en CHU to t het CDA in 1977 heeft 
geleid to t een aanzienlijke daling van het godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag in 
Nederland. Ik laat ook zien dat de invloed van godsd ienst op stem gedrag is 
gedaald na de verkiezingen van 2002, het jaar waarin de GPV en RPF voor het 
eerst als de fusiepartij C hristenU nie aan de verkiezingen deelnam en. Beide 
partijfusies hebben niet alleen bijgedragen aan het verm inderen van de 
sam enhang tussen godsdienst en stem gedrag, ze zijn zelfs van belang w anneer 
de lineaire daling van godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag al volledig wordt 
verklaard door religieuze disintegratie. Ik concludeer daarom  dat naast sociale 
veranderingen partijpolitieke herstructureringen belangrijke bijdragen zijn aan het 
proces van religieuze “degroepering” in het N ederlandse electoraat.
Tot slot laat ik zien dat relig ieus stem gedrag w ordt bevorderd w anneer partijen 
m eer trad itione le  partijposities innemen. Met name niet-kerkleden zijn m inder 
geneigd op partijen te stem m en naarm ate deze meer nadruk leggen op trad itioneel 
m orele standpunten. Ik concludeer daarom  dat partijen met trad itionee l morele 
standpunten m et name seculiere kiezers afstoten in plaats van religieuze kiezers 
aantrekken. Om dat de neerw aartse trend in godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag 
bijna volled ig w ordt verklaard door de afnem ende invloed van kerkgang op 
partijkeuze, dragen de m orele standpunten van partijen echter niet verder bij aan 
het verklaren van deze trend. Na rekening te houden met het afnem ende effect 
van kerkgang blijft er een U-vorm ige curve over met betrekking to t de trend van 
godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag sinds de jaren zeventig. Deze curve vertoont 
sterke gelijkenis m et de nadruk die het religieuze partijen in Nederland 
(voornam elijk het CDA en haar voorlopers) door de tijd heen hebben gelegd op 
trad itioneel m orele bele idsstandpunten. G em odelleerd als lineaire veranderingen 
in godsdienstgebonden stem gedrag w ordt deze trend slechts heel beperkt
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verklaard door rekening te houden met de trad itioneel morele posities van 
partijen.
Slotbeschouwing
In het laatste hoofdstuk vat ik de bevindingen van dit proefschrift sam en, en 
evalueer ik de gevoerde onderzoeksstra teg ie  en gehanteerde analysetechnieken. 
Tot slot bespreek ik de w etenschappelijke bijdragen van dit proefschrift en de 
im plicaties ervan voor toekom stig  onderzoek. De onderzoeksstra teg ie  in dit 
proefschrift is er één van grootschalig landenvergelijkend onderzoek gecombineerd 
met trendonderzoek in Nederland. In het s lo thoo fdstuk stel ik vast dat er zowel 
voor- als nadelen aan deze aanpak zitten. Een belangrijk voordeel is dat de twee 
delen e lkaar aanvullen. De landenvergelijkende hoofdstukken in het eerste deel 
van dit proefschrift stellen mij is staat a lgem ene conclusies te trekken over de 
mate van sam enhang tussen socia le scheidslijnen en stem gedrag binnen en 
tussen landen. De nadelen van deze vergelijkende analyses zijn gelegen in de 
beperkte mate van detail bij het meten van sociale klasse, godsdienst en 
stem gedrag, en het gebrek aan m ogelijkheden om alternatieve verklaringen te 
toetsen voor variatie  in k lassengebonden stem gedrag. M aar de landenvergelij­
kende analyses laten daarentegen wel zien in hoeverre de trends in Nederland, 
zoals gevonden in het tw eede deel van dit proefschrift, deel uit maken van bredere 
in ternationale ontw ikkelingen.
Ik ga in dit s lo thoo fdstuk uitgebreid in op de im plicaties van gehanteerde 
operationa liseringen van stem gedrag, socia le klasse, godsd ienst en partijposities 
zoals gehanteerd in de verschillende hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift. Deze 
bespreking zich vooral op de c lassificatie van variabelen in een beperkt aantal 
categorieën. Met betrekking to t stem gedrag bespreken we de im plicaties van het 
indelen van Nederlandse politieke partijen in vier groepen, en het gebruik van 
slechts tw ee of drie categorieën voor stem gedrag in het landenvergelijkende 
onderzoek dit proefschrift. Met betrekking to t de operationa lisering  van sociale 
klasse bespreek ik m et name de keuze om in het landenvergelijkende deel van dit 
proefschrift niet m eer dan vier categorieën te hanteren, waarin verschillen tussen 
aparte segm enten van de d ienstenklasse buiten beschouwing worden gelaten. 
De mate van d ifferentia tie  speelt ook een rol in de bespreking van de religieuze 
c lassificaties in dit proefschrift. Ik richt me daarbij vooral op verschillen tussen 
landen in mate waarin er in form atie beschikbaar is over kerk lidm aatschap van
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respondenten. Met betrekking to t de operationa lisering van partijposities ga ik 
zowel in op de voordelen en nadelen van de Comparative Manifesto Project-data, 
en de belangrijkste alternatieven voor deze data. In dit hoofdstuk besteed ik ook 
aandacht aan de analyse m ethoden en geschatte m odellen. Ik bespreek daarbij 
in het b ijzonder het gebruik van cond itione le  log istische (CL) regressie modellen 
in hoofdstukken 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift. Ik stel dat CL m odellen voorzien in 
w etenschappelijke vooru itgang in het onderzoek naar sociale scheidslijnen en 
stem gedrag om dat in deze m odellen zowel kenm erken van kiezers opgenom en 
kunnen worden als kenm erken van hun keuzealternatieven. CL m odellen maken 
het daarom  niet alleen m ogelijk om ‘to p -d ow n ’ theorieën strenger te toetsen, 
maar bieden ook een op lossing voor een em pirisch probleem  in vergelijkend 
onderzoek, namelijk: hoe om te gaan met het feit dat partij categorieën verschillen 
tussen tijdstippen en plekken. Ik beargum enteer dat CL m odellen daarm ee een 
voordeel hebben ten opzichte van de meer w ijdverbreide m ultinom ia le  logistische 
(MNL) regressie m odellen. Ook ga ik in dit hoofdstuk in op de zw akte van CL en 
MNL m odellen, nam elijk de assum ptie van O nafhankelijkhe id  van Irrelevante 
A lternatieven (IIA, ‘ Independence of Irrelevant A lte rna tives ’). Deze assum ptie 
houdt in dat het toevoegen of verw ijderen van een categorie van de afhankelijke 
variabele geen invloed heeft op de kansverhoud ingen van de initiële of resterende 
alternatieven.
Ik besluit dit proefschrift m et een beschouwing van wat dit proefschrift aan 
kennis heeft opgeleverd over de sociale en politieke verk laringen voor 
veranderingen in de sam enhang van sociale scheidslijnen en politieke partijkeuze. 
Aan de hand van vragen, uitspraken en bevindingen in dit proefschrift geef ik 
daarbij suggesties voor toekom stig  onderzoek. Met betrekking to t de ‘bo ttop -up ’ 
verk laringen over socia le veranderingen laten de landenvergelijkende analyses in 
dit proefschrift onder andere zien dat de verschillen tussen de arbeidende klasse 
en andere sociale klassen deels tanende zijn vanwege de opkom st nieuwe 
scheidslijnen tussen kiezers die een hoge opleid ing hebben genoten en kiezers 
die dat niet hebben. Deze bevinding strookt m et het idee van nieuwe culturele 
scheidslijnen waarb ij hoger opgele iden er over het a lgem een progressievere 
denkbeelden op nahouden dan lager opgeleiden. Imm ers, ook in Nederland 
vinden we dat een hoge opleid ing in steeds m indere mate een rechtse politieke 
partijkeuze voorspelt, en ju ist in steeds grotere mate geassocieerd m oet worden 
met een voorkeur voor n ieuw -linkse partijen. Tevens laten de analyses voor 
Nederland zien dat de heterogenisering van de d ienstenklasse een cruciale rol 
speelt in het veranderende karakter van klassengebonden stem gedrag. Ik moedig
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daarom  andere onderzoekers aan het onderscheid tussen technocraten en 
soc iaa l-cu lturee l specialisten mee te nemen in toekom stig  onderzoek naar 
klassenverschillen in politieke gedragingen en opvattingen.
In dit p roefschrift m aak ik belangrijke stap vooru itgang in het onderzoek naar 
veranderende soc iaa l-po litieke  scheidslijnen door ‘b o ttom -up ’ verk laringen uit te 
breiden met veranderingsprocessen die betrekking hebben op de rol van keuze- 
a lternatieven die partijen kiezers bieden. Mijn resultaten veronderste llen dat 
‘to p -d o w n ’ invloeden op klassengebonden stem gedrag vooral te maken hebben 
met verschillen tussen partijen, en niet zozeer m et de econom ische positie van 
alleen linkse partijen. Deze bevinding w eerspreekt de verw achting op basis van 
Przeworksi and Sprague ’s (1985) ‘Electorale D ilem m a’ dat klassengebonden 
stem gedrag afneem t als gevolg van het fe it dat linkse partijen zich uit electorale 
noodzaak steeds sterker op de m iddenklasse richten om de afnam e van de 
arbeidende klassen in de sam enleving te com penseren. Voor Nederland vind ik 
echter niet dat verschillen tussen partijen met betrekking to t econom ische 
standpunten ve rantw oorde lijk  zijn voor de afnam e van klassengebonden 
stem gedrag. Ik vind in Nederland echter wel substantië le  klassenverschillen in de 
mate waarin progressieve of conservatieve partijstandpunten leiden to t een stem 
op een partij. A rbeiders stem m en eerder op partijen naarm ate deze conservatiever 
zijn, terw ijl andere sociale klasse vaker op partijen stem m en naarm ate deze 
progressiever zijn. In dit opzicht lijkt het relevant dat partijen in Nederland 
divergerende posities innemen met betrekking to t ‘n ieuw e’ politieke issues.
Hoewel ik vind dat partijposities niet in staat zijn de neerw aartse trends in 
klassengebonden stem gedrag te verklaren, betekent dit niet dat hypothesen over 
politieke veranderingen niet zinvol zijn. Het feit dat partijveranderingen geen 
lineaire trends verklaren, slu it niet uit dat ze wel in staat zijn m eer tijdspecifieke 
veranderingen in soc iaa l-po litieke scheidslijnen te verklaren. Voor Nederland heb 
ik laten zien dat de to tstandkom ing  van het CDA en de C hristenU nie relig ieusge- 
bonden stem gedrag heeft beïnvloed, zelfs wanneer er rekening w ordt gehouden 
met de desintegratie van religieuze groepen. Deze bevinding is belangrijk omdat 
de fusie van de KVP, ARP en CHU to t het CDA zelf een reactie was op de 
secularisering in Nederland en de te loorgang van de oude confessionele  partijen. 
Het toont aan dat ‘b o ttom -up ’-verklaringen los gezien kunnen w orden van 
‘to p -d o w n ’, m aar niet andersom . Sociale veranderingen kunnen gradueel zijn van 
aard, m aar ze kunnen p lotselinge politieke reacties u itlokken die leiden to t abrupte 
verschuivingen van sociale groepen in het electoraat.
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APPENDiX A! DATA
A.1 Data Sources
A.1.1 Data Archives:
ANES Am erican National E lection Studies: Center for Political Studies,
Ann A rbor (MI), USA 
ASSDA Austra lian Social Science Data Archive: The Austra lian National 
University, Canberra, Australia 
CDSP Centre de Données Soc io -Po litiques, Paris, France
CSES C om parative Study of E lectoral System s, Ann A rbor (MI), USA
CIS Centro de Investigaciones Socio log icas, Madrid, Spain
DANS Data Archiving and Networked Services, Den Haag, the
Netherlands
DDA Danish Data Archive, Odense, Denm ark
ESRC ESRC Data Archive, Essex, United Kingdom
FSD Finnish Social Science Data Archive, Tampere, Finland
ITANES Italian National E lection Survey, Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, Bologna, 
Italy
ICPSR Inter-U nivers ity C onsortium  for Political and Social Research,
Ann A rbor (MI), USA 
NSD Norwegian Social Science Data Service, Bergen, Norway
SIDOS Sw iss Inform ation and Data Archive Service for the Social 
Sciences, Neuchâtel, Sw itzerland 
SSD Swedish Social Science Data Service, Göteborg, Sweden
ZA Zentral Archive, Köln, Germ any
A.1.2 Data files by country
File Archive:# Chapter File Archive:# Chapter
Australia AUS85I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS65 DANS:P1145 2,3 AUS86I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS67 DANS:P1145 2,3 AUS87 DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS73 DANS:P1145 3 AUS87I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS79 DANS:P1145 2,3 AUS90E DANS:P1145 2,3
AUS84 DANS:P1145 2,3 AUS93E ASSDA:0763 2,3
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File Archive:# Chapter File Archive:# Chapter
AUS96E A SSDA:0943 2,3 Finland
AUS98E A SSD A:1001 2,3 FIN72S DANS:P1145 3
AUS01E A SSD A:1048 2,3 FIN75P DANS:P1145 3
AUS04E A SSD A:1079 2 FIN91E FSD:1018 3
FIN95E FSD:1031 3
Austria FIN99E FSD:1042 3
AUT74P DANS:P1145 2,3 FIN03E FSD:1260 3
AUT85I DANS:P1145 2,3
AUT88I DANS:P1145 2,3 France
AUT89I DANS:P1145 2,3 FRA67E ICPSR:2978 2,3
AUS95I ZA:2280 2,3 FRA68E ICPSR:7274 2,3
AUS99I ZA:3430 2,3 FRA78E DANS:P1145 3
AUS03I ZA:3910 2,3 FRA88E C D SP:PE88 2,3
FRA95E C D SP:PE95 2,3
Belgium FRA97E CDSP:PE97 2,3
BEL75 DANS:P1145 3 FRA02E C D SP:PEFV 2,3
BEL91 DANS:P1228 2,3 FRA06 C D SP:PE06 2
BEL95 DANS:P1422 2,3 FRA07 CDSP:PE07 2
BEL99 CSES:1 2,3
BEL03 C SES:2 2,3 Germany
G ER69E DANS:P1145 2,3
Denmark G ER 69F DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN71E DDA:0658 3 GER75P DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN72S DDA:0658 3 GER76Z DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN75E DDA:0658 3 G ER77Z DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN77E DDA:0658 3 GER78C DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN79E DDA:0658 3 GER78X DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN81E DDA:0658 3 GER79Z DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN84E DDA:0772 3 GER79X DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN87E DDA:1340 3 GER80A DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN88E DDA:1432 3 GER80C DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN90E DDA:1564 3 GER80P DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN94E DDA:2210 3 GER80Z DANS:P1145 2,3
DEN98E DDA:4189 3 GER82A DANS:P1145 3
DEN01E DDA:12516 3 GER84A DANS:P1145 2,3
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File Archive:# Chapter File Archive:# Chapter
GER86A DANS:P1145 2,3 N ET89E DANS:P1000 2,3,4,5
GER87I DANS:P1145 2,3 N ET90S DANS:P1145 2,3
GER88A DANS:P1145 2,3 NET94E DANS:P1208 2,3,4,5
GER90A DANS:P1145 2,3 NET98E DANS:P1415 2,3,4,5
GER94E ZA:3911 2,3 NET02E DANS:P1628 2,3,4,5
GER98E ZA:3911 2,3 NET06E DANS:P1719 2,3,4,5
GER02E CSES:2 2,3
GER05E CSES:3 2 Norway
N OR65E DANS:P1145 3
Italy NOR72S DANS:P1145 3
ITA68E DANS:P1145 2,3 NOR77E DANS:P1145 3
ITA75P DANS:P1145 2,3 NOR81E DANS:P1145 2,3
ITA85 DANS:P1145 2,3 NOR85E DANS:P1145 2,3
ITA90E ITANES:1990 2,3 NOR89E DANS:P1145 2,3
ITA92E ITANES:1992 2,3 NOR90I DANS:P1145 3
ITA94E ITANES:1994 2,3 N OR93E ZA:3911 2,3
ITA96E ITANES:1996 2,3 NOR97E ZA:3911 2,3
ITA01E ITANES:2001 2,3 NOR01E CSES:2 3
ITA06E ITANES:2006 2
Spain
Netherlands SPA79E CIS:1192 2,3
NET70 DANS:P1145 2,3 SPA82E C IS: 1327 3
NET71 DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5 SPA86E CIS:1542 2,3
NET72E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5 SPA89E C IS: 1842 3
NET74P DANS:P1145 2,3 SPA93E CIS:2061 3
NET76 DANS:P1145 2,3 SPA96E CI S: 2210 3
NET77E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5 SPA00E CIS:2384 2,3
NET77L DANS:P1145 2,3 SPA04E CIS:2559 2,3
NET79P DANS:P1145 2,3 SPA08E CIS:2757 2
NET81E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5
NET82E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5 Sweden
NET85S DANS:P1145 2,3 SW E72S DANS:P1145 3
NET86E DANS:P1145 2,3,4,5 SW E76E ZA:3911 3
NET87 DANS:P1145 3 SW E79E ZA:3911 3
NET89M DANS:P1145 3 SW E82E ZA:3911 3
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File Archive:# Chapter File Archive:# Chapter
SW E85E ZA:3911 2,3 ENG01E ZA:3911 3
SW E88E ZA:3911 2,3 ENG05E ESRC:BES05 2,3
SWE91 DANS:P1145 3
SWE91E ZA:3911 2,3 United States
SW E94E ZA :3911 2,3 USA60E DANS:P1145 2,3
SW E98E ZA:3911 2,3 USA64E DANS:P1145 2,3
SW E02E C SES:2 2,3 USA66E DANS:P1145 2,3
USA68E DANS:P1145 2,3
Switzerland USA70E DANS:P1145 2,3
SWI71E SIDOS:8862 2,3 USA72E DANS:P1145 2,3
SWI72 DANS : P1145 3 USA72G DANS:P1145 3
SWI75E SIDOS:8862 2,3 USA73G DANS:P1145 3
SWI76P DANS:P1145 3 USA74G DANS:P1145 3
SWI79E SIDOS:8862 2,3 USA74P DANS:P1145 3
SWI87E SIDOS:8862 3 USA75G DANS:P1145 3
SWI91E SIDOS:8862 3 USA76E ANES:48-04 2,3
SW I95E SIDOS:8862 2,3 USA76G DANS:P1145 3
SW I99E SIDOS:8862 2,3 USA77G DANS:P1145 3
SW I03E SIDOS:8862 2,3 USA78G DANS:P1145 3
USA80E A N ES:48-04 2,3
United Kingdom USA80G DANS:P1145 3
ENG64E DANS:P1145 2,3 USA82G DANS:P1145 3
ENG66E DANS:P1145 2,3 USA83G DANS:P1145 3
ENG70E DANS:P1145 2,3 USA84E A N ES:48-04 2,3
ENG74O DANS:P1145 3 USA84G DANS:P1145 3
ENG79E DANS:P1145 2,3 USA85G DANS:P1145 3
ENG83E DANS:P1145 2,3 USA86G DANS:P1145 3
ENG85I DANS:P1145 3 USA87G DANS:P1145 3
ENG86I DANS:P1145 3 USA88E A N ES:48-04 2,3
ENG87E DANS:P1145 2,3 USA88G DANS:P1145 3
ENG87I DANS:P1145 3 USA89G DANS:P1145 3
ENG88I DANS:P1145 3 USA90G DANS:P1145 3
ENG89I DANS:P1145 3 USA92E A N ES:48-04 2,3
ENG90I DANS:P1145 3 USA96E A N ES:48-04 2,3
ENG92E ZA:3911 2,3 US00AE A N ES:48-04 2,3
ENG97E ZA:3911 2,3 US04AE A N ES:48-04 2,3
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A.1.3 Data references
ANES:48-04 American National Election Studies. The 1948-2004 release of the Time Series 
Cumulative Data File.
ASSDA763. Jones, R., McAllister, I., Denemark, D. and Gow, D. Australian Election Study, 
1993.
3.4 9 :0 A: D5 S A Jones, R., McAllister, I. and Gow, D. Australian Election Study, 1996.
ASSDA:1001. Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. Australian Election Study, 1998.
8.4 0 A:1D5 S A Bean, C., Gow, D. and McAllister, I. Australian Election Study, 2001.
9.70A:1DSSA Bean, C., McAllister, I., Gisbon, R and Gow, D. Australian Election Study, 2004.
CDSP:PE88 Mayer, N. et al. Enquête post-électorale française, 1988.
CDSP:PE95 Mayer, N., Boy, D., and Lewis-Bec, M. Enquête post-électorale française, 1995
CDSP:PE97 CEVIPOF. Enquête post-électorale française, 1997.
CDSP:PEFV CEVIPOF. Panel Électoral Français, 2002.
CDSP:PE06 CEVIPOF. The Baromètre Politique Français, 2006-2007.
CDSP:PE07 CEVIPOF. Panel Électoral Français, 2007.
CIS: 1192 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1979
CIS: 1321 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1982
CIS:1542 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1986
CIS: 1842 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1989
CIS:2061 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1993
CIS:2210 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 1996
CIS:2384 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 2000
CIS:2559 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 2004
CIS:2757 Postelectoral Elecciones Generales, 2008
CSES:1 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES Module 1 Full Release. 
August 4, 2003
CSES:2 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES Module 2 Full Release. 
June 27, 2007.
CSES:3 The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. CSES Module 3 First Advance 
Release. March 29, 2010.
D A z : P1 0 o o Anker, H. and Oppenhuis, E.V. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 1989.
DANS:P1145 Nieuwbeerta, P and Ganzeboom, H.B. International Social Mobility and 
Politics File.
D A z : P1 2 o CD Anker, H. and Oppenhuis, E.V. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 1994.
15141:P1S:NAD Aarts, K., Kolk, H. van der, and Kamp, M. Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, 1998.
DANS:P1628 Irwin, G.A., Holsteyn, J.J.M. and Ridder, J.M. den. Nationaal Kiezers-
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DANS:P1719
onderzoek, 2002/3.
Aarts, K., Kolk, H., van der, Rosema, M., and Schmeets, H. Nationaal
DDA:0658
Kiezersonderzoek, 2006.
Borre, Ole, et al. Danish Election Studies Continuity File, 1971-1981.
DDA:0772 Borre, O., G. A..J., et al. Danish Election Survey, 1984.
DDA:1340 Borre, O., J. Goul A., et al. Danish Election Survey, 1987.
DDA:1342 Nielsen, H.J., Sauerberg, S. and Worre, T  (1988). Danish Election Survey,
DDA:1564
1988.
Andersen, J.G., Borre, O., Nielsen, H.J.S. Sauerberg, S. and Worre, T Danish
DDA:2210
Election Survey, 1990.
Andersen, J. and Borre,O. Danish elections study, 1994.
DDA:4189 Andersen, J. G., Andersen, J., Borre, O. and H. J. Nielsen. Danish Election
DDA:12516
Survey, 1998.
Andersen, J. G., Borre, O., Nielsen, H. J., Andersen J., Thomsen, S. R. and
50SE:BC:RSE
Elklit, J. Danish Election Survey, 2001.
Sanders, D., Whiteley, P, Clarke, H. and Stewart, M. British National Election
FSD:1018
Study, 2005.
Finnish Voter Barometer, 1991.
FSD:1031 Finnish Voter Barometer, 1995
FSD:1042 Finnish Voter Barometer, 1999
FSD:1260 Finnish Voter Barometer, 2003
ITANES:90 Parisi, A.M.L. and Schadee, H.M.A. Italian National Election Studies, 1990.
ITANES:92 Corbetta,P. and Parisi, A.M.L. Italian National Election Studies, 1992.
ITANES:94 Corbetta,P. and Parisi, A.M.L. Italian National Election Studies, 1994.
ITANES:96 Corbetta,P. and Parisi, A.M.L. Italian National Election Studies, 1996.
ITANES:01 Caciagli, M. and Corbetta, P. Italian National Election Studies, 2001.
ITANES:06 Bellucci, P. and Segatti, P Italian National Election Studies, 2006.
SIDOS:8862 Selb. P, Fontana, M. and Lachat, R. Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects).
ZA:2280
Cumulative file, 1971-2003.
International Social Survey Programme, National Identity, 1995.
ZA:3430 International Social Survey Programme, Social Inequality III, 1999.
ZA:3910 International Social Survey Programme, National Identity I  2003.
ZA:3911 Thomassen, J. The European Voter Database. Continuity Files of National
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Election studies in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Sweden.
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A.2 Party classifications in chapters 2 and 3
Country Left-wing parties
(Socialist, Communist and Left-socialist parties)
Australia ALP Australian labor party; DLP Democratic labor party; QLP Queensland labor 
party
Austria....................... S.P.O. . Socialist. Party;. .K.P.O. .Communist. . party............................................................
Belgium BSP - PSB - POB Belgian socialist party; PS Socialist Party Wallonia; SP-SPa
Socialist Party Flanders
Denmark SD Social Democratic Party; DKP Danish Communist Party; RF Justice party; SF 
Socialist Peoples Party; VS Left Socialists FK Common Course; EL Unity List
Finland SDP Social democrats; STP Socialist workers party; SKDL Finnish peoples 
democratic union; TPSL Social democratic league of workers & smallholders; VAS
Left.Alliance.............................................................................................................................
SFIO-PS Socialist party; PCF Communist party; minor left; other extreme leftFrance
Germany SPD Social democrats; KPD-DKP Communist party; PDS- The Left
Italy PCI Commmunist party; PSI Socialist party; PSDI Social democrats; PDS
Democratic Party of the Left; PSIUP Socialist party of proletarian unity; PDUP 
Manifesto-party proletarian communism; PSU United socialist party; DP Proletarian 
democracy; Progressives; RC Communist Refoundation Party; PdCI Party of Italian
....................................Commun.i.st.s;. .C.e.nt.re. . left . co.aMo.n. .(generic).........................................................................
The Netherlands PVDA Labor party; CPN Communist party; SP Socialist party; PSP Pacifist socialist 
party; PPR Radical political party; DS70 Democratic socialist 70
Norway DNA Norwegian Labor Party; SV Socialist Left Party; RV Red Electoral alliance: NKP
Communist Party
Spain PSOE Socialist Labor Party; PCE-U Communist Party /United Left; Left-wing
......................................Nationalists........................................................................................................................................
Sweden SAP Social Democratic Labour Party; VKP Swedish Communist Party - V Left Party
Switzerland SPS - PS'S Social Democratic Party of Switzerland; Pda - Pdt Labour Party; POCH 
Progressive organization of Switzerland; minor left
United Kingdom LAB Labour party 
United States_______D Democratic Party
Source: primarily based upon the classification by Lane and Ersson (1997); other sources: Nieuwbeerta 
(1995); Knutsen (2004); and own additions
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Right-wing parties
(liberal, conservative, agrarian, and other right parties)
Religious parties
(Christian Democratic, Catholic and other 
denominational parties)__________________
LPA Liberal party; NP National party - country party; CLP 
Country-liberal party; AD Australian democrats; ON One 
Nation
...FPO.Freedom, .party;. LF. Liberal Forum...................................
PVV - Party of liberty and progress; PLDP Brussels liberal 
party; PRL- Walloon Liberals; VLD - Flemish Liberals;
VB Flemish Interest- Flemish Bloc; FN National Front -  
Wallonia; MR Reform Movement - Walloon Liberals
OVP Austrian peoples party
"PSC -C V P C ath o licp a rty ;C V P - CD&V,.....
Flemish Christian Democrats; PSC - CDH 
Walloon Christian Democrats
CD Centre Democrats; V Left -  Liberals; RV Radical Left 
-  Liberals; KF Conservative Peoples Party; FRP Progress 
Party; DF Danish Peoples Party
KD Christian Democrats - KrF Christian 
Peoples Party
KESK Finnish Centre party; KOK National coalition; LKP 
Liberal peoples party; SMP Finnish rural party; PS True
_FlnceLNUORSYouna.Fi.nGs.......................................................RFP Rally for the French People; UNr Union for the New 
Republic; UDR Union for the Defense of the Republic;
RPR Rally for the Republic; UMP Union for the Popular 
Movement; MRP Popular Republican Movement; CDS 
Democratic and Social Centre; UDF Union for French
...Democracy.;. NC . N.e.w. .Centre...................................................
FDP Free democrats
SKD Christian league - KD Christian 
Democrats
CDU Christian democratic union; CSU
.Christian. .social . union.................................
DC Christian democrats; CCD Christian 
Democratic Centre; PPI Italian Popular 
Party; CCD-CDU, Whiteflower-list
PLI Liberal Party; PRI; Republican Party; FI Forza Italia; 
AN National Alliance; LN Northern League; Radical party; 
centre right coalition (generic)
VVD Liberal party ; D66 Democrats 66; New Middle Party; 
BP Farmers party;; CP Centre party; CD Centre Democrats; 
LPF List Pim Fortuyn
ARP Anti-revolutionary party; KVP Catholic 
party; CHU Christian Historicals; SGP 
Political reformed party; GPV Reformed 
political union; RKPN Roman catholic 
party; CDA Christian democratic appeal; 
RPF Reformed political federation; EVP 
Evangelical peoples party; CU Christian
Union..................................................................
KrF Christian Peoples PartyV Left -  Liberals; H Right -  Conservatives; DFL Liberal 
Peoples Party: ALP Anders langes party -  FrP; FrP
...Progress, .party;. SP . Center. party...
PP Popular Party; Right-wing Nationalists; UCD-CDS,
.centrists...................................................................................
M Moderate Free Traders; FP Peoples party -  Liberals;
...M.id.die. . parties .-  C.P. . .C.e.n.t.r.e . .P.a.rty;. .N.D. New ..D.e.m.o.c.rac.y...
Kd-former KDS, Christian Democracy
SVP- UDC Swiss Peoples Party; FDP - PRD Radical 
Democrats; LPS - PLS Liberal Party of Switzerland - Liberal 
conservatives; Independents; National action; SD - DS 
Swiss Democrats - former Nation Action; FPS - PSL 
..Freedom. . .P.a.rty. of. .Switzerland . .
CVP - PDC Christian Democratic Peoples 
Party -  Catholic; EVP - PEP Protestant 
Peoples Party; CSP -PCS Christian Social 
Party; EDU - UDF - Federal Democratic 
Union
CON Conservative party; LIB Liberal Party; LIBDEM Liberal
...Democrats .-. .the. .aliian.c.e.............................................................
R Republican Party________________________________________
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A.3 Party classifications in chapters 4 and 5
Party group Party Party name
(Dutch abbreviation) (English translation)
Old Left PvdA Labor Party
DS70 Democratic Socialists ‘70
CPN Communist Party of the Netherlands
SP Socialist Party
New Left D66 Democrats ‘66
PPR Political Party Radicals
PSP Pacifist Socialist Party
EVP Evangelical People’s Party
GroenLinks GreenLeft
Liberal Right VVD People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
BP Farmer’s Party
NMP New Middle Party
Religious ARP Anti Revolutionary Party
KVP Catholic People’s Party
CHU Christian Historical Union
CDA Christian Democratic Appeal
SGP Political Reformed Party
GPV Reformed Political Alliance
RPF Reformed Political Federation
CU ChristianUnion
RKPN Roman-Catholic Party of the Netherlands
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Appendix B: Chapter 2 
B.1 Model selection
Australia: G oodness-o f-fit s tatis tics of 27 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of 
cleavage change (N =20,645)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 1926851.2 27040.0 5
2 2026843.6 27042.3 6
3 2126844.1 27052.8 8
4 3026832.5 27130.6 11
5 4326794.4 27221.6 16
6 3226821.8 27139.7 12
7 4426784.4 27221.6 15
8 2226832.6 27051.2 7
9 5426779.4 27315.9 22
10 2226805.0 27023.5 1
11 2326798.9 27027.4 2
12 2426798.7 27037.2 3
13 3326786.9 27114.7 9
14 4626748.2 27205.2 13
15 3526777.4 27125.1 10
16 4726740.2 27207.2 14
17 2526789.2 27037.6 4
18 5726734.0 27300.3 21
19 5226764.3 27280.9 17
20 5326757.3 27283.9 18
21 5426758.2 27294.7 20
22 6326745.9 27371.8 23
23 7626709.3 27464.4 25
24 6526736.7 27382.4 24
25 7726700.3 27465.3 26
26 5526747.7 27294.1 19
27 8726694.8 27559.1 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
10 vs. 11 6.1 (1) p < 0.05
11 vs. 12 0.2 (1) n.s.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Austria: G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 53 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of 
cleavage change (N = 3,227)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 24 5014.9 5208.8 1 - - - - -
2 26 5012.2 5222.2 5 2b 25 5014.9 5216.9 3
3 26 5013.6 5223.6 6 3b 25 5014.0 5216.0 2
4 36 4988.9 5279.7 24 4b 30 5002.6 5245.0 13
5 36 4994.5 5285.4 26 5b 30 5003.7 5246.1 14
6 38 4986.6 5293.6 27 6b 31 5001.8 5252.2 15
7 38 4990.0 5297.0 29 7b 31 5003.5 5254.0 16
8 28 5009.6 5235.8 10 8b 26 5013.9 5224.0 7
9 48 4968.8 5356.6 42 9b 36 4993.6 5284.4 25
10 30 4999.4 5241.8 12 10b 27 5002.8 5220.9 4
11 32 4995.7 5254.2 17 11b 28 5002.8 5229.0 9
12 32 4998.4 5256.9 18 12b 28 5001.8 5228.0 8
13 42 4972.5 5311.8 31 13b 33 4990.6 5257.2 19
14 42 4980.1 5319.5 34 14b 33 4991.4 5258.1 20
15 44 4970.7 5326.2 36 15b 34 4989.7 5264.4 21
16 44 4975.0 5330.5 37 16b 34 4991.3 5266.0 22
17 34 4993.6 5268.3 23 17b 29 5001.7 5236.0 11
18 54 4953.7 5390.0 44 18b 39 4981.5 5296.5 28
19 58 4957.1 5425.7 45 19b 41 4977.9 5309.1 30
20 60 4953.3 5438.1 46 20b 42 4977.9 53172 33
21 60 4956.0 5440.8 47 21b 42 4977.0 5316.3 32
22 70 4931.5 5497.0 49 22b 46 4965.2 5336.9 38
23 70 4938.8 5504.4 50 23b 47 4966.6 5346.3 39
24 72 4929.7 5511.4 51 24b 48 4964.4 5352.2 40
25 72 4933.8 5515.5 52 25b 48 4966.5 5354.3 41
26 62 4951.3 5452.2 48 26b 43 4976.9 5324.3 35
27 82 4913.3 5575.8 53 27b 53 4956.1 5384.3 43
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
1.vs. 3b 0.9(1) n.s.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Belgium: G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 53 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of 
cleavage change (N = 6,776)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 18 13300.3 13459.1 2 - - - - -
2 20 13294.9 13471.3 7 2b 19 13297.5 13465.1 3
3 20 13290.7 13467.1 5 3b 19 13291.5 13459.0 1
4 24 13276.5 13488.1 20 4b 21 13291.9 13477.1 10
5 24 13276.3 13488.0 19 5b 21 13284.1 13469.3 6
6 26 13269.8 13499.1 29 6b 22 13285.6 13479.6 12
7 26 13274.0 13503.3 32 7b 22 13283.6 13477.6 11
8 22 13287.8 13481.9 15 8b 20 13290.6 13467.0 4
9 30 13262.0 13526.6 41 9b 24 13280.8 13492.5 25
10 24 13285.3 13497.0 28 10b 21 13288.8 13474.0 9
11 26 13280.0 13509.3 36 11b 22 13286.0 13480.0 13
12 26 13275.4 13504.8 34 12b 22 13279.5 13473.6 8
13 30 13261.3 13525.9 40 13b 24 13280.1 13491.8 23
14 30 13260.8 13525.4 39 14b 24 13272.1 13483.8 18
15 32 13254.3 13536.5 42 15b 25 13273.4 13493.9 27
16 32 13258.4 13540.7 43 16b 25 13271.6 13492.1 24
17 28 13272.6 13519.5 38 17b 23 13278.8 13481.6 14
18 36 13246.4 13563.9 46 18b 27 13268.7 13506.9 35
19 36 13235.5 13553.0 44 19b 27 13245.6 13483.7 17
20 38 13230.1 13565.3 47 20b 28 13242.5 13489.4 21
21 38 13225.5 13560.6 45 21b 28 13236.0 13482.9 16
22 42 13212.3 13582.7 50 22b 30 13236.8 13501.4 31
23 42 13211.1 13581.5 49 23b 30 13228.2 13492.8 26
24 44 13205.4 13593.5 51 24b 31 13230.0 13503.5 33
25 44 13208.8 13596.9 52 25b 31 13227.7 13501.1 30
26 40 13222.7 13575.5 48 26b 29 13235.1 13490.8 22
27 48 13197.7 13621.0 53 27b 33 13225.1 13516.2 37
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
3b vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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France: G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 27 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of cleavage 
change (N=17,872)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 13 22651.3 22778.6 5
2 14 22621.1 22758.2 1
3 14 22640.8 22777.9 4
4 20 22613.5 22809.3 10
5 20 22617.4 22813.2 11
6 21 22608.9 22814.5 12
7 21 22593.3 22798.9 9
8 15 22616.5 22763.4 2
9 27 22579.7 22844.1 17
10 16 22638.4 22795.0 8
11 17 22610.1 22776.6 3
12 17 22627.4 22793.9 7
13 23 22602.3 22827.5 14
14 23 22603.8 22829.0 15
15 24 22597.3 22832.3 16
16 24 22581.6 22816.6 13
17 18 22605.1 22781.3 6
18 30 22567.8 22861.5 18
19 34 22559.0 22891.8 22
20 35 22531.8 22874.5 19
21 35 22548.3 22891.0 21
22 41 22523.2 22924.6 24
23 41 22528.3 22929.8 26
24 42 22518.3 22929.5 25
25 42 22506.9 22918.1 23
26 36 22526.9 22879.3 20
27 48 22492.4 22962.4 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
2 vs.8 4.6(1) p<0.05
8 vs.11 6.4(2) p<0.05
11 vs. 3 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Germ any: G oodness-o f-fit s tatis tics of 53 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of 
cleavage change (N= 25,244)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 44 44476.2 44922.2 3 - - - - -
2 46 44455.9 44922.2 2 2b 45 44459.7 44915.8 1
3 48 44442.3 44928.8 6 3b 46 44458.0 44924.3 4
4 74 44415.6 45165.7 20 4b 59 44443.5 45041.5 16
5 103 44368.9 45413.0 34 5b 74 44429.7 45179.8 21
6 78 44392.3 45183.0 23 6b 61 44432.5 45050.8 17
7 105 44359.6 45423.9 35 7b 75 44420.7 45180.9 22
8 50 44432.7 44939.6 9 8b 47 44448.9 44925.3 5
9 133 44325.6 45673.8 42 9b 89 44402.7 45304.9 28
10 50 44452.5 44959.3 12 10b 47 44462.2 44938.6 8
11 52 44433.2 44960.3 13 11b 48 44445.9 44932.4 7
12 54 44418.3 44965.7 14 12b 49 44443.8 44940.5 10
13 80 44393.3 45204.2 26 13b 62 44429.6 45058.1 18
14 109 44344.2 45449.1 37 14b 77 44415.6 45196.1 24
15 84 44369.5 45221.0 27 15b 64 44418.4 45067.1 19
16 111 44335.6 45460.7 39 16b 78 44406.8 45197.4 25
17 56 44409.4 44977.0 15 17b 50 44434.8 44941.7 11
18 139 44302.1 45711.0 44 18b 92 44388.9 45321.4 30
19 134 44370.2 45728.5 45 19b 90 44413.9 45326.2 31
20 136 44351.5 45730.0 46 20b 91 44397.8 45320.2 29
21 138 44336.9 45735.7 47 21b 92 44395.8 45328.3 32
22 164 44311.6 45973.9 49 22b 105 44381.7 45446.0 36
23 193 44262.9 46219.3 51 23b 120 44367.7 45584.1 40
24 168 44288.2 45991.2 50 24b 107 44370.5 45455.1 38
25 195 44254.3 46230.9 52 25b 121 44358.8 45585.4 41
26 140 44328.0 45747.1 48 26b 93 44386.8 45329.5 33
27 223 44220.7 46481.2 53 27b 135 44341.0 45709.4 43
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
2b vs. 2a 3.8 (1) n.s
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Italy: G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 17 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of cleavage 
change (N=9,989)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 26 16660.4 16899.9 7 - - - - -
2 28 16654.8 16912.6 9 2b 27 16655.9 16904.5 8
3 - - - - 3b - - - -
4 41 16630.9 17008.5 14 4b 33 16637.6 16941.5 12
5 - - - - 5b - - - -
6 - - - - 6b - - - -
7 - - - - 7b - - - -
8 - - - - 8b - - - -
9 - - - - 9b - - - -
10 32 16490.9 16785.6 3 10b 29 16495.0 16762.1 1
11 34 16484.3 16797.5 4 11b 30 16490.3 16766.6 2
12 - - - - 12b - - - -
13 47 16461.2 16894.1 6 13b 36 16472.4 16803.9 5
14 - - - - 14b - - - -
15 - - - - 15b - - - -
16 - - - - 16b - - - -
17 - - - - 17b - - - -
18 - - - - 18b - - - -
19 74 16407.2 17088.7 15 19b 50 16461.7 16922.2 10
20 76 16401.3 17101.2 16 20b 51 16457.0 16926.7 11
21 - - - - 21b - - - -
22 89 16378.5 17198.1 17 22b 57 16439.0 16963.9 13
23 - - - - 23b - - - -
24 - - - - 24b - - - -
25 - - - - 25b - - - -
26 - - - - 26b - - - -
27 - - - - 27b - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig
10b vs. 11b 4.7(1) p<0.05
11b vs.10 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
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Netherlands: G ood ness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 53 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of 
cleavage change (N=18,049)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 46 32516.2 32967.1 15 - - - - -
2 48 32434.2 32904.6 6 2b 47 32460.2 32920.8 10
3 50 32442.4 32932.4 11 3b 48 32450.2 32920.6 9
4 78 32354.3 33118.7 23 4b 62 32411.7 33019.3 18
5 110 32312.5 33390.6 39 5b 78 32377.6 33142.0 27
6 82 32314.0 33117.7 22 6b 64 32371.5 32998.7 17
7 112 32269.2 33366.9 36 7b 79 32351.1 33125.3 26
8 52 32394.3 32904.0 5 8b 49 32420.6 32900.8 2
9 142 32218.8 33610.5 43 9b 94 32317.5 33238.8 30
10 52 32456.6 32966.3 14 10b 49 32460.0 32940.2 13
11 54 32375.5 32904.8 7 11b 50 32402.8 32892.8 3
12 56 32383.7 32932.5 12 12b 51 32395.2 32895.1 4
13 84 32295.6 33118.8 24 13b 81 32298.7 33092.6 19
14 116 32252.6 33389.5 38 14b 81 32322.1 33116.0 21
15 88 32256.5 33119.0 25 15b 70 32312.5 32998.6 16
16 118 32210.8 33367.3 37 16b 82 32294.3 33097.9 20
17 58 32336.8 32905.3 8 17b 52 32364.3 32873.9 1
18 148 32160.0 33610.6 44 18b 97 32260.8 33211.4 28
19 142 32313.2 33705.0 48 19b 94 32378.2 33299.5 33
20 144 32233.7 33645.1 45 20b 95 32320.9 33252.0 31
21 146 32241.9 33672.8 47 21b 96 32313.8 33254.7 32
22 174 32157.3 33862.7 49 22b 110 32273.4 33351.5 35
23 206 32122.8 34141.8 52 23b 126 32241.1 33476.0 41
24 178 32119.3 33863.8 50 24b 112 32234.4 33332.1 34
25 208 32081.3 34119.9 51 25b 127 32213.1 33457.8 40
26 148 32196.1 33646.6 46 26b 97 32282.6 33233.3 29
27 238 32031.1 34363.7 53 27b 142 32180.3 33572.0 42
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
17b vs. 8b. n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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Norway: G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 17 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of 
cleavage change (N=7,563)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 18 13322.5 13483.3 4 - - - - -
2 20 13318.1 13496.7 8 2b 19 13318.3 13488.0 5
3 - - - - 3b - - - -
4 26 13306.6 13538.8 13 4b 22 13312.6 13509.0 9
5 - - - - 5b - - - -
6 - - - - 6b - - - -
7 - - - - 7b - - - -
8 - - - - 8b - - - -
9 - - - - 9b - - - -
10 24 13264.6 13479.0 3 10b 21 13281.3 13468.8 1
11 26 13261.0 13493.2 6 11b 22 13276.2 13472.7 2
12 - - - - 12b - - - -
13 32 13249.9 13535.7 12 13b 25 13270.7 13494.0 7
14 - - - - 14b - - - -
15 - - - - 15b - - - -
16 - - - - 16b - - - -
17 - - - - 17b - - - -
18 - - - - 18b - - - -
19 42 13235.7 13610.8 15 19b 30 13260.9 13528.9 10
20 44 13232.1 13625.0 16 20b 31 13256.0 13532.8 11
21 - - - - 21b - - - -
22 50 13221.2 13667.8 17 22b 34 13250.4 13554.1 14
23 - - - - 23b - - - -
24 - - - - 24b - - - -
25 - - - - 25b - - - -
26 - - - - 26b - - - -
27 - - - - 27b - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig
10b vs. 11b 5.1(1) p<0.05
11b vs. 10 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
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Spain: G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 9 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of cleavage
change (N=12,725)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1* 9 15477.4 15562.5 1
2* 10 15474.2 15568.7 2
3 - - - -
4* 13 15462.4 15585.3 5
5 - - - -
6 - - - -
7 - - - -
8 - - - -
9 - - - -
10* 12 15463.2 15576.7 3
11* 13 15459.2 15582.1 4
12 - - - -
13* 16 15447.7 15598.9 6
14 - - - -
15 - - - -
16 - - - -
17 - - - -
18 - - - -
19* 21 15435.5 15634.0 7
20* 22 15430.6 15638.6 8
21 - - - -
22* 25 15420.4 15656.7 9
23 - - - -
24 - - - -
25 - - - -
26 - - - -
27 - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
1 vs. 2. 3.2 (1) n.s
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
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Sweden: G ood ness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 7 m ultinom ia l regression m odels of 
cleavage change (N=9,958)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 20 14351.8 14536.0 2 - - - -
2 22 14334.1 14536.6 3 2b 21 14337.5 14530.8 1
3 - - - - 3b - - - -
4 - - - - 4b - - - -
5 - - - - 5b - - - -
6 - - - - 6b - - - -
7 - - - - 7b - - - -
8 - - - - 8b - - - -
9 - - - - 9b - - - -
10 26 14337.5 14576.9 6 10b 23 14347.3 14559.1 5
11 28 14320.3 14578.0 7 11b 24 14333.0 14554.0 4
12 - - - - 12b - - - -
13 - - - - 13b - - - -
14 - - - - 14b - - - -
15 - - - - 15b - - - -
16 - - - - 16b - - - -
17 - - - - 17b - - - -
18 - - - - 18b - - - -
19 - - - - 19b - - - -
20 - - - - 20b - - - -
21 - - - - 21b - - - -
22 - - - - 22b - - - -
23 - - - - 23b - - - -
24 - - - - 24 b - - - -
25 - - - - 25b - - - -
26 - - - - 26b - - - -
27 - - - - 27b - - - -
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig.
2b vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
* denominational cleavage not measured
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Switzerland: G oodness-o f-fit s tatis tics of 53 m ultinom ia l regression m odels 
of cleavage change (N =9,115)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank) model df. 2LL BIC (rank)
1 24 16755.8 16974.6 12 - - - -
2 26 16755.7 16992.8 18 2b 25 16755.7 16983.7 16
3 28 16721.8 16977.1 14 3b 26 16732.2 16969.2 10
4 34 16748.5 17058.5 33 4b 29 16751.2 17015.6 23
5 43 16702.8 17094.9 40 5b 33 16716.7 17017.5 25
6 38 16714.5 17061.0 34 6b 31 16727.6 17010.3 22
7 45 16702.4 17112.7 41 7b 34 16716.5 17026.5 26
8 30 16721.2 16994.7 19 8b 27 16731.9 16978.1 15
9 53 16694.4 17177.7 48 9b 38 16711.9 17058.3 32
10 30 16648.6 16922.1 1 10b 27 16684.1 16930.3 4
11 32 16648.0 16939.8 7 11b 28 16684.1 16939.4 6
12 34 16615.8 16925.9 2 12b 29 16662.3 16926.7 3
13 40 16641.1 17005.8 20 13b 32 16679.7 16971.5 11
14 49 16597.6 17044.3 31 14b 36 16646.9 16975.2 13
15 44 16608.5 17009.6 21 15b 34 16657.8 16967.8 9
16 51 16596.7 17061.7 35 16b 37 16646.8 16984.1 17
17 36 16614.8 16943.1 8 17b 30 16662.0 16935.5 5
18 59 16588.8 17126.8 45 18b 41 16642.3 17016.1 24
19 54 16629.7 17122.0 43 19b 39 16676.1 17031.7 28
20 56 16629.0 17139.6 46 20b 40 16676.1 17040.8 30
21 58 16597.5 17126.3 44 21b 41 16654.3 17028.1 27
22 64 16621.6 17205.2 49 22b 44 16671.6 17072.8 37
23 73 16578.5 17244.1 51 23b 48 16638.7 17076.3 38
24 68 16589.5 17209.5 50 24b 46 16649.8 17069.2 36
25 75 16577.6 17261.4 52 25b 49 16638.5 17085.3 39
26 60 16596.4 17143.5 47 26b 42 16654.0 17036.9 29
27 83 16569.3 17326.1 53 27b 53 16634.0 17117.3 42
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig
10 vs. 12 34.8(4) p<0.05
12 vs. 12b n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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United Kingdom: G ood ness-o f-fit sta tis tics of 27 m ultinom ia l regression m odels 
of cleavage change (N=16,564)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 15 19906.6 20052.3 2
2 16 19899.1 20054.5 3
3 17 19896.1 20061.3 6
4 23 19892.1 20115.6 9
5 31 19866.6 20167.8 14
6 25 198870 20129.9 12
7 32 19863.5 20174.3 15
8 18 19892.7 20067.6 8
9 39 19858.0 20236.9 20
10 18 19876.6 20051.5 1
11 19 19871.6 20056.2 4
12 20 19864.5 20058.8 5
13 26 19864.4 20117.0 10
14 34 19836.4 20166.7 13
15 28 19857.1 20129.1 11
16 35 19835.0 20175.0 16
17 21 19863.0 20067.0 7
18 42 19829.3 20237.3 21
19 39 19843.9 20222.8 17
20 40 19838.9 20227.5 18
21 41 19831.7 20230.0 19
22 47 19833.0 20289.6 23
23 55 19802.2 20336.5 25
24 49 19825.5 20301.6 24
25 56 19800.8 20344.8 26
26 42 19830.2 20238.2 22
27 63 19796.7 20408.7 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig
10 vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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United States: G oodness-o f-fit s tatis tics of 27 m ultinom ia l regression m odels 
of cleavage change (N=10,585)
model df. -2LL BIC (rank)
1 18 13949.7 14116.5 6
2 19 13949.6 14125.7 8
3 20 13915.9 14101.3 2
4 29 13919.6 14188.3 12
5 40 13857.4 14228.1 14
6 31 13882.5 14169.8 10
7 41 13857.4 14237.4 16
8 21 13915.7 14110.4 4
9 51 13820.0 14292.6 18
10 21 13920.9 14115.5 5
11 22 13920.8 14124.6 7
12 23 13883.5 14096.6 1
13 32 13890.8 14187.3 11
14 43 13824.8 14223.2 13
15 34 13849.6 14164.7 9
16 44 13824.7 14232.5 15
17 24 13883.1 14105.5 3
18 54 13787.9 14288.4 17
19 51 13863.9 14336.5 21
20 52 13863.6 14345.5 22
21 53 13826.1 14317.2 19
22 62 13834.1 14408.6 24
23 73 13768.8 14445.3 25
24 64 13792.4 14385.5 23
25 74 13768.7 14454.5 26
26 54 13825.6 14326.0 20
27 84 13732.8 14511.2 27
Models Decrease -2LL (df) Sig
10 vs. 1 n.a. n.a.
Most optimal model in bold (cf. Table 2)
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B.2 Preferred models of cleavage change
Australia: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression of left vs. right voting 
(N=20,645)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -1.496 0.086
1965 (ref.) - -
1967 0.095 0.089
1979 0.445 0.085
1984 0.152 0.083
1985 0.306 0.097
1986 0.075 0.098
1987 0.380 0.086
1990 0.895 0.096
1993 0.649 0.097
1996 1.101 0.109
1998 1.021 0.110
2001 1.179 0.116
2004 1.115 0.125
No/other religion (ref.) - -
Catholic -0.071 0.044
Protestant 0.482 0.039
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 0.626 0.072
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 1.348 0.089
Routine non-manaul class 0.908 0.103
Self-employed 1.449 0.106
Year*Service class -0.024 0.004
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.011 0.004
Year*Self-employed -0.007 0.004
Year*Church attendance -0.007 0.003
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Austria: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ial 
religion voting (N =3,227)
regression for left. Vs. right vs.
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious Parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -3.21 0.24 -3.24 0.18
1974 (ref.) - - - -
1985 -0.31 0.43 0.72 0.16
1988 0.59 0.28 0.41 0.14
1989 1.36 0.23 0.35 0.13
1995 2.49 0.24 0.43 0.18
1999 2.05 0.26 0.37 0.19
2003 1.56 0.24 0.73 0.14
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.01 0.16 1.07 0.15
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.)
Frequent church attendance 0.14 0.14 1.35 0.10
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 0.19 0.17 1.05 0.11
Routine non-manaul class 0.37 0.17 0.56 0.12
Self-employed 1.76 0.20 2.45 0.14
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Belgium: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression for left. Vs. 
right vs. religion voting (N = 6,776)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious Parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -0.60 0.08 -1.91 0.12
1991 (ref.) - - - -
1995 0.19 0.09 0.23 0.11
1999 0.64 0.08 0.56 0.14
2003 0.03 0.09 -0.01 0.19
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.45 0.07 1.51 0.12
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.32 0.07 1.45 0.08
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 0.54 0.08 0.54 0.09
Routine non-manaul class 0.14 0.08 0.22 0.09
Self-employed 1.59 0.15 1.14 0.16
Year*Catholic a -0.05 0.02
a Param eter estim ate constrained to 0.
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France: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression for left. Vs. 
right voting (N =17,872)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -1.60 0.10
1967 - -
1968 0.66 0.10
1988 0.05 0.09
1995 0.66 0.10
1997 0.45 0.11
2002 0.57 0.11
2006 0.38 0.11
2007 0.64 0.11
No/other religion (ref.) - -
Catholic 0.84 0.04
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 1.25 0.09
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 0.65 0.12
Routine non-manaul class 0.44 0.11
Self-employed 1.18 0.12
Year*Service class -0.01 0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.01 0.00
Year*Self-employed -0.01 0.00
Year*Church attendance -0.02 0.00
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Germ any: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression of left vs. right vs. 
relig ious voting (N=25,244)
Reference category: Left-wing parties
b
Right-wing parties 
s.e. b
Religious parties 
s.e.
Intercept -3.18 0.18 -1.77 0.13
1969 (ref.) - - - -
1975 1.17 0.19 0.12 0.10
1976 1.45 0.18 0.22 0.10
1977 0.91 0.19 0.34 0.10
1978 1.10 0.18 0.28 0.10
1979 0.88 0.18 0.36 0.10
1980 1.20 0.17 0.22 0.10
1984 0.56 0.20 0.62 0.12
1986 1.10 0.19 0.48 0.13
1987 0.72 0.23 0.51 0.15
1988 0.84 0.19 0.39 0.14
1990 1.01 0.19 0.45 0.14
1994 -0.31 0.29 0.30 0.17
1998 -0.06 0.21 0.06 0.17
2002 0.67 0.21 0.44 0.20
2005 1.05 0.20 0.47 0.20
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic -0.01 0.08 1.29 0.11
Protestant 0.04 0.07 0.31 0.11
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.14 0.05 0.75 0.03
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.08 0.06 0.55 0.04
Routine non-manaul class 0.74 0.06 0.46 0.04
Self-employed 1.38 0.09 1.45 0.06
Year*Catholic a -0.02 0.01
Year*Protestant a -0.01 0.01
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.
APPENDiX B! CHAPTER 2
Italy: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression for left. Vs. right voting 
(N=9,989)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e.
Intercept -3.53 0.20 -2.15 0.16
1968 (ref.) - -
1975 -0.35 0.19 -0.45 0.11
1985 0.83 0.17 0.02 0.17
1990 -0.56 0.35 -0.08 0.23
1992 1.80 0.22 0.10 0.24
1994 3.23 0.20 -1.51 0.28
1996 2.64 0.20 -2.39 0.29
2001 3.60 0.23 -2.00 0.37
2006 3.19 0.26 -1.43 0.38
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.79 0.08 2.24 0.16
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 2.77 0.23 0.47 0.09
Routine non-manaul class 1.63 0.22 0.40 0.07
Self-employed 0.71 0.23 0.71 0.07
Year*Service class -0.10 0.01 a
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.06 0.01 a
Year*Self-employed 0.00 0.01 a
Year*Church attendance a -0.02 0.01
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.
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Netherlands: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression of left vs. right vs. 
relig ious voting (N =18,049)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -2.04 0.14 -3.02 0.16
1970 (ref.) - - - -
1971 -0.01 0.18 0.13 0.18
1972 0.19 0.14 -0.32 0.15
1974 -0.08 0.15 -0.42 0.15
1976 0.57 0.16 -0.05 0.17
1977 0.33 0.13 0.09 0.13
1979 0.51 0.17 0.31 0.17
1981 0.90 0.15 0.57 0.15
1982 0.80 0.15 0.24 0.16
1985 0.72 0.14 0.21 0.16
1986 0.70 0.16 0.84 0.17
1989 0.73 0.16 1.00 0.17
1990 1.57 0.16 1.83 0.17
1994 1.88 0.17 0.91 0.20
1998 1.50 0.18 0.70 0.22
2002 1.83 0.20 1.44 0.23
2006 1.12 0.20 1.47 0.22
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.22 0.11 1.63 0.13
Protestant 0.21 0.11 1.46 0.12
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.58 0.10 2.45 0.10
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.73 0.09 0.49 0.10
Routine non-manaul class 1.38 0.10 0.43 0.10
Self-employed 2.07 0.14 1.50 0.14
Year*Catholic a -0.02 0.01
Year*Protestant a 0.01 0.01
Year*Church attendance a -0.04 0.01
Year*Service class -0.03 0.01 a
Year*Routine non-manaul class -0.03 0.01 a
Year*Self-employed -0.03 0.01 a
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.
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Norway: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression for left. Vs. right vs. 
religion voting (N=7,563)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious Parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -0.68 0.09 -2.61 0.15
1981 (ref.) - - - -
1985 -0.01 0.09 0.11 0.15
1989 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.16
1993 0.04 0.12 -0.21 0.18
1997 0.24 0.14 0.78 0.17
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.11 0.08 2.35 0.16
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.50 0.11 0.39 0.11
Routine non-manaul class 0.51 0.12 0.40 0.12
Self-employed 1.63 0.14 0.79 0.14
Year*Church attendance a -0.03 0.01
Year*Service class -0.07 0.01 a
Year*Routine non-manaul class -0.02 0.01 a
Year*Self-employed -0.03 0.01 a
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.
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Spain: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression for left. vs. right voting 
(N =12,725)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -0.85 0.09
1979 - -
1986 -1.02 0.10
2000 0.38 0.09
2004 -0.56 0.09
2008 -0.54 0.09
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 1.08 0.04
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 0.66 0.05
Routine non-manaul class 0.43 0.06
Self-employed 0.83 0.06
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Sweden: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression for left. vs 
relig ious voting (N=9,958)
. right vs.
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -1.03 0.06 -6.44 0.43
1985 - - - -
1988 -0.14 0.07 -0.04 0.29
1991 -0.16 0.07 0.73 0.31
1994 0.15 0.07 2.13 0.36
1998 -0.16 0.08 3.04 0.43
2002 -0.67 0.10 3.10 0.50
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.53 0.05 3.69 0.39
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.74 0.06 1.09 0.18
Routine non-manaul class 0.85 0.05 0.80 0.15
Self-employed 2.19 0.08 1.65 0.20
Year*Church attendance a -0.11 0.03
a Parameter estimate constrained to 0.
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Switzerland: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression of left vs. right vs. 
relig ious voting (N =9,115)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties Religious parties
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -1.08 0.31 -3.56 0.56
1971 - - - -
1975 -0.20 0.15 -0.06 0.21
1979 -0.07 0.19 0.47 0.26
1995 0.80 0.28 1.03 0.49
1999 1.19 0.32 1.71 0.56
2003 1.41 0.35 1.90 0.63
No/other religion (ref.) - - - -
Catholic 0.65 0.31 2.68 0.55
Protestant 0.98 0.30 0.48 0.56
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - - - -
Frequent church attendance 0.28 0.05 1.69 0.08
Manual class (ref.) - - - -
Service class 1.51 0.16 1.13 0.22
Routine non-manaul class 0.52 0.20 0.34 0.26
Self-employed 2.19 0.24 2.16 0.28
Year*Catholic -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.02
Year*Protestant -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02
Year*Service class -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.01
Year*Routine non-manaul class -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Year*Self-employed -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.01
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United Kingdom: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression of left vs. 
right voting (N =16,564)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -0.92 0.09
1964 (ref.) - -
1966 -0.37 0.10
1970 0.03 0.10
1979 0.55 0.10
1983 0.95 0.09
1987 0.88 0.09
1992 0.55 0.09
1997 -0.13 0.10
2005 0.32 0.12
No/other religion (ref.)
Catholic -0.50 0.06
Protestant 0.37 0.04
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 0.24 0.04
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 1.88 0.10
Routine non-manaul class 1.24 0.10
Self-employed 1.82 0.15
Year*Service class -0.02 0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class -0.01 0.00
Year*Self-employed -0.01 0.01
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United States: Param eter estim ations of m ultinom ia l regression of left vs. right 
voting (N=10,585)
Reference category: Left-wing parties Right-wing parties
b s.e.
Intercept -1.74 0.19
1960 (ref.) - -
1964 -0.65 0.12
1968 0.34 0.13
1972 0.92 0.13
1976 0.36 0.14
1980 0.85 0.17
1984 0.91 0.17
1988 0.76 0.19
1992 0.38 0.21
1996 0.42 0.23
2000 0.76 0.25
2004 0.96 0.27
No/other religion (ref.) - -
Catholic 0.56 0.19
Protestant 1.43 0.17
No/Infrequent church attendance (ref.) - -
Frequent church attendance 0.18 0.04
Manual class (ref.) - -
Service class 0.93 0.10
Routine non-manaul class 0.46 0.11
Self-employed 0.48 0.16
Year*Service class -0.02 0.00
Year*Routine non-manual class 0.00 0.00
Year*Self-employed 0.01 0.01
Year*Catholic 0.00 0.01
Year*Protestant -0.02 0.01
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Appendix C: Chapter 3
C.1 Model selection and additional analyses
G oodness-o f-fit sta tis tics of multilevel linear regression m odels of class vo ting 1 
on year
Model df Log Likelihood AIC BIC
Routine non-manual class
Null model 3 -32.77 71.54 81.25
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals) 7 -16.52 47.04 69.69
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals) 11 -11.86 45.72 81.32
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 4 -18.04 44.08 57.02
Random Slope (Linear Year) 6 -17.31 46.62 66.04
Service class
Null model 3 -81.44 168.88 178.58
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals) 7 -45.88 105.77 128.42
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals) 11 -43.43 108.86 144.46
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 4 -45.19 98.38 111.32
Random Slope (Linear Year) 6 -41.06 94.12 113.54
Self-employed
Null model 3 -102.89 211.77 221.48
Random Intercept (10-year Intervals) 7 -87.07 188.13 210.79
Random Intercept (5-year Intervals) 11 -83.77 189.53 225.13
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 4 -86.44 180.89 193.83
Random Slope (Linear Year) 6 -72.19 156.38 175.80
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)
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Likelihood-ra tio  test of multilevel linear regression m odels of class vo ting 1 on 
linear year
Model LRx2 (df) Compared P-value
to
Routine non-manual class
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 29.46 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year) 1.46 (2) Random intercept 0.4819 n.s.
Service class
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 72.50 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year) 8.26 (2) Random intercept 0.0161 **
Self-employed
Random Intercept (Linear Year) 32.88 (1) Null model 0.0000 ***
Random Slope (Linear Year) 28.51 (2) Random intercept 0.0000 ***
* p. < 0.1 * *  p < 0.05 * * *  p < 0.01
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)
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Likelihood-ra tio  test of m ultilevel linear regression m odels of class vo ting 1 on 
LR position of left-w ing parties /  LR party system  polarization
Model
Routine non-manual class
LR%2 (df) Compared 
to
P-value
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties) 
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties)
3.76 (1) 
1.72 (2)
Null model
Random
intercept
0.0659
0.4238
*
n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization) 
Random Slope (LR party system polarization)
8.08 (1) 
2.23 (2)
Null model
Random
intercept
0.0045
0.3271
* * *
n.s.
Service class
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties) 
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties)
6.25 (1) 
0.23 (2)
Null model
Random
intercept
0.0124
0.8927
**
n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization) 
Random Slope (LR party system polarization)
10.53 (1) 
3.57 (2)
Null model
Random
intercept
0.0012
0.1679
* * *
n.s.
Self-employed
Random Intercept (LR position of left-wing parties) 
Random Slope (LR position of left-wing parties)
47.51 (1) 
0.39 (2)
Null model
Random
intercept
0.0000
0.8227
* * *
n.s.
Random Intercept (LR party system polarization) 
Random Slope (LR party system polarization)
48.96 (1) 
1.55 (2)
Null model
Random
intercept
0.0000
0.4616
* * *
n.s.
* p. < 0.1 * *  p < 0.05 * * *  p < 0.01
1 measured in log-odds ratios to vote for a right versus a left party (manual class= reference group)
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CDCT> Second-stage param eter estim ations of m ultilevel linear regression predicting the level of c lass voting m easured in ‘g ross ’ 
(i.e. uncontro lled) log -odds ratios to  vote  for a right versus a left party
log-odds ratio to vote left versus right 
manual working class = reference group
Routine non-manual 
class
Service class Self-employed and 
farmers
Null Model b se b se b se
Fixed Effects
Intercept 0 .534*** 0.071 0.851*** 0.109 1.548*** 0.165
Variance Components
Level 1 Variance 0 .079*** 0.014 0.167*** 0.037 0.131*** 0.021
Level 2 Variance 0 .06 2*** 0.020 0.151*** 0.052 0.364*** 0.114
-2 Loglikelihood 89.9 232.6 202.5
Model I
Fixed Effects
Intercept 0 .559*** 0.072 0 .903*** 0.116 1.562*** 0.170
Linear year * 10 (1985=0) -0.155*** 0.032 -0 .266*** 0.045 -0.152*** 0.053
Variance Components
Level 1 Variance 0 .055*** 0.007 0 .096*** 0.018 0.105*** 0.018
Level 2 Variance 0 .065*** 0.019 0.172*** 0.052 0.381*** 0.116
-2 Loglikelihood 28.9 138.5 165.9
Model II
Fixed Effects
Intercept 0.574*** 0.068 0.915*** 0.113 1.579*** 0.165
Linear year * 10 (1985=0) -0.174*** 0.029 -0.285*** 0.044 -0.192*** 0.039
Variance Components
Level 1 Variance 0 .049*** 0.005 0.079*** 0.016 0 .086*** 0.012
Level 2 Variance 0 .06 0*** 0.018 0.169*** 0.051 0.370*** 0.111
Random Slope linear year 0 .00 6*** 0.004 0.018* 0.009 0.015* 0.008
-2 Loglikelihood 19.6 120.9 142.2
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Appendix D: Chapter 4
D.1. Test of Independence of Irrelevant A lternatives (IIA) of m ultinom ia l logistic 
regression m odels in tab le 4.1 (Ho: Odds are independent of other alternatives)
Hausman test of IIA (N=11.832)
Omitted chi2 df P>chi2 evidence
Model I
Old-Left 223.0 60 0.000 against Ho
New-Left 15.4 60 1.000 for Ho
Religious 10.0 59 1.000 for Ho
Liberal Right 38.9 60 0.984 for Ho
Model II
Old-Left 17.3 62 1.000 for Ho
New-Left -77.2 62 --- --- a
Religious -72.0 62 --- --- a
Liberal Right 473.0 62 0.000 against Ho
Model III
Old-Left 899.8 66 0.000 against Ho
New-Left -80.4 66 --- --- a
Religious -270.2 65 --- --- a
Liberal Right -1500.0 66 --- --- a
Model IV
Old-Left -15.0 78 --- --- a
New-Left -34.6 78 --- --- a
Religious 123.6 76 0.000 against Ho
Liberal Right 177.1 78 0.000 against Ho
a) Negative test statistic indicate that IIA has not been violated
b) Because the Small and Hsiao Test requires randomly dividing the data into subpopulations,
the results differ with each operation. Repeated tests on average suggest no violation of IIA
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Small and Hsiao Test of IIAb (N=11.832)
InL(full) InL(omit) chi2 df P>chi2 evidence
3201.8 -3168.8 66.0 60 0.277 for Ho
4130.9 -4097.9 66.1 60 0.275 for Ho
3780.1 -3759.1 41.9 60 0.963 for Ho
(base)
-3075.2 -3043.3 63.8 64 0.482 for Ho
-3981.1 -3950.9 60.5 64 0.601 for Ho
-3751.1 -3716.2 69.9 64 0.285 for Ho
(base)
2923.82 -2883.0 81.7 68.0 0.123 for Ho
3784.6 -3746.0 77.1 68.0 0.21 for Ho
3396.93 -3355.1 83.6 68.0 0.096 for Ho
(base)
3016.7 -2969.6 94.2 80 0.133 for Ho
3793.5 -3747.6 91.8 80 0.172 for Ho
3450.0 -3413.0 74.1 80 0.664 for Ho
(base)
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